Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17, claiming compensatory damages for disparate treatment and hostile work environment. Plaintiff also brought parallel state law claims and sought backpay and reinstatement under Title VII and attorneys' fees. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's rulings on the post-trial motions regarding backpay, her state law claims, and the hourly rate applied to the award of attorneys' fees. The court held that because a backpay award required a separate inquest, a district court could not deny an award of backpay because it believed that an award of compensatory damages was sufficient. Accordingly, on remand, the district court was directed to hold a separate inquest as to backpay. The court also held that because the district court abused its discretion in its "specific finding" that plaintiff was not entitled to backpay, the district court should consider in the first instance on remand whether plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay. The court further held that plaintiff abandoned her state law claims because she did not pursue the matter diligently. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to remove its "abandonment" reference. The court finally held that the district court's award of attorneys' fees, while perhaps lagging behind the market, was not an abuse of discretion.

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption.

Plaintiff moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel in this appeal from an order of the district court that dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The motions were denied on the ground that plaintiff had filed three or more frivolous lawsuits in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against his former employer, seeking monetary and equitable relief for alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq., and state law. At issue was whether the separation agreement between the parties was unenforceable because its provisions did not comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. 626(f), and applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, that the separation agreement be written in a manner calculated to be understood. The court held that the separation agreement was written in a manner calculated to be understood by the relevant employees of defendant. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that summary judgment should have been denied because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried and that the separation agreement was unenforceable because plaintiff was not advised in writing to consult with an attorney. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the district court granting defendants' motion to dismiss his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the statute of limitations had run on the first of his two causes of action and in dismissing his second cause of action for improper venue. The court vacated and remanded on the grounds that claims brought by an inmate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 32 U.S.C. 1997e(a), were entitled to equitable tolling during the time-period the inmate was exhausting his administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. The court also vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed some of defendants' claims for improper venue and remanded with instructions that the court transfer those claims to the Eastern District of New York if the court deemed it proper to do so upon reexamination of defendants' claims.

Plaintiffs, a father and his children, brought various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that a children's services caseworker entered their home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of the children into state custody. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that the caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all of the claims against him and granted summary judgment in his favor. The court held that the caseworker was not entitled to qualified immunity and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of the allegedly unlawful search of plaintiffs' home; plaintiffs' claims for violations of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; the father's claim for violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and the children's claim for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a federal safety inspector, sued defendant in New York Supreme Court, alleging that defendant used photographs of plaintiff for advertising purposes without his consent in violation of New York State Civil Rights Law 50 and 51. Defendant filed a notice of removal asserting federal subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of its third-party claims and plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that plaintiff's complaint contained no federal claim and therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and remanded back to state court. The court held that, because the district court's decision to remand the case rested on its determination that it was without subject matter jurisdiction, the court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review it. The court held, however, that it did possess appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's purported basis for removal was objectively unreasonable and therefore, the modest size of the award of attorney's fees and costs was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendants appealed from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and entering a permanent injunction barring the Board of Education of the City of New York ("Board") from enforcing a rule that prohibited outside groups from using school facilities after hours for "religious worship services." At issue was whether the rule constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The court held that because the rule did not exclude expressions of religious points of view or of religious devotion, but excluded for valid non discriminatory reasons only a type of activity, the conduct worship services, the rule did not constitute viewpoint discrimination. The court also held that because defendants reasonably sought by this rule to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, the exclusion of religious worship services was a reasonable content-based restriction, which did not violate the Free Speech Clause. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the injunction barring enforcement of the rule against plaintiffs was vacated.

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued defendants pro se alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law where plaintiff was charged with a traffic violation by a state trooper and where plaintiff alleged that the charge was false and that the trooper's actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to reopen his case, which the district court had administratively closed, because of plaintiff's failure to obtain counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion where the inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel was not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.