Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On April 10, 2008, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree by a New York state-court jury. The court sentenced him to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of twenty years to life for the murder count and five to fifteen years for the weapon possession count. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent, the Warden of the facility in which Petitioner is imprisoned, moved to dismiss a subset of the claims in the petition on the ground that they were time-barred under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1). The district court agreed and entered an order supported by a memorandum decision granting the motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and sought a certificate of appealability. The Second Circuit granted a certificate of appealability. Petitioner contends that under Section 2244(d)(1), all the claims raised in his petition were timely because at least one claim asserted therein was timely filed within the applicable one-year limitations period.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that Section 2244(d)(1)’s statute of limitations requires a claim-by-claim approach. The court explained that Petitioner’s sole argument in support of his entitlement to equitable tolling is that his lawyer told him the wrong deadline for filing a habeas petition that included the arguments that he advanced in his direct appeal. But this argument has been squarely foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling and properly dismissed his claims as time-barred. View "Clemente v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was barred from proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because he had accumulated three “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). At issue on appeal is whether (1) a res judicata dismissal and (2) a dismissal of an entire complaint on several alternative grounds—one of which qualifies as a strike under existing precedent—can constitute strikes under Section 1915(g).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 1915(g) bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP, absent a showing of imminent danger, if on three or more occasions while incarcerated, he has brought an action or an appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court reasoned that Section 1915(g) does not provide Plaintiff an opportunity to relitigate his prior cases. The court considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and concluded they are meritless. The district court correctly concluded that Griffin was barred by the PLRA’s three strikes provision from proceeding IFP, and, therefore, properly dismissed his complaint. View "Griffin v. Carnes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an aspiring sidewalk counselor, brought a First Amendment challenge to Westchester County’s recently enacted “bubble zone” law, which makes it illegal to approach within eight feet of another person for the purpose of engaging in “oral protest, education, or counseling” when inside a one-hundred-foot radius of a reproductive health care facility. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff lacks standing to mount a pre-enforcement challenge to the bubble zone law and that, in any event, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) forecloses her First Amendment claim.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of standing. The court nevertheless affirmed the judgment on the merits because the district court correctly concluded that Hill is dispositive of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Plaintiff has standing to seek pre-enforcement relief because she has pleaded sufficient facts to support a credible threat that Westchester County will enforce the bubble zone law if she pursues her stated intention to engage in sidewalk counseling. View "Vitagliano v. County of Westchester" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed successive habeas corpus petitions challenging their convictions and mandatory sentences imposed by the district court. The district court held that their substantive RICO convictions, on which their Section 924(c) convictions were based, were valid “crimes of violence.”This appeal focuses on their convictions under Count Thirteen of the indictment, which charged them with using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), based on an offense charged in Count One, racketeering activity in violation of RICO.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the jury was instructed that it could base Petitioners’ Section 924(c) convictions upon a predicate offense, which, according to the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretations of the term, was not a “crime of violence.” The jury’s findings rendered under those (later determined to be erroneous) instructions do not specify whether it found that the defendants committed a variation of New York larceny by extortion that necessarily requires the actual or threatened use of force. Nor did the written jury findings specify whether the predicate offense related to second-degree grand larceny by extortion was the substantive offense or conspiracy or attempt to commit the offense. Nonetheless, reviewing the jury’s verdict in relation to the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded with a high degree of confidence that, if properly instructed, the jury would have predicated Petitioners’ Section 924(c) convictions on a valid crime of violence. View "U.S. v. Colotti" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery and of the brandishing of a firearm during two crimes of violence (i.e., the charged robberies). Defendant argued that the district court erred (1) in relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine to deny his motion to suppress evidence obtained through warrants supported by concededly defective affidavits and (2) in charging the jury that a gun constitutes a firearm and refusing to give his requested jury instruction.