Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on counts related to a drug distribution conspiracy, the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant committed these crimes while on supervised release following prior convictions. On appeal, Defendant asserted primarily that two alleged district court errors require vacatur of his conviction. First, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 2 U.S. 545 (1977), Defendant contended that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony from his former cellmate concerning what Defendant told the cellmate about Defendant planned defense. Second, Defendant submitted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer supervising Defendant during his period of supervised release coordinated a search of his residence and rental car. Accordingly, Defendant argued that the district court erred by admitting his former cellmate’s testimony and evidence seized during the search of his residence and rental car.   The Second Circuit affirmed hold that on plain error review of the Sixth Amendment claim, the court identified no error, never mind plain error. Nothing in the record suggests that the government learned privileged information or intentionally invaded Defendant’s relationship with his attorney. On de novo review of the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The officer monitoring Defendant had reasonable suspicion to search his residence and rental car based on credible reports that Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and was engaged in drug trafficking. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial Defendant was convicted of numerous crimes related to his leadership of two organizations, a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called DOS. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for sex trafficking crimes. At the center of his appeal is the meaning of “commercial sex act,” which Section 1591 defines as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” He contended that evidence the Government submitted at trial showing that individuals received benefits, such as privileged positions within an organization, is insufficient to sustain his sex trafficking convictions.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Section 1591 requires neither that a “[]thing of value” have a monetary or financial component nor that the sexual exploitation is conducted for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the October 30, 2020 judgment as it concerns Defendant’s sex trafficking offenses: the sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of N  (Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of J (Count 7), and the racketeering act of sex trafficking of N (Act 10A).   The court further explained that the phrase “anything of value” need not have a monetary or financial component, and the actionable sexual exploitation need not have been conducted for profit. The jury was neither misinformed nor misled. Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury and that Defendant was afforded at least “the minimum that due process requires.”. View "United States v. Raniere" on Justia Law

In 2014, Plaintiff, then a women’s soccer player at the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) and recipient of a one-year athletic scholarship, raised her middle finger to a television camera during her team’s post-game celebration after winning a tournament championship. Although she initially was suspended from further tournament games for that gesture, Plaintiff was ultimately also punished by UConn with a mid-year termination of her athletic scholarship. She brought this lawsuit against UConn (through its Board of Trustees) and several university officials alleging, inter alia, violations of her First Amendment and procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as a violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”), in connection with the termination of her scholarship. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the decision of the district court granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's procedural due process and First Amendment claims and vacated the district court’s judgment to the extent it granted summary judgment to UConn on the Title IX claim. The court explained Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence, including a detailed comparison of her punishment to those issued by UConn for male student-athletes found to have engaged in misconduct, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she was subjected to a more serious disciplinary sanction, i.e., termination of her athletic scholarship, because of her gender. View "Radwan v. Manuel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought various claims against Rockland County ("Rockland County Defendants") officials including a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, based on orders which excluded children who were not vaccinated against measles from attending school and an emergency declaration which barred unvaccinated children, other than those with medical exemptions, from places of public assembly. The district court granted summary judgment for Rockland County Defendants.The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Plainitffs' claim raises numerous disputes—including whether there is evidence of religious animus, to whom the emergency declaration applied, and what the County’s purpose was in enacting the declaration—that prevent Defendants from prevailing on summary judgment. View "M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from an order denying their motion to dismiss in part and rejecting their qualified immunity defense against the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") claims of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are practicing Muslims whose religion requires them to perform daily congregational prayers with as many other Muslims as are available. According to the allegations in their complaint, while Plaintiffs were incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, Defendants enforced a policy that restricted group prayer to the prison's chapel, despite that facility's frequent unavailability. As a result, Plaintiffs were forced to forgo their religious exercise of group prayer to avoid disciplinary action.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that the wardens are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings because the pleadings do not establish that their enforcement of the policy against Plaintiffs was in service of a compelling interest, and it was clearly established at the time of the violation that substantially burdening an inmate's religious exercise without justification violates RFRA. View "Sabir v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an employment action claiming that his employer, Salisbury Bank and Trust Company (the "Bank") discharged him in violation of New York Labor Law Section 201-d because he chose to campaign for election to a seat in the New York State Assembly. The district court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and was not constructively discharged.   On appeal, Plaintiff made two principal arguments. First, he contends that the Bank unlawfully "forced" him to decide between "termination or his protected political activity" and that, as a result, his departure from the Bank was involuntary. Second, he argued that the Bank has only proffered as a reason for its actions his statutorily "protected political activities."   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court explained that even though the Bank claims that it had not decided to discharge Plaintiff when it learned of his "Decision," on this record a reasonable jury could find that the Bank had already concluded that Plaintiff would be discharged if he did not give up his campaign. For these reasons, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action by being forced to choose between his campaign and his job in violation of New York Labor Law. Further, a reasonable jury could find that the Bank's actions violated New York Labor Law Section 201-d because the bank failed to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action it took against Plaintiff. View "Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. On appeal, Defendant argued that her pretrial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to transmit a plea offer from the government to Defendant before it expired, thereby depriving her of the chance to plead guilty under the terms of the offer.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction. The court concluded that Defendant has waived any claim that the alleged error violated her Sixth Amendment rights. Unlike the defendant in Frye, Defendant learned of her expired plea offer and received new court-appointed counsel two months before trial. She nonetheless chose to go to trial rather than to plead guilty or to petition the court for reinstatement of the offer. This knowing and the voluntary choice was inconsistent with seeking the benefit of the expired plea offer and thus constitutes waiver.
The court further found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Defendant’s other fraudulent activity that was similar and/or related to the charged conduct; the court did not err by allowing the government to introduce certain “red flag” emails from an outside attorney for the limited purpose of proving her knowledge, and the court’s decision to instruct the jury on conscious avoidance was proper. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff National Rifle Association of America (the "NRA") claims that Defendant, the former Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), violated its rights to free speech and equal protection when she investigated three insurance companies that had partnered with it to provide coverage for losses resulting from gun use and encouraged banks and insurance companies to consider discontinuing their relationships with gun promotion organizations. The NRA contends that Defendant used her regulatory power to threaten NRA business partners and coerce them into disassociating with the NRA, in violation of its rights.   The district court dismissed the equal protection claim on the basis that Defendant was protected by absolute immunity, but it declined to dismiss the free speech claims, concluding that the NRA plausibly alleged its claims and issues of fact existed as to whether she was protected by qualified immunity.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that here, the various cases addressing the issue did not provide clear and particularized guidance but involved very different circumstances and much stronger conduct. The cases do not clearly establish that Defendant’s statements, in this case, were unconstitutionally threatening or coercive. Qualified immunity balances the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise their power irresponsibly with the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties responsibly. Here, the Complaint's factual allegations show that, far from acting irresponsibly, Defendant was doing her job in good faith. View "National Rifle Association of America v. Maria T. Vullo" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed dismissing his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner challenged his conviction on the ground that the state court erroneously denied his motion to suppress a gun seized during an allegedly unlawful search. Without giving Petitioner prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, the district court dismissed the petition sua sponte, concluding that his Fourth Amendment claim could not provide a basis for habeas relief under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court.   At issue is (1) whether a district court may dismiss a petition sua sponte under Stone without providing a petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard; and (2) if such notice and an opportunity to be heard are required. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment. The court held that although a district court has the authority to raise the Stone issue sua sponte, a habeas petitioner is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a petition is dismissed under Stone. The court further concluded that, in this case, the district court did not comply with that procedure, and the denial of a post-judgment motion for reconsideration, which objects to the sua sponte dismissal under Stone, is not an adequate substitute for that requirement. View "Ethridge v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the narcotics conspiracy count on the grounds that the classification of marijuana under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act violates their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. They argued that marijuana's scheduling has no rational basis because it does not meet the statutory criteria for inclusion on Schedule I. The district court denied their motion to dismiss, concluding that they incorrectly sought to tether the rational basis inquiry to the statutory criteria   The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the Act's scheduling criteria are largely irrelevant to our constitutional review because the rational basis test asks only whether Congress could have any conceivable basis for including marijuana on the strictest schedule. Because there are other plausible considerations that could have motivated Congress's scheduling of marijuana, the court concluded that its classification does not violate Defendants’ due process or equal protection rights. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law