Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Nnebe plaintiffs, taxi drivers, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when their licenses were suspended following their arrests and they were not given meaningful post-suspension hearings to consider whether their licenses should be reinstated.The Second Circuit held that the Taxi and Limousine Commission's suspension procedures did not afford plaintiffs adequate process, because the drivers' property interests in their licenses was substantial, the risk of erroneous deprivation was unacceptably high, and defendants could institute a more meaningful process at minimal financial and administrative costs. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.The Stallworth plaintiffs, also taxi drivers, brought a similar action challenging the same regulatory regime. The court held that the district court erroneously dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim in reliance on its Nnebe ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nnebe v. Daus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYIT, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Plaintiff alleged that NYIT discriminated against him based on his homosexuality and mental health disability.The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiff's 2010-11 claims were untimely, and the continuing violation doctrine did not apply to these claims. However, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's 2013-14 claims under the ADA and Title IX, because the four month statute of limitations for a New York State Article 78 Proceeding did not apply to these claims. Rather, a three year statute of limitations applied to both claims, and thus his claims were timely. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded. View "Purcell v. N.Y. Institute of Technology - College of Osteopathic Medicine" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the City's motion for summary judgment in an action challenging the City's rules banning advertisements in for-hire vehicles (FHVs) absent authorization from the Taxi and Limousine Commission. The district court concluded that the City's rules banning advertisements in for‐hire passenger vehicles, such as Ubers and Lyfts, violate the First Amendment, primarily because the City permits certain advertising in taxicabs.The court held that the City's prohibition on advertising in FHVs did not violate the First Amendment under the Central Hudson test. In this case, the City's asserted interest in improving the overall passenger experience is substantial, the prohibition "directly advances" that interest, and the prohibition was no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. The court held that the City's determination that banning ads altogether is the most effective approach was reasonable. View "Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Tweed, seeking to expand its primary runway, filed suit to invalidate a Connecticut statute that had limited the runway's length. As a preliminary matter, the Second Circuit held that Tweed had Article III standing because it established an injury in fact, the injury was caused by the Runway Statute, and a favorable decision will likely redress Tweed's fear of the statute's enforcement. The court joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in holding that a subdivision may sue its state under the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, Tweed, as a political subdivision of Connecticut, may bring suit against Connecticut.On the merits, the court held that the Runway Statute was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act where the Act's preemption applies to airport runways and the Runway Statute falls within the scope of that preemption. Furthermore, Congress intended the Act to occupy the entire field of air safety including runway length. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Tweed. View "Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong" on Justia Law

President Trump engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by utilizing Twitter's blocking function to limit certain users' access to his social media account, which is otherwise open to the public at large, because he disagrees with their speech. The First Amendment does not permit a public official who utilizes a social media account for all manner of official purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise‐open online dialogue because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.In this case, the government concedes that individual plaintiffs were blocked from President Trump's Twitter account after they criticized the President or his policies, and that they were blocked as a result of their criticism. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and entry of a declaratory judgment that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the account because of their expressed political views violates the First Amendment. View "Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order committing defendant to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 4241(d) for psychiatric treatment and evaluation. Defendant alleged that the district court's order violated his due process rights because a forensic psychologist stated that his disorder was degenerative and would not significantly improve with treatment.The court held that, under 18 U.S.C. 4241 et seq., commitment to assess future competency is mandatory, and only the district court, and not a forensic psychologist, can determine whether defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such a decision, the court held that defendant's commitment to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and further evaluation was reasonably related to determining whether defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the court held that the district court constitutionally applied section 4241(d)'s commitment procedures to defendant. View "United States v. Brennan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a state murder conviction. The court held that there are no categorical limits on the types of evidence that can be offered to demonstrate actual innocence and therefore the district court did not err in considering impeachment evidence; the district court did not clearly err in finding some of the new evidence petitioner offered to support his actual innocence claim credible; and even deferring to that credibility finding, however, on de novo review, petitioner failed to make a compelling showing of actual innocence necessary for merits review of his procedurally barred Sixth Amendment claim.In this case, the credible new evidence showed only that a recanting trial witness did not view the shootout at issue in the charged crimes, not that petitioner did not or could not have committed those crimes. Furthermore, under the totality of the evidence, the court could not conclude that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Hyman v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Asian-owned companies and an Asian construction worker, filed suit against the City and others, alleging that defendants discriminatorily enforced municipal building codes against plaintiffs on the basis of race and personal animus. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Equal Protection claims under the theories articulated in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), the Due Process clause, and the Monell doctrine.However, the court vacated as to the selective enforcement claims of race-based and malice-based discrimination articulated under LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2d 5 Cir. 1980), because plaintiffs plausibly alleged differential treatment by the same defendant for conduct at the same work site. Likewise, the court vacated the district court's judgment as to the 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim for race-based interference with plaintiffs' right to make and enforce contracts, because plaintiffs alleged a plausible Equal Protection claim under LeClair. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hu v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, formerly civil immigration detainees treated for serious mental illnesses, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the county and others, alleging that the failure to engage in discharge planning or to provide them with discharge plans upon release violated their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiffs have adequately stated a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, because they plausibly alleged that they had serious medical needs requiring discharge planning and that defendants' failure to provide discharge planning to plaintiffs constituted deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court remanded for further fact finding and further proceedings. View "Charles v. Orange County" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for rehearing of its prior decision concluding that petitioner's prior convictions for robbery under Con. Gen. Stat. 53a‐133 qualified as predicates under the Force Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), and reinstating his original ACCA sentence.The court held that petitioner misread Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018). While petitioner was correct that in Villanueva the court remanded for resentencing, rather than direct the district court to reimpose the original sentence that had impermissibly relied on the ACCA's now‐defunct residual clause, the court neither ruled nor suggested that the latter course would have been impermissible, much less ruled that future courts in similar circumstances should follow the same course. Therefore, the decision to remand for resentencing was discretionary. The court also held that petitioner misconstrued Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), nor was petitioner correct that a sentencing court's reliance on the ACCA's residual clause, later determined to be unconstitutional, would be a structural error not susceptible to harmless error analysis. Petitioner's remaining arguments were unpersuasive. View "Shabazz v. United States" on Justia Law