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s firearms convictions. The court agreed with Defendant that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in the circumstances of this case, and because the conceded misstatements in the affidavits were material to the issuing magistrate judges’ probable cause determinations, remand is required for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine if the challenged evidence was admissible under the standard identified in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). As to the jury charge, the district court erred in instructing the jury that a gun is a firearm. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that this error was harmless as a matter of law. View "United States v. Lauria (Molina)" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances after a search warrant was executed against his residence. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement seized from the search. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision. Defendant challenged the search warrant’s validity. He argued that the district court should have given him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in the supporting affidavit.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that any of the three statements Defendant scrutinized were false material statements that the Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit. He succeeds only at identifying inconsistent statements—and discrete details within them—that is immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Further, Defendant impugns only the CI’s veracity, not the Officers’. Accordingly, the court held that he is not entitled to a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Domenico Sandalo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a district court judgment imposing, among other things, special conditions of supervised release making Defendant’s internet and computer access contingent on his compliance with computer monitoring terms devised by the U.S. Probation Office. Defendant challenges both the court’s special conditions themselves and the computer monitoring terms they contemplate on procedural reasonableness, substantive reasonableness, and improper delegation grounds.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s appeal raises legitimate concerns, nearly all of those concerns can be resolved by construing his computer monitoring restrictions to avoid the troublesome implications that, in a few cases, an expansive reading might suggest. The court wrote that although “the defendant, the public, and appellate courts should not be required to engage in guesswork about the rationale for a particular sentence,” it requires no “guesswork” to understand why the district court imposed the conditions it imposed in this case. Given the nature both of Defendant’s underlying offense and of his repeated violations of supervised release, the longstanding general computer monitoring requirement that Defendant has never (including now) objected to, and the officer’s justification for the recommended updates, the district court’s rationale for imposing this sort of computer monitoring program was apparent on this record. Thus, the court discerned no procedural error in the sentence it imposed. View "United States of America v. Kunz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against several police officers and the City of New York, asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York state law based on his allegation that police officers falsely claimed that they observed him selling drugs. After his criminal trial, Plaintiff was acquitted of a drug sale charge and convicted of a drug possession charge. Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil action, and the district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims and remanded. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s dismissal of all of the federal claims except for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim based on the use of fabricated evidence regarding the drug sale charge of which he was acquitted. Specifically, the district court erred in concluding that because Plaintiff was arrested, detained, prosecuted, and convicted for drug possession simultaneous to the drug sale proceedings, this precludes, as a matter of law, his ability to plead a deprivation of liberty caused by the drug sale prosecution. Because the prosecution of an individual based on fabricated evidence may itself constitute a deprivation of liberty, even in the absence of custody or a conviction, Plaintiff was not required to show that his drug sale prosecution resulted in additional custody or a conviction in order to sufficiently allege a claim at the pleading stage. View "Barnes v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a jury verdict finding him guilty of nine narcotics and money-laundering offenses, including operating a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”). Defendant challenged his conviction primarily on two grounds. First, he argued that his indictment insufficiently stated the CCE count because it did not identify the conduct constituting the “continuing series of violations” that 21 U.S.C. Section 848(c)(2) requires. Second, Defendant argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury when it construed Section 848(b)(2)(A) to allow aggregation of drug amounts across the continuing series of violations rather than requiring that a single narcotics offense “involve” at least 150 kilograms of cocaine.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the indictment was sufficient under the court’s previous decision in United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2002). The court wrote it was not persuaded by Defendant’s challenge to his indictment because the indictment satisfies the test the court announced in United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2002). In fact, the indictment here is not meaningfully different from the one the court considered in Flaharty. The court agreed, however, with Defendant’s interpretation of Section 848(b)(2)(A). That provision requires the threshold drug amount to be “involved” in a single felony violation of the drug laws. The district court’s interpretation, which permitted aggregation, was erroneous. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence introduced against Defendant. As a result, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction on all counts. View "United States v. Montague" on Justia Law