Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., as untimely. The court concluded that the 90-day limitations period provided by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) began to run when a right-to-sue letter issued by the EEOC was first received either by the claimant or by the claimant's counsel. Therefore, because plaintiff initiated this action 93 days after her presumptive receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the district court properly held that her claim was time-barred. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims against defendants under the First and Fourth Amendments and under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401-3422, as well as under state constitutions and various anti-wiretapping, consumer protection, and deceptive trade practices laws. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by holding that it lacked standing, by denying jurisdictional discovery, and by denying it leave to amend its complaint. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not have Article III standing to assert its claims. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery and for leave to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court.

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants had retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that the speech on which plaintiff based her claim was not protected under the First Amendment and that the individual defendants had qualified immunity from suit. The district court held, alternatively, that summary judgment would have been appropriate if the speech had been protected, because the school district would have fired plaintiff even in the absence of the speech. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment; that appellees' rebuttal was subject to credibility questions and hence could not be resolved as a matter of law; and that appellees were not, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing her disability-discrimination complaint against JetBlue. Plaintiff alleged that she required wheelchair assistance as a result of her disability and that JetBlue discriminated against her by failing to provide timely wheelchair assistance. The court affirmed the order of the district court because no private right of action existed for a violation of the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. 41705, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189, did not apply to services provided by an air carrier in an airport terminal used primarily to facilitate air transportation.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court denying her petition to vacate an arbitration decision that rejected her claims, which asserted principally that defendant, her former employer, discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal plaintiff principally contended that the arbitrators' decision should be vacated in light of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (Fair Pay Act), Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The court reviewed the district court's conclusions of law de novo and found plaintiff's contentions to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff, a New York state prisoner who practiced Rastafarianism, sued New York Department of Corrections officials, among others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging inter alia that these two defendants infringed his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by touching his dreadlocks without his consent. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff but awarded him only $1.00 in actual damages. Plaintiff appealed from the part of an amended judgment awarding him $1.50 in attorney's fees and ordering defendants to pay $1.40 of the fee award. Plaintiff contended that the district court erred in concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), capped the maximum possible fee award in this case at 150 percent of the $1.00 monetary judgment. The court agreed with the district court and held that Section 1997e(d)(2) limited the possible award of attorney's fees in this case to 150 percent of the monetary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the amended judgment.

Plaintiff, employed as a security officer by defendant, contended that he was sexually harassed by a co-worker and brought an action against defendant, asserting claims for constructive discharge, hostile environment sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the district court properly granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the retaliation claim because a reasonable employee in plaintiff's situation would not have been deterred from engaging in protected activities. The district court also correctly held that, even assuming the jury could have reasonably found plaintiff on his retaliation claim, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the award of punitive damages because a reasonable jury could find that defendant sought to, and did, address defendant's claims in good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on her claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. The district court granted summary judgment after determining that plaintiff had offered "sham evidence" in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that, in light of plaintiff's inconsistent and contradictory testimony, there was no genuine issue of fact to be decided by a jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Appellants appealed the dismissal of their class action complaint against Nextel, the law firm of Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C. (LMB), and seven of LMB's lawyers (also LMB). Appellants were former clients of LMB who retained the firm to bring discrimination claims against Nextel. The complaint asserted that, inter alia, LMB breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to appellants and the class by entering into an agreement with Nextel in which Nextel agreed to pay: (i) $2 million to LMB to persuade en masse its approximately 587 clients to, inter alia, abandon ongoing legal and administrative proceedings against Nextel, waive their rights to a jury trial and punitive damages, and accept an expedited mediation/arbitration procedure; (ii) another $3.5 million to LMB on a sliding scale as the clients' claims were resolved through that procedure; and (iii) another $2 million to LMB to work directly for Nextel as a consultant for two years beginning when the clients' claims had been resolved. The court held that appellants have alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against LMB for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty and against Nextel for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed pro se an order dismissing his complaint against defendants for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that medical care providers, Christopher Aiken and Dr. James Hohensee, at the Niagara County Jail, were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs during his incarceration at the jail. Plaintiff also appealed from a judgment dismissing his claims against the remaining defendants, alleging that excessive force on the part of corrections officers, Paul Curcione, Jeff Chawer, and Sergeant Tammy Williams. The court held that plaintiff's complaint fell short of alleging a deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Practitioner Aikin and Dr. Hohensee to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend where issues of medical judgment could not be the basis of a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference was lacking. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams for plaintiff's failure to exhaust the requisite administrative review process as to Williams. The court further held that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was satisfied by an untimely filing of a grievance if it was accepted and decided on the merits by the appropriate prison authority. Therefore, plaintiff had met the exhaustion requirement of his original filing and the district court's contrary determination was erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings.