Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment on all claims to Defendants-Appellees Chautauqua County (“the County”) and Correction Officers (“the Officers”) in this civil rights suit concerning the County’s policy of handcuffing inmates in an allegedly painful manner and the Officers’ use of force in extracting Plaintiff from his cell at the Chautauqua County Jail (“the Jail”).   The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on exhaustion grounds with regard to Plaintiff’s claims against the Officers, but that it did err in doing so with regard to his claim against the County. The court explained that that the district court was correct that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had submitted a timely grievance related to his claims against the Officers. The district court erred, however, in holding that the Chautauqua County Jail’s grievance policy applied to his separate claim against the County. By its plain terms, the grievance procedures did not apply to matters outside the jail captain’s control, such as the County handcuffing policy that Plaintiff challenges, and thus there were no administrative remedies for Plaintiff to exhaust with respect to that claim. View "Saeli v. Chautauqua County" on Justia Law

The appeal involved involves five lawsuits in which visually impaired Plaintiffs sued Defendant stores under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for failing to carry braille gift cards. The complaints alleged that Plaintiffs live near Defendants’ stores, have been customers in the past, and intend to purchase gift cards when they become available in the future. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ ADA claims for lack of standing.   The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that Plaintiffs’ conclusory, boilerplate allegations fail to establish standing. The court explained that missing from Plaintiffs’ allegations is any explanation of how Plaintiffs were injured by the unavailability of braille gift cards or any specificity about Plaintiffs’ prior visits to Defendants’ stores that would support an inference that Plaintiffs intended to return. In the ADA context a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has suffered an injury in fact when: “(1) the plaintiff alleged past injury under the ADA; (2) it was reasonable to infer that the discriminatory treatment would continue; and (3) it was reasonable to infer, based on the past frequency of plaintiff’s visits and the proximity of defendants’ [businesses] to plaintiff’s home, that plaintiff intended to return to the subject location.” Here, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs have offered only “naked assertions” of intent to return to Defendants’ stores if they offer braille gift cards. This reliance on a mere “profession of an intent to return to the places” previously visited is “not enough” to establish standing for prospective relief. View "Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd." on Justia Law

A former faculty member appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing (A) claims against the university principally for violation of his right to due process, and for gender and national origin discrimination in violation of, respectively, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (B) claims that documents issued by the United States Department of Education violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the  Spending Clause of the Constitution. The district court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings finding that Title IX does not authorize a private right of action for discrimination in employment and that the complaint failed to state a claim for national-origin discrimination under Title VI. The court granted the United States Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment in part finding merit only in Plaintiff’s contention that Title IX allows a private right of action for a university's intentional gender-based discrimination against a faculty member. The court found that the complaint contained sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined following irregular investigative procedures in circumstances permitting a plausible inference of bias on the basis of gender in violation of Title IX. Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, viewed within the same analytical framework as that applicable to his Title IX claim, lacks sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined in whole or in part on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VI. View "Vengalattore v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

