Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Plaintiff SeanPaul Reyes, who frequently posts videos of his interactions with police on YouTube, challenged a New York City Police Department (NYPD) policy that prohibits video recording inside police facilities. Reyes, who had been arrested twice for recording inside police stationhouses, argued that the policy violated his rights under the First Amendment and the New York State and New York City Right to Record Acts (RTRAs). He sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the policy and to remove signs stating the policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Reyes a preliminary injunction based on his state and local law claims, despite finding that he was unlikely to succeed on his First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Reyes demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his RTRAs claims, irreparable harm, and that the public interest favored an injunction.The City of New York appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims and in finding that Reyes met the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction or its determination of irreparable harm. However, the court noted that the resolution of whether Reyes is likely to succeed on the merits and whether the public interest favors an injunction depends on the interpretation of the RTRAs.Given the lack of clear guidance from New York courts on whether the RTRAs afford a right to record inside police stationhouses, the Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: Does either N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-p or N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 14-189 afford individuals the right to video record law enforcement activities inside public facilities, specifically inside the publicly accessible lobbies of police stationhouses, notwithstanding the NYPD policy forbidding such recording? The decision on the appeal is reserved pending the response from the New York Court of Appeals. View "Reyes v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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William Hines was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for receipt and possession of child pornography found on his cellphone and laptop. Hines had pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cellphone. Hines argued that his girlfriend, K.S., acted as an agent of the police when she used his password to unlock his cellphone, observed child pornography, and showed the images to a police officer, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights.The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent when she unlocked the phone and showed the images to the police officer. The court concluded that the private search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the burden lies with the defendant to show that a private search constituted governmental action implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court found no error in the district court's determination that Hines failed to meet this burden. The court concluded that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent, and thus, the private search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search warrant was admissible. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hines" on Justia Law

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Selim Zherka, a convicted felon, challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Zherka argued that because his felony was nonviolent, Congress could not deprive him of his Second Amendment right to bear arms. He also claimed a due process right to an individualized assessment of dangerousness before being deprived of this right. Zherka sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him and an injunction preventing the government from enforcing it against him.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Zherka’s claims. The court held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to him and that he had no right to a hearing before the application of a categorical prohibition. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s assurance in District of Columbia v. Heller that longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful. The court also rejected Zherka’s due process claim, citing Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, which held that procedural due process does not require a hearing to prove or disprove facts irrelevant under the challenged statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Second Amendment does not prohibit Congress from disarming convicted felons, including those convicted of nonviolent felonies. The court found that there is a historical tradition of legislative disarmament of classes of people perceived as dangerous, which supports the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The court also concluded that Zherka had no procedural due process right to an individualized assessment of dangerousness before being disarmed under the statute. View "Zherka v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant met a sixteen-year-old runaway in the Bronx and, along with two associates, lured her to their apartment. There, they gave her drug-laced alcohol, sexually assaulted her, and began prostituting her over a period of three weeks. The group took explicit photos, posted online advertisements, arranged clients, and used violence and threats to control the victim. Although the victim initially claimed to be eighteen, the defendant and his associates became suspicious of her age and eventually learned she was sixteen, but continued the operation. The defendant left the group after being injured in a shooting, but remained in contact with his co-conspirators. The victim was eventually rescued by law enforcement, and the defendant was arrested after several months as a fugitive.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. The government charged the defendant with sex trafficking conspiracy, sex trafficking a minor, and conspiracy to use interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts. The defendant moved for acquittal on the sex trafficking count, arguing that the government failed to prove he knew the victim was underage, and objected to the jury instructions, claiming the relevant statutory language was unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), which allows conviction for sex trafficking a minor if the defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim, is not unconstitutionally vague. The court also found no error in the district court’s use of a general verdict form rather than a special verdict form. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

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Mary Doe, a social worker proceeding under a pseudonym, challenged New York’s Reproductive Health Act (RHA), arguing it violated constitutional rights. Doe sought to represent a class of viable fetuses, claiming the RHA’s decriminalization of abortion and elimination of fetal homicide laws harmed them. She also sought to amend her complaint post-judgment to include a specific fetus, "Baby Nicholas," alleging he faced harm due to the RHA.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Doe’s claims for lack of standing, denying her motion to be appointed as "next friend" to the fetuses, citing her lack of a significant relationship with them. The court also denied her post-judgment motion to amend the complaint, finding it futile as Baby Nicholas lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the district court erred in requiring a significant relationship for next friend appointments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). However, it affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s claims on the grounds that she failed to identify or describe any specific member of the viable fetus class, thus failing to establish a live case or controversy under Article III.Regarding the post-judgment motion, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial, concluding that Baby Nicholas lacked standing. The court found that the alleged risks to Baby Nicholas were not imminent and traceable to the RHA, as required for standing. The potential harm from a third party was not sufficiently connected to the RHA’s provisions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, maintaining the dismissal of Doe’s claims and denying the motion to amend the complaint. View "Doe v. Hochul" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Mansoor Hamoud Hadwan, a natural-born U.S. citizen, has been stranded in Yemen for twelve years. In 2013, he visited the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen, to apply for immigration paperwork for his children. During this visit, embassy staff retained his Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) and U.S. passport. Nine months later, the U.S. Department of State formally revoked both documents, alleging they were fraudulently obtained. Hadwan was unable to attend his hearing challenging the revocation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the State Department's decision to revoke Hadwan's documents. The court found that Hadwan had waived most of his arguments by not presenting them at the agency hearing, which he was not permitted to attend. The court also found that the State Department's hearing process did not violate due process requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the State Department erred in two ways. First, the decision to uphold the revocation was arbitrary and capricious, violating the Administrative Procedure Act, because it failed to consider material, undisputed facts about Hadwan’s English literacy, which raised doubts about the reliability of his alleged confession statement. Second, the State Department violated Hadwan’s constitutional due process rights by revoking his documents without providing him an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. The court reversed the district court's judgment and the State Department's decision, ordering the State Department to return Hadwan’s CRBA and expired passport so he may reapply for a new passport if he chooses. View "Hadwan v. US Dep't of State" on Justia Law

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A group of landlords and property owners in New York's Hudson Valley region challenged the constitutionality of the 2023 amendments to New York's rent stabilization law. These amendments, known as the Vacancy Provisions, allow municipalities to impose civil penalties on landlords who do not cooperate with vacancy surveys and to presume zero vacancies for nonresponsive landlords. The landlords argued that these provisions authorize warrantless searches of their records without an opportunity to challenge the searches' scope, violating the Fourth Amendment, and that they prevent landlords from contesting vacancy calculations, violating procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim. The landlords appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Vacancy Provisions are facially valid under the Fourth Amendment because landlords have adequate pre-compliance review available under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court also found that the searches authorized by the Vacancy Provisions are not unreasonable in every situation, given the ample notice and minimal penalties involved. Additionally, the court held that the Vacancy Provisions do not violate procedural due process because landlords can contest vacancy calculations at public hearings before rent stabilization is adopted and through Article 78 after adoption. View "Hudson Shore v. State of New York" on Justia Law

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Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law

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Darrell Robinson was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), after law enforcement officers found six firearms in his vehicle during a search. Robinson pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district court also imposed a special condition of supervised release that allowed for the search of Robinson’s electronic devices upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of a condition of supervision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) without modification and imposed the special search condition as recommended in the PSR. Robinson did not object to the PSR or the special condition during sentencing but later moved to correct the judgment, arguing that the electronic search condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. The district court denied the motion, finding that it had met its obligation by referencing the PSR.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Robinson’s appeal, where he argued that the electronic search condition was not orally pronounced, was procedurally unreasonable, and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that the district court’s reference to the PSR was sufficient to impose the special condition, and the need for the condition was self-evident given Robinson’s extensive criminal history and dishonesty with law enforcement. The court also held that the condition, which required reasonable suspicion, did not violate Robinson’s Fourth Amendment rights due to his diminished expectation of privacy while on supervised release.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the special condition of supervised release allowing for the search of Robinson’s electronic devices. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law