Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to first-degree conspiracy and second-degree murder in state court, Petitioner filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition as well as an unsuccessful motion in state court to vacate his conviction. In this second habeas petition presently before the Second Circuit, Petitioner argued that newly discovered evidence shows that he is actually innocent of the murder charge. The district court dismissed the petition as both procedurally barred and lacking merit. Although Petitioner’s petition was filed after the one-year time limit in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d), he argued, based on Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), for an equitable exception to the time limit based on a sufficient   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Petitioner’s claim is time-barred because he failed to show that it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” The court reasoned that the state post-conviction court’s factual findings, including determinations of witness credibility, are entitled to the presumption of correctness under Section 2254(e)(1). Here, the court agreed with the district court that Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s factual findings are wrong. Nor has Petitioner otherwise demonstrated that it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because Petitioner’s petition fails to satisfy the high threshold standard set forth in Schlup for a gateway claim of actual innocence, the court concluded that it is untimely. View "Cosey v. Lilley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment against him following a jury trial where he was convicted of one count of conspiring to illegally donate  monies to a political campaign and one count of aiding and abetting over $25,000 of such donations. Defendant argued that the district court erred in giving the standard jury instruction on willfulness: that “a person acts ‘willfully’ when he acts with a ‘bad purpose’ to disobey or disregard the law. Further, Defendant challenged the district court’s refusal to 1) instruct the jury that for count one, a co-conspirator must knowingly and willfully join the conspiracy with the “intent of achieving [the alleged conspiracy’s] unlawful objectives, namely violation of the federal election laws;” and 2) to provide e a good faith defense charge.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained it is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant was aware of the specific provision of the law that he is charged with violating.” Further, the district court charged the jury that the government needed to prove  Defendant acted willfully, knowingly, and voluntarily. As the district court aptly noted, “to have found that Defendants acted willfully, the jury had to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they intentionally did something that the law forbids, the opposite of good faith.” Where, as here, the district court correctly instructed the jury as to knowledge and willfulness and the defendant’s theory was thus “effectively presented elsewhere in the charge,” its refusal to provide a separate “good faith defense” instruction is not reversible error. View "United States v. Kukushkin" on Justia Law

Defendant s pled guilty to (1) using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during an attempted armed robbery of suspected marijuana dealers (“Count One”); and (2) using, carrying, possessing, and discharging a firearm during an assault in aid of racketeering of an individual whom Defendant shot and killed (“Count Two”). Both Counts were violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A), which requires that a defendant use, carry, or possess a firearm “during and in relation to” or “in furtherance of,” as relevant here, a “crime of violence.” To sustain Defendant’s Section 924(c) convictions, each Count must contain a predicate “crime of violence.” Defendant appealed from the judgment sentencing him principally to 360-months’ imprisonment. He argued that neither count contains a predicate “crime of violence” necessary to sustain his Section 924(c) convictions.   The Second Circuit held Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction on Count One is vacated because attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a valid predicate crime of violence that would support a conviction under Section 924(c). Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction on Count Two is sustained because, after applying the modified categorical approach prescribed by the Supreme Court, the court concluded that the predicate crime of violence—VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon premised on a violation of N.Y. Penal Law Section 120.05(2) and perhaps also N.Y. Penal Law Section 120.10(1)—qualifies as a crime of violence that supports a conviction under Section 924(c). View "United States v. Darren Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (Rockland County Probation Department employees and their union) brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants (the County of Rockland and its Director of Probation). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants retaliated against them for writing a letter to the Rockland County Legislature by holding department-wide emergency meetings and issuing a “Memorandum of Warning.” The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the Plaintiffs on two liability issues: (1) whether the Plaintiffs’ letter had spoken on a matter of public concern and (2) whether the Plaintiffs had spoken as private citizens. A jury trial was held on liability issue (3): whether the Defendants had engaged in an adverse employment action. After the jury entered a verdict for the Defendants, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. It later granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from retaining the Memorandum of Warning or using it against any Plaintiff. Defendants appealed the district court’s decision to grant judgment as a matter of law on Issues (2) and (3). They also challenged the permanent injunction.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remand the case with directions to enter judgment for the Defendants. The court explained that the trial record contains evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the test for adverse action was not met. Indeed, the evidence below could support a conclusion that the Memorandum and the meetings were no more than a “‘petty slight,’ ‘minor annoyance,’ or ‘trivial’ punishment.” View "Bennett v. County of Rockland" on Justia Law