Connecticut State Police Union (“CSPU”) brought suit against the Commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (the “Commissioner”), alleging that the FOIA-related portions of the state law violated the Contracts Clause and moved for a preliminary injunction. The law at issue is Public Act 20–1: An Act Concerning Police Accountability (“the Act”). Section 8 of the Act took aim at FOIA exemptions under Connecticut law.   The district court denied the motion primarily on the ground that the CSPU was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim since the law was reasonable and necessary to promote transparency and accountability for law enforcement. The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the law served a legitimate public purpose and that the legislature, in passing it, acted not self-servingly but in the public interest.   The court explained that determine whether a law violates the Contracts Clause, it asks (1) whether the contractual impairment is substantial, (2) whether the law serves “a legitimate public purpose such as remedying a general social or economic problem,” and (3) whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are reasonable and necessary.  Here, the Act served two legitimate public purposes: ensuring the transparency and accountability of law enforcement and promoting “FOIA’s strong legislative policy in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.” Moreover, because the district court did not err in concluding that the CSPU could not succeed on the merits of its claim, the court did not need to address the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test. View "Conn. State Police Union v. Rovella" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against the International Criminal Police Organization (“Interpol”), charging negligent infliction of emotional distress and violation of his right to due process of law under the New York State Constitution after Interpol refused to delete a so-called “red notice” identifying Plaintiff as a convicted criminal in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”).   The district court granted Interpol’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Interpol is a protected organization under the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”), 22 U.S.C. Sections 288-288l, and thus enjoys the same immunity from suit normally enjoyed by foreign sovereigns.   The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the term “public international organizations” as used in 22 U.S.C. Section 288 includes any international organization that is composed of governments as its members, regardless of whether it has been formed by international treaty. Further, the court found that Interpol qualifies as a “public international organization” for the purposes of 22 U.S.C. Section 288 because its members are official government actors whose involvement is subject to control by participating nations. Next, the Headquarters Agreement between Interpol and the Government of France does not constitute an immunity waiver that would permit the present suit in a United States district court. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery prior to dismissal. View "El Omari v. The International Criminal Police Organization" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a total term of 28 months imprisonment for violations of multiple conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged his revocation on Specification Four, which alleged that, on May 12, 2019, Defendant committed the state crime of second-degree assault in violation of New York Penal Law Section 120.05(2) by striking his ex-girlfriend (“J.D.”) with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument—namely, a glass bottle.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant committed Specification Four by a preponderance of the evidence or by finding good cause to admit the out-of-court statement under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(c). In addition, the majority disagreed with the dissent’s conclusion that because the charged supervised release violations subjected Defendant to imprisonment for more than one year based on new conduct for which he was never federally indicted, the violation proceedings constitute a new prosecution that violated Defendant Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Finally, as to Specification Nine, the court agreed with the parties that the written judgment conflicted with the district court’s oral ruling that the alleged violation had been proven, and that the oral ruling controls. View "United States v. Peguero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Nassau County (the “County”) and five “John Doe” law enforcement officers (the County and the individuals together, “Defendants”) for alleged constitutional violations arising from their enforcement of New York Penal Law Section 400.00(11)(c). Plaintiff alleged that the County’s policy interpreting and applying Section 400.00(11)(c) is broader than the law itself and unconstitutional as it was applied to him. The district court disagreed finding that the County acted to enforce a mandatory provision of state law and as a result was not a proper defendant under Vives v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2008). It granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Fourth Amendment claims, related Monell claims, and Section 1983 conspiracy claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, except to the extent that it failed to reach an adequate determination on the County’s longarms possession policy, the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that in requiring Plaintiff to surrender his longarms after his conviction, Nassau County was reasonably applying state law, not crafting its own independent firearm surrender policy untethered to the Penal Law.  Further, Plaintiff’s Fourth and Second Amendment claims fail because the County is not the proper defendant to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim and even if the County were the proper defendant to this challenge, it is uncertain that the County “seized” his longarms within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, much less unreasonably seized them. View "Juzumas v. Nassau County" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter for administering a fatal dose of prescription medication to her son. The courtroom was closed to spectators for fifteen minutes, during which the prosecutor addressed a website and an email detailing complaint by Petitioner that her trial was unfair. Petitioner moved to set aside her conviction on the ground that her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. The district court, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluded that the Appellate Division had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Petitioner’s writ and remanded with instructions to the district court to deny the petition. The court held that the ruling of the New York Appellate Division was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  The court reasoned that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") claims are "adjudicated on the merits" if the state court ruled on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural ground. Further, a writ cannot be granted "simply because . . . the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." The court concluded that based on the relevant Supreme Court decisions, there are at least reasonable arguments supporting the Appellate Division's ruling, which is enough to preclude habeas relief. View "Jordan v. Lamanna" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a federal action against the State of Connecticut, a colonel in his official capacity, and a retired detective in her individual capacity, alleging three constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that those provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute that required him to disclose his email address and other internet communication identifiers and periodically to verify his residence violated the First Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Plaintiff further alleged that the detective engaged in malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment by seeking an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s alleged failure to disclose one of his email addresses. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his Post Facto Clause and malicious prosecution claims. The court concluded that the burden of demonstrating that the disclosure requirement satisfied intermediate scrutiny fell on the government and the government must show that the challenged law advances important governmental interests and is narrowly tailored to those interests. The court found that the government did not make the showing.The court further found that because the residence verification provision has not been applied to Plaintiff retroactively, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated. Finally, although the history between Plaintiff and the Sex Offender Registry Unit suggests a motivation to harass him, an officer cannot be liable for a vexatious motivation as long as she acts with arguable probable cause. View "Cornelio v. Connecticut" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and other offenses in New York state court. During jury selection, Petitioner’s lawyer exercised peremptory strikes against two male jurors, but the prosecutor raised a “reverse-Batson” challenge; which is a claim that the defendant (rather than the prosecution) was using strikes in a discriminatory manner. The state court disallowed the two strikes, and Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner petitioned unsuccessfully for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 in the United States District Court. On appeal, Petitioner renews his challenge to the state court’s reverse-Batson ruling.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that it need not determine whether the state court properly applied Batson or erred in disallowing the two peremptory strikes because those claims are not cognizable under Section 2254. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has held that a state defendant has no freestanding federal constitutional right to peremptory strikes, and so a state court’s mistaken disallowance of such a strike does not, standing alone, form a basis for federal habeas relief. Thus,  any procedural error by the state court in following the three-step Batson framework would not, without more, constitute a violation of a federal constitutional right. View "Murray v. Noeth" on Justia Law