Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, an association of authors and several individual authors, filed suit against Google alleging that it committed copyright infringement through the Library Project of its "Google Books" search tool by scanning and indexing more than 20 million books and making available for public display "snippets" of most books upon a user's search. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's grant of class certification. The court believed that the resolution of Google's fair use defense in the first instance would necessarily inform and perhaps moot the court's analysis of many class certification issues and that holding the issue of certification in abeyance until Google's fair use defense has been resolved would not prejudice the interests of either party. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider the fair use issues. View "The Authors Guild Inc., et al. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Intervenors appealed the district court's denial of their motion to intervene in a suit where the lead plaintiff and other putative class members alleged that defendants had made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in the offering and sale of certain financial instruments which they purchased. The court held that: (1) American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah's tolling rule did not apply to the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77m; and (2) absent circumstances that would render the newly asserted claims independently timely, neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 nor the Rule 15(c) "relation back" doctrine permitted members of a putative class, who were not named parties, to intervene in the class action as named parties in order to revive claims that were dismissed from the class complaint for want of jurisdiction. The proposed intervenors could not circumvent Section 13's statute of repose by invoking American Pipe or Rule 15(c). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court partially denied the motions to intervene. View "In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their Second Amended Class Action Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs challenged the veracity of certain advertisements in which Time Warner allegedly described its Road Runner Internet service. Plaintiffs asserted that Time Warner's allegedly deceptive advertisements violated New York General Business Law 349 and various California consumer protection statutes, and gave rise to claims for common law fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The court concluded that the allegations of the Complaint were materially inconsistent with the sole advertisement plaintiffs have submitted. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims lacked the facial plausibility necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fink v. Time Warner Cable" on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former customers of Sterling Foster, for which Bear Stearns, as a clearing broker, performed certain settlement and record-keeping functions, alleged that Bear Stearns violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), by participating in Sterling Foster's market manipulation scheme. Bear Stearns pursued this interlocutory appeal from a decision and order of the district court granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations failed to trigger a duty of disclosure to Sterling Foster's clients such that the Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States presumption of reliance applied. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Levitt v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated action sought relief on behalf of two large putative classes - one whose members bought auction rate securities and one whose members issued them - alleging that defendants triggered the market's collapse by conspiring with each other to simultaneously stop buying auction rate securities for their own proprietary accounts. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs' complaints did not successfully allege a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Although the court did not reach the district court's implied-repeal analysis under Credit Suisse Securities (USC) LLC v. Billing, the district court was ultimately correct that the complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether plaintiff had stated plausible claims under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. The court held that allegations in the complaint stated a plausible claim that the offering documents for the security misstated the applicable underwriting standards in violation of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15. The court also held that the alleged misstatements were not immaterial as a matter of law. Finally, the court vacated the district court's holding that plaintiff, even as the representative of a proposed class, lacked standing to pursue claims based on securities in which it had not invested. Rather than addressing this issue, the court instructed the district court to reconsider it in light of the court's intervening opinion in NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. The Royal Bank of Scotland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a purported class of similarly situated employees, appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the New York Labor Law (NYLL), NYLL 663(1). Plaintiffs alleged that CHS failed to compensate them adequately for time worked during meal breaks, before and after scheduled shifts, and during required training sessions. The court affirmed the dismissal of the FLSA and RICO claims for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of the NYLL overtime claims, which have the same deficiencies as the FLSA overtime claims. However, because the district court did not explain why plaintiffs' NYLL gap-time claims were dismissed with prejudice, the court vacated that aspect of the judgment and remanded for further consideration. View "Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc." on Justia Law

Kentucky commenced this action in Kentucky state court against Purdue, alleging that Purdue violated Kentucky law by misleading health care providers, consumers, and government officials regarding the risks of addiction associated with the prescription drug OxyContin, which Purdue manufactures, markets, and sells. Following transfer from the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Southern District of New York, the district court granted Kentucky's motion to remand, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit did not meet the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, requirements. Purdue appealed the remand order under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court held that the district court correctly determined that Kentucky's action was not a class action as defined in CAFA, and therefore the case was properly remanded. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal was denied. View "Purdue Pharma, L. P. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky" on Justia Law

In this action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, the court considered whether, following the approval of a federal class action settlement, the district court properly enjoined a state court action for legal malpractice directed at counsel for the plaintiff class. The court held that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act could not form the basis for the district court's injunction of the state court action, as the limited circumstances in which the injunction of an in personam action could be appropriate "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction were not present in this case. The court also concluded that where, as here, the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the reasonableness of counsel's representation, a subsequent malpractice action could be enjoined under the relitigation exception. View "Barroway v. Computer Assoc., et. al." on Justia Law