Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances after a search warrant was executed against his residence. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement seized from the search. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision. Defendant challenged the search warrant’s validity. He argued that the district court should have given him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in the supporting affidavit.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that any of the three statements Defendant scrutinized were false material statements that the Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit. He succeeds only at identifying inconsistent statements—and discrete details within them—that is immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Further, Defendant impugns only the CI’s veracity, not the Officers’. Accordingly, the court held that he is not entitled to a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Domenico Sandalo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a district court judgment imposing, among other things, special conditions of supervised release making Defendant’s internet and computer access contingent on his compliance with computer monitoring terms devised by the U.S. Probation Office. Defendant challenges both the court’s special conditions themselves and the computer monitoring terms they contemplate on procedural reasonableness, substantive reasonableness, and improper delegation grounds.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s appeal raises legitimate concerns, nearly all of those concerns can be resolved by construing his computer monitoring restrictions to avoid the troublesome implications that, in a few cases, an expansive reading might suggest. The court wrote that although “the defendant, the public, and appellate courts should not be required to engage in guesswork about the rationale for a particular sentence,” it requires no “guesswork” to understand why the district court imposed the conditions it imposed in this case. Given the nature both of Defendant’s underlying offense and of his repeated violations of supervised release, the longstanding general computer monitoring requirement that Defendant has never (including now) objected to, and the officer’s justification for the recommended updates, the district court’s rationale for imposing this sort of computer monitoring program was apparent on this record. Thus, the court discerned no procedural error in the sentence it imposed. View "United States of America v. Kunz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against several police officers and the City of New York, asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York state law based on his allegation that police officers falsely claimed that they observed him selling drugs. After his criminal trial, Plaintiff was acquitted of a drug sale charge and convicted of a drug possession charge. Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil action, and the district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims and remanded. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s dismissal of all of the federal claims except for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim based on the use of fabricated evidence regarding the drug sale charge of which he was acquitted. Specifically, the district court erred in concluding that because Plaintiff was arrested, detained, prosecuted, and convicted for drug possession simultaneous to the drug sale proceedings, this precludes, as a matter of law, his ability to plead a deprivation of liberty caused by the drug sale prosecution. Because the prosecution of an individual based on fabricated evidence may itself constitute a deprivation of liberty, even in the absence of custody or a conviction, Plaintiff was not required to show that his drug sale prosecution resulted in additional custody or a conviction in order to sufficiently allege a claim at the pleading stage. View "Barnes v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a jury verdict finding him guilty of nine narcotics and money-laundering offenses, including operating a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”). Defendant challenged his conviction primarily on two grounds. First, he argued that his indictment insufficiently stated the CCE count because it did not identify the conduct constituting the “continuing series of violations” that 21 U.S.C. Section 848(c)(2) requires. Second, Defendant argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury when it construed Section 848(b)(2)(A) to allow aggregation of drug amounts across the continuing series of violations rather than requiring that a single narcotics offense “involve” at least 150 kilograms of cocaine.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the indictment was sufficient under the court’s previous decision in United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2002). The court wrote it was not persuaded by Defendant’s challenge to his indictment because the indictment satisfies the test the court announced in United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2002). In fact, the indictment here is not meaningfully different from the one the court considered in Flaharty. The court agreed, however, with Defendant’s interpretation of Section 848(b)(2)(A). That provision requires the threshold drug amount to be “involved” in a single felony violation of the drug laws. The district court’s interpretation, which permitted aggregation, was erroneous. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence introduced against Defendant. As a result, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction on all counts. View "United States v. Montague" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a), which prohibits using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct. The jury also convicted Defendant of possessing and distributing child pornography based on different images found on his phone. The district court sentenced Defendant to 70 years in prison. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the production charge, that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement based on a finding that he was a repeat and dangerous offender and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant “used” a minor “to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct” under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) when he filmed himself masturbating near the victim, directed his conduct toward her, and framed the visual depiction to show that she was a passive participant in his sexual activity. Further, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in applying the five-level repeat-and-dangerous-offender enhancement because sufficient evidence supported the finding that Defendant abused the victim. Finally, the court held that Defendant’s sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Osuba" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Virginia-licensed mental health counselor, appealed from a district court judgment dismissing her First Amendment and Due Process challenges to a New York law requiring her to obtain a further license in that state to provide mental health counseling to New York residents. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) dismissing her as-applied challenges for lack of standing, (2) construing her First Amendment facial challenge as alleging overbreadth and concluding therefrom that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and (3) overlooking her facial Due Process claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff need not satisfy the particular requirements for initial licensure to provide mental health counseling to New York residents, she can allege no injury from, and therefore has no standing to challenge, that part of the law. Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court explained that New York’s license requirement withstands intermediate scrutiny as a matter of law because there is no question that the law (i) serves an important government interest in promoting and protecting public health, specifically, public mental health; and (ii) is narrowly tailored by statutory definition and exemptions to advance that interest without unduly burdening speech. View "Brokamp v. James" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 57 months imprisonment following his plea of guilty to one count of wire fraud. Defendant argued that the district court incorrectly applied a two-level obstruction enhancement and improperly denied him a three-level sentence reduction.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1’s obstruction enhancement to Defendant’s sentence and did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1’s acceptance of responsibility reduction. The court explained that at least two of the forged letters satisfy Section 3C1.1’s materiality requirement, which makes the application of the obstruction enhancement proper. In deciding whether to apply the sentence reduction, a district court considers factors such as the defendant’s “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations.” U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1 application note 1(b). Here, the district court observed that Defendant’s forgery of the sentencing letters resembled the forgeries he submitted as part of the donation scheme, indicating that Defendant had not abandoned his criminal conduct. These were appropriate considerations. View "U.S. v. Strange" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a), which prohibits using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct. The jury also convicted Defendant of possessing and distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A, based on different images found on his phone. The district court sentenced Defendant to 70 years in prison. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the production charge, that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement based on a finding that he was a repeat and dangerous offender and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that because Defendant took actions designed to depict the minor as the passive recipient of his sexual actions, the court concluded, on the particular facts of this case, that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant used the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct. The court further concluded that the evidence supported the enhancement and that the sentence was not shockingly high in light of Defendant’s conduct. View "United States v. Osuba" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing all claims against Defendants-Newburgh Enlarged City School District, Superintendent, and Assistant Superintendent. Plaintiff, an African American woman of West Indian descent who served as principal of South Middle School, asserts claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Title VII claim to the extent the claim is based on alleged adverse employment actions in May 2019 and vacated the district court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed the Section 1983 claim and the remainder of the Title VII claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, including a determination as to whether Plaintiff should be provided with an extension of time to effectuate proper service as to the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent. The court explained that taking the allegations in the FAC as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the FAC meets that pleading standard with respect to the denial of the position for RISE administrator, the denial of her application to administer the summer-school program, and the termination of her position as SMS principal. Accordingly, the court explained that Plaintiff has stated plausible discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1983, and the district court erred in dismissing them. Therefore, Plaintiff may proceed with her Section 1983 claim as to all three alleged adverse employment actions and with her Title VII claim against the School District. View "Buon v. Spindler, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former New York State prisoner, sued defendants-appellants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for purportedly violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when they denied his judicially ordered enrollment in New York's Shock Incarceration Program, thereby potentially extending his period of confinement. The district court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated clearly established law.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, reversed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Eighth Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails at the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: it was not clearly established at the time of Defendants' conduct that denying a prisoner the opportunity to obtain early release from his sentence of confinement by denying judicially ordered entry into the Shock program would violate the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that given the liberty interest at stake and the clarity of the statutory law, Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants' actions were egregious, shocking to the conscience, and unreasonable. View "Michael Matzell v. Anthony J. Annucci et al." on Justia Law