Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Seneca Nation brought a lawsuit seeking relief from New York State, the New York Thruway Authority, and the Thruway Authority’s Executive Director (collectively “Defendants”) for ongoing use of an invalid easement over its tribal land. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. Defendants contend that the Nation is collaterally estopped from bringing this present action based on a 2004 judgment of this court and that this lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Seneca Nation does not assert property rights over land to which New York State has traditionally held the title and does not seek a declaration that the State’s laws and regulations do not apply to the area in dispute. Therefore, the quiet title exception to Ex parte Young outlined by the Court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no application here. Accordingly, the lawsuit falls under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, neither collateral estoppel nor the Eleventh Amendment bars the Nation from proceeding in this case. View "Seneca Nation v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 36 months in prison following his conviction by a jury of witness retaliation. Defendant challenged the manner in which the district court conducted jury selection, arguing primarily that the district court neglected to adequately screen prospective jurors for bias against gang members and that the voir dire process was too abbreviated to allow for informed peremptory and for-cause challenges.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that, under these circumstances, the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to sufficiently account for the risk of gang-related bias among prospective jurors. The court explained that the district court’s failure on voir dire to explore or to take other steps specifically to counter such potential prejudice unfairly deprived Defendant of the opportunity to unearth a pervasive bias relevant to an issue pivotal to the government’s case against him. Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States of America v. Nieves" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and unlawful use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. In his plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his convictions and sentence so long as the district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment equal to or less than 106 months. He was sentenced principally to 96 months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed the district court’s order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and his corresponding sentence. He contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), invalidate his conviction on that count. The government disputes primarily that Petitioner’s guilty plea to the section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction rested solely on Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, contending that the conviction also rested on the predicate crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The government asserts that the record is sufficient to support Petitioner’s guilt based on attempted Hobbs Act robbery.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Petitioner relief under section 2255, vacated Petitioner’s conviction and related sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1); and remanded to allow resentencing. The court explained that on de novo review, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence.” Thus, the court concluded that Petitioner’s conviction under section 924(c)(1)(A) is invalid. View "Hall v. United States" on Justia Law

An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on counts related to a drug distribution conspiracy, the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant committed these crimes while on supervised release following prior convictions. On appeal, Defendant asserted primarily that two alleged district court errors require vacatur of his conviction. First, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 2 U.S. 545 (1977), Defendant contended that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony from his former cellmate concerning what Defendant told the cellmate about Defendant planned defense. Second, Defendant submitted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer supervising Defendant during his period of supervised release coordinated a search of his residence and rental car. Accordingly, Defendant argued that the district court erred by admitting his former cellmate’s testimony and evidence seized during the search of his residence and rental car.   The Second Circuit affirmed hold that on plain error review of the Sixth Amendment claim, the court identified no error, never mind plain error. Nothing in the record suggests that the government learned privileged information or intentionally invaded Defendant’s relationship with his attorney. On de novo review of the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The officer monitoring Defendant had reasonable suspicion to search his residence and rental car based on credible reports that Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and was engaged in drug trafficking. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial Defendant was convicted of numerous crimes related to his leadership of two organizations, a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called DOS. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for sex trafficking crimes. At the center of his appeal is the meaning of “commercial sex act,” which Section 1591 defines as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” He contended that evidence the Government submitted at trial showing that individuals received benefits, such as privileged positions within an organization, is insufficient to sustain his sex trafficking convictions.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Section 1591 requires neither that a “[]thing of value” have a monetary or financial component nor that the sexual exploitation is conducted for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the October 30, 2020 judgment as it concerns Defendant’s sex trafficking offenses: the sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of N  (Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of J (Count 7), and the racketeering act of sex trafficking of N (Act 10A).   The court further explained that the phrase “anything of value” need not have a monetary or financial component, and the actionable sexual exploitation need not have been conducted for profit. The jury was neither misinformed nor misled. Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury and that Defendant was afforded at least “the minimum that due process requires.”. View "United States v. Raniere" on Justia Law

In 2014, Plaintiff, then a women’s soccer player at the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) and recipient of a one-year athletic scholarship, raised her middle finger to a television camera during her team’s post-game celebration after winning a tournament championship. Although she initially was suspended from further tournament games for that gesture, Plaintiff was ultimately also punished by UConn with a mid-year termination of her athletic scholarship. She brought this lawsuit against UConn (through its Board of Trustees) and several university officials alleging, inter alia, violations of her First Amendment and procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as a violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”), in connection with the termination of her scholarship. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the decision of the district court granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's procedural due process and First Amendment claims and vacated the district court’s judgment to the extent it granted summary judgment to UConn on the Title IX claim. The court explained Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence, including a detailed comparison of her punishment to those issued by UConn for male student-athletes found to have engaged in misconduct, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she was subjected to a more serious disciplinary sanction, i.e., termination of her athletic scholarship, because of her gender. View "Radwan v. Manuel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought various claims against Rockland County ("Rockland County Defendants") officials including a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, based on orders which excluded children who were not vaccinated against measles from attending school and an emergency declaration which barred unvaccinated children, other than those with medical exemptions, from places of public assembly. The district court granted summary judgment for Rockland County Defendants.The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Plainitffs' claim raises numerous disputes—including whether there is evidence of religious animus, to whom the emergency declaration applied, and what the County’s purpose was in enacting the declaration—that prevent Defendants from prevailing on summary judgment. View "M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from an order denying their motion to dismiss in part and rejecting their qualified immunity defense against the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") claims of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are practicing Muslims whose religion requires them to perform daily congregational prayers with as many other Muslims as are available. According to the allegations in their complaint, while Plaintiffs were incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, Defendants enforced a policy that restricted group prayer to the prison's chapel, despite that facility's frequent unavailability. As a result, Plaintiffs were forced to forgo their religious exercise of group prayer to avoid disciplinary action.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that the wardens are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings because the pleadings do not establish that their enforcement of the policy against Plaintiffs was in service of a compelling interest, and it was clearly established at the time of the violation that substantially burdening an inmate's religious exercise without justification violates RFRA. View "Sabir v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an employment action claiming that his employer, Salisbury Bank and Trust Company (the "Bank") discharged him in violation of New York Labor Law Section 201-d because he chose to campaign for election to a seat in the New York State Assembly. The district court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and was not constructively discharged.   On appeal, Plaintiff made two principal arguments. First, he contends that the Bank unlawfully "forced" him to decide between "termination or his protected political activity" and that, as a result, his departure from the Bank was involuntary. Second, he argued that the Bank has only proffered as a reason for its actions his statutorily "protected political activities."   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court explained that even though the Bank claims that it had not decided to discharge Plaintiff when it learned of his "Decision," on this record a reasonable jury could find that the Bank had already concluded that Plaintiff would be discharged if he did not give up his campaign. For these reasons, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action by being forced to choose between his campaign and his job in violation of New York Labor Law. Further, a reasonable jury could find that the Bank's actions violated New York Labor Law Section 201-d because the bank failed to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action it took against Plaintiff. View "Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Co." on Justia Law