Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The parties dispute the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff in an action successfully claiming a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party; plaintiff may not obtain fees for the administrative proceedings for failure to identify "the discrete portion of the work product from the administrative proceedings" for which fees might have been awarded, North Carolina Dep't of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986); and the 50 percent reduction was appropriate. View "Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District Commission" on Justia Law

Defendants, athletics officials at Binghampton, appealed the district court's denial in part of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Second Circuit held that the district court erroneously conflated the distinct Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983 standards for both vicarious liability and causation. The court clarified the differences between discrimination claims brought under Title VII and those brought under section 1983.The court held that section 1983 claims for discrimination in public employment require plaintiffs to establish that the defendant's discriminatory intent was a "but‐for" cause of the adverse employment action; section 1983 claims for discrimination in public employment cannot be based on a respondeat superior or "cat's paw" theory to establish a defendant's liability; and defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, even when interpreted in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record cannot support the conclusion that they violated her "clearly established" constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order in regard to the section 1983 claims against defendants, entered judgment for defendants, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Naumovski v. Norris" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that defendants violated plaintiff's constitutional rights and denied qualified immunity to defendants for the week of administratively imposed post‐release supervision (PRS) after plaintiff's determinate sentences had expired.In regard to the period of PRS that plaintiff served from her initial release from prison on October 5, 2007, until her determinate sentences expired on November 27, 2008, the court held that there were material issues of fact as to whether that period of PRS was more onerous than the period of conditional release she would have been subjected to without PRS and consequently whether she was deprived of a liberty interest during that period. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the appeal, remanding for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Fischer" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of Sarah Palin's defamation complaint against The New York Times for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court erred in relying on facts outside the pleadings to dismiss the complaint.The court also held that Palin's Proposed Amended Complaint plausibly stated a claim for defamation and may proceed to full discovery. In this case, a jury could plausibly find that The Times editor knew before publishing the editorial that it was false to claim that Palin or her political action committee were connected to the Loughner shooting that injured Representative Gabby Giffords; certain aspects of the drafting and publication process of the editorial at The Times permitted an inference of actual malice; and a reasonable reader could view the challenged statements as factual, namely that Palin, through her political action committee, was directly linked to the Loughner shooting. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Palin v. The New York Times Co." on Justia Law

The Nnebe plaintiffs, taxi drivers, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when their licenses were suspended following their arrests and they were not given meaningful post-suspension hearings to consider whether their licenses should be reinstated.The Second Circuit held that the Taxi and Limousine Commission's suspension procedures did not afford plaintiffs adequate process, because the drivers' property interests in their licenses was substantial, the risk of erroneous deprivation was unacceptably high, and defendants could institute a more meaningful process at minimal financial and administrative costs. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.The Stallworth plaintiffs, also taxi drivers, brought a similar action challenging the same regulatory regime. The court held that the district court erroneously dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim in reliance on its Nnebe ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nnebe v. Daus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYIT, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Plaintiff alleged that NYIT discriminated against him based on his homosexuality and mental health disability.The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiff's 2010-11 claims were untimely, and the continuing violation doctrine did not apply to these claims. However, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's 2013-14 claims under the ADA and Title IX, because the four month statute of limitations for a New York State Article 78 Proceeding did not apply to these claims. Rather, a three year statute of limitations applied to both claims, and thus his claims were timely. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded. View "Purcell v. N.Y. Institute of Technology - College of Osteopathic Medicine" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the City's motion for summary judgment in an action challenging the City's rules banning advertisements in for-hire vehicles (FHVs) absent authorization from the Taxi and Limousine Commission. The district court concluded that the City's rules banning advertisements in for‐hire passenger vehicles, such as Ubers and Lyfts, violate the First Amendment, primarily because the City permits certain advertising in taxicabs.The court held that the City's prohibition on advertising in FHVs did not violate the First Amendment under the Central Hudson test. In this case, the City's asserted interest in improving the overall passenger experience is substantial, the prohibition "directly advances" that interest, and the prohibition was no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. The court held that the City's determination that banning ads altogether is the most effective approach was reasonable. View "Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Tweed, seeking to expand its primary runway, filed suit to invalidate a Connecticut statute that had limited the runway's length. As a preliminary matter, the Second Circuit held that Tweed had Article III standing because it established an injury in fact, the injury was caused by the Runway Statute, and a favorable decision will likely redress Tweed's fear of the statute's enforcement. The court joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in holding that a subdivision may sue its state under the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, Tweed, as a political subdivision of Connecticut, may bring suit against Connecticut.On the merits, the court held that the Runway Statute was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act where the Act's preemption applies to airport runways and the Runway Statute falls within the scope of that preemption. Furthermore, Congress intended the Act to occupy the entire field of air safety including runway length. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Tweed. View "Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong" on Justia Law

President Trump engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by utilizing Twitter's blocking function to limit certain users' access to his social media account, which is otherwise open to the public at large, because he disagrees with their speech. The First Amendment does not permit a public official who utilizes a social media account for all manner of official purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise‐open online dialogue because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.In this case, the government concedes that individual plaintiffs were blocked from President Trump's Twitter account after they criticized the President or his policies, and that they were blocked as a result of their criticism. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and entry of a declaratory judgment that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the account because of their expressed political views violates the First Amendment. View "Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order committing defendant to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 4241(d) for psychiatric treatment and evaluation. Defendant alleged that the district court's order violated his due process rights because a forensic psychologist stated that his disorder was degenerative and would not significantly improve with treatment.The court held that, under 18 U.S.C. 4241 et seq., commitment to assess future competency is mandatory, and only the district court, and not a forensic psychologist, can determine whether defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such a decision, the court held that defendant's commitment to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and further evaluation was reasonably related to determining whether defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the court held that the district court constitutionally applied section 4241(d)'s commitment procedures to defendant. View "United States v. Brennan" on Justia Law