Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed from the denial of his successive Section 2255 motion challenging his conviction and accompanying sentence for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). In his motion, Petitioner argued that his  924(c) conviction was invalid in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The district court denied the motion because it determined that Petitioner’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on the valid predicate crime of murder. The district court further held that its Pinkerton instruction—which permits a jury to convict a defendant of a substantive offense committed by his co-conspirators—did not undermine the validity of the Section 924(c) predicate.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that intentional murder under New York law, even when the conviction is based on a Pinkerton theory of liability, qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of Section 924(c). Under a Pinkerton theory, the defendant is convicted of the substantive offense—not of conspiring to commit the offense—so he has committed a crime of violence if the substantive offense is a crime of violence. Because Pinkerton does not transform a substantive offense into a conspiracy offense, it does not implicate Davis. View "Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed with his case, Plaintiff, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a filing fee of $402. Plaintiff believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 23 U.S.C. Section 1915, which would allow Plaintiff to bring his suit without having to prepay the full filing fee. The Second Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that the prison provided Plaintiff’s necessities of life. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion. On reconsideration, the district court found that Plaintiff had the resources to pay for both the necessities of life and the filing fee but had instead chosen to prioritize contributions to his family members for their necessities. Plaintiff argued