Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The government petitions for a panel rehearing of so much of the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), as ruled that the 2015 removal of naloxegol from the federal controlled substances schedules promulgated under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), 21 U.S.C. Sections 801-971, rendered those schedules categorically narrower than the New York drug schedules applicable to Defendant’s 2002 state-law conviction. The government's petition suggests that that ruling in the court’s opinion ("Opinion") was dictum rather than a holding and asks that the court issue an amended opinion so stating.   The Second Circuit granted rehearing in order to note the government's various positions on the comparability of the state and federal drug schedules and to flag some defects in the petition's characterizations of the record. However, the court denied the request for an amended opinion. The court explained that the comparability of the New York's 2002 drug schedules and the current federal drug schedules was an issue that the district court was required to, and did, decide in order to make a determination as to what Defendant’s Guidelines sentence would be. This Court was required to and did, determine whether the district court's decision was correct. View "USA v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are individuals who own apartment buildings in New York City that are subject to the relevant Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the New York Rent Stabilization Law was unconstitutional, both facially and as applied. The court held that Plaintiffs did not establish that application of the RSL resulted in a physical taking. The court also held that the RSL did not "go to far" in determining how private landowners can use their property. The court went on to reject Plaintiff's as-applied challenges to the RSL. View "74 Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals who own apartment buildings in New York City subject to the relevant Rent Stabilization Law (RSL), appealed from a district court judgment. The court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs alleged that the RSL, as amended in 2019, effected, facially, an unconstitutional physical and regulatory taking. The District Court held that Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to state claims for violations of the Takings Clause.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Here, the RSL is part of a comprehensive regulatory regime that governs nearly one million units. Like the broad public interests at issue in Penn Central, here, the legislature has determined that the RSL is necessary to prevent “serious threats to the public health, safety and general welfare.” Further, the Landlords urged the Court to consider two additional, less commonly cited Penn Central factors that, they argued, tend to show that the RSL results in a regulatory taking: noxious use and a lack of a reciprocal advantage. Even assuming for the sake of argument that these factors apply, the claims fail. View "Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of extortion for threatening to disseminate nude photographs of Jane Doe if she did not return to a relationship with him. Defendant appealed, arguing that the plea proceedings were defective because the district court did not explain the “wrongfulness” element of extortion under United States v. Jackson. He also challenged two special conditions of supervised release on First Amendment grounds: (1) a requirement that Defendant seek retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe and her brother-in-law, John Doe, and (2) a requirement that he seek approval from the district court before publishing any further information about them.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the plea proceedings were not defective because the district court correctly determined that Defendant understood the “nature of each charge” to which he pled. Second, the special condition that Defendant seeks retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe and John Doe has expired, so Defendant’s challenge to that condition is moot. Finally, the special condition that Defendant seeks approval from the district court before publishing further information about Jane Doe and John Doe does not violate the First Amendment under the circumstances here. Defendant pled guilty to extortion by threatening to publish nude images of Jane Doe, and he is a journalist who had published or threatened to publish information about her and John Doe in the past. So the district court acted within its broad discretion by imposing the narrowly tailored special condition requiring Defendant to obtain approval from the court before publishing any further information about them. View "United States v. Farooq" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Seneca Nation brought a lawsuit seeking relief from New York State, the New York Thruway Authority, and the Thruway Authority’s Executive Director (collectively “Defendants”) for ongoing use of an invalid easement over its tribal land. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. Defendants contend that the Nation is collaterally estopped from bringing this present action based on a 2004 judgment of this court and that this lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Seneca Nation does not assert property rights over land to which New York State has traditionally held the title and does not seek a declaration that the State’s laws and regulations do not apply to the area in dispute. Therefore, the quiet title exception to Ex parte Young outlined by the Court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no application here. Accordingly, the lawsuit falls under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, neither collateral estoppel nor the Eleventh Amendment bars the Nation from proceeding in this case. View "Seneca Nation v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 36 months in prison following his conviction by a jury of witness retaliation. Defendant challenged the manner in which the district court conducted jury selection, arguing primarily that the district court neglected to adequately screen prospective jurors for bias against gang members and that the voir dire process was too abbreviated to allow for informed peremptory and for-cause challenges.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that, under these circumstances, the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to sufficiently account for the risk of gang-related bias among prospective jurors. The court explained that the district court’s failure on voir dire to explore or to take other steps specifically to counter such potential prejudice unfairly deprived Defendant of the opportunity to unearth a pervasive bias relevant to an issue pivotal to the government’s case against him. Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States of America v. Nieves" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and unlawful use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. In his plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his convictions and sentence so long as the district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment equal to or less than 106 months. He was sentenced principally to 96 months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed the district court’s order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and his corresponding sentence. He contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), invalidate his conviction on that count. The government disputes primarily that Petitioner’s guilty plea to the section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction rested solely on Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, contending that the conviction also rested on the predicate crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The government asserts that the record is sufficient to support Petitioner’s guilt based on attempted Hobbs Act robbery.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Petitioner relief under section 2255, vacated Petitioner’s conviction and related sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1); and remanded to allow resentencing. The court explained that on de novo review, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence.” Thus, the court concluded that Petitioner’s conviction under section 924(c)(1)(A) is invalid. View "Hall v. United States" on Justia Law

An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on counts related to a drug distribution conspiracy, the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant committed these crimes while on supervised release following prior convictions. On appeal, Defendant asserted primarily that two alleged district court errors require vacatur of his conviction. First, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 2 U.S. 545 (1977), Defendant contended that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony from his former cellmate concerning what Defendant told the cellmate about Defendant planned defense. Second, Defendant submitted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer supervising Defendant during his period of supervised release coordinated a search of his residence and rental car. Accordingly, Defendant argued that the district court erred by admitting his former cellmate’s testimony and evidence seized during the search of his residence and rental car.   The Second Circuit affirmed hold that on plain error review of the Sixth Amendment claim, the court identified no error, never mind plain error. Nothing in the record suggests that the government learned privileged information or intentionally invaded Defendant’s relationship with his attorney. On de novo review of the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The officer monitoring Defendant had reasonable suspicion to search his residence and rental car based on credible reports that Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and was engaged in drug trafficking. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial Defendant was convicted of numerous crimes related to his leadership of two organizations, a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called DOS. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for sex trafficking crimes. At the center of his appeal is the meaning of “commercial sex act,” which Section 1591 defines as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” He contended that evidence the Government submitted at trial showing that individuals received benefits, such as privileged positions within an organization, is insufficient to sustain his sex trafficking convictions.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Section 1591 requires neither that a “[]thing of value” have a monetary or financial component nor that the sexual exploitation is conducted for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the October 30, 2020 judgment as it concerns Defendant’s sex trafficking offenses: the sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of N  (Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of J (Count 7), and the racketeering act of sex trafficking of N (Act 10A).   The court further explained that the phrase “anything of value” need not have a monetary or financial component, and the actionable sexual exploitation need not have been conducted for profit. The jury was neither misinformed nor misled. Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury and that Defendant was afforded at least “the minimum that due process requires.”. View "United States v. Raniere" on Justia Law