The Evergreen Association brought an action against New York officials, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of New York Labor Law Sec. 203-e, which prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees for their reproductive health decisions. Evergreen claimed that Sec. 203-e unconstitutionally burdens its right to freedom of expressive association, preventing it from employees who seek abortions. The district court granted the New York defendants' motion to dismiss, and Evergreen appealed.On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evergreen's claims that Sec. 203-e violates its right to freedom of speech, violates its right to the free exercise of religion, and is impermissibly vague. However, the court reversed Evergreen's claim that the statute violates its freedom of expressive association. More specifically, the panel held that the district court should have applied strict scrutiny. Because the state did not show that Sec. 203-e is the least restrictive means to achieve its governmental interest, the panel reversed on this issue alone. View "Slattery v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Plaintiff responded to a distracted-driving enforcement campaign conducted by Defendants (the City of Stamford and its Sergeant) by standing down the street from where police sat holding a sign stating "Cops Ahead." Plaintiff's sign was confiscated twice before he was arrested for interfering with an officer. Charges were filed, Plaintiff spent a night in jail, and shortly thereafter, the prosecution dropped the charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit under Sec. 1983, claiming Defendants infringed on his freedom of speech, engaged in malicious prosecution, and deprived him of equal protection and due process, violating the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim. Specifically, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on the First and Fourth Amendment claims but did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court held that no Connecticut law proscribed Plaintiff's conduct, and thus, officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. Thus, the district court erred in finding that the existence of probable cause served as a complete defense to Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. The court also held that Plaintiff's speech was protected but rejected his equal protection and due process claims based on the City's bail-setting policies. View "Friend v. Gasparino" on Justia Law

The government petitions for a panel rehearing of so much of the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), as ruled that the 2015 removal of naloxegol from the federal controlled substances schedules promulgated under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), 21 U.S.C. Sections 801-971, rendered those schedules categorically narrower than the New York drug schedules applicable to Defendant’s 2002 state-law conviction. The government's petition suggests that that ruling in the court’s opinion ("Opinion") was dictum rather than a holding and asks that the court issue an amended opinion so stating.   The Second Circuit granted rehearing in order to note the government's various positions on the comparability of the state and federal drug schedules and to flag some defects in the petition's characterizations of the record. However, the court denied the request for an amended opinion. The court explained that the comparability of the New York's 2002 drug schedules and the current federal drug schedules was an issue that the district court was required to, and did, decide in order to make a determination as to what Defendant’s Guidelines sentence would be. This Court was required to and did, determine whether the district court's decision was correct. View "USA v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are individuals who own apartment buildings in New York City that are subject to the relevant Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the New York Rent Stabilization Law was unconstitutional, both facially and as applied. The court held that Plaintiffs did not establish that application of the RSL resulted in a physical taking. The court also held that the RSL did not "go to far" in determining how private landowners can use their property. The court went on to reject Plaintiff's as-applied challenges to the RSL. View "74 Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals who own apartment buildings in New York City subject to the relevant Rent Stabilization Law (RSL), appealed from a district court judgment. The court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs alleged that the RSL, as amended in 2019, effected, facially, an unconstitutional physical and regulatory taking. The District Court held that Plaintiffs-Appellants failed to state claims for violations of the Takings Clause.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Here, the RSL is part of a comprehensive regulatory regime that governs nearly one million units. Like the broad public interests at issue in Penn Central, here, the legislature has determined that the RSL is necessary to prevent “serious threats to the public health, safety and general welfare.” Further, the Landlords urged the Court to consider two additional, less commonly cited Penn Central factors that, they argued, tend to show that the RSL results in a regulatory taking: noxious use and a lack of a reciprocal advantage. Even assuming for the sake of argument that these factors apply, the claims fail. View "Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of extortion for threatening to disseminate nude photographs of Jane Doe if she did not return to a relationship with him. Defendant appealed, arguing that the plea proceedings were defective because the district court did not explain the “wrongfulness” element of extortion under United States v. Jackson. He also challenged two special conditions of supervised release on First Amendment grounds: (1) a requirement that Defendant seek retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe and her brother-in-law, John Doe, and (2) a requirement that he seek approval from the district court before publishing any further information about them.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the plea proceedings were not defective because the district court correctly determined that Defendant understood the “nature of each charge” to which he pled. Second, the special condition that Defendant seeks retraction of articles he published about Jane Doe and John Doe has expired, so Defendant’s challenge to that condition is moot. Finally, the special condition that Defendant seeks approval from the district court before publishing further information about Jane Doe and John Doe does not violate the First Amendment under the circumstances here. Defendant pled guilty to extortion by threatening to publish nude images of Jane Doe, and he is a journalist who had published or threatened to publish information about her and John Doe in the past. So the district court acted within its broad discretion by imposing the narrowly tailored special condition requiring Defendant to obtain approval from the court before publishing any further information about them. View "United States v. Farooq" on Justia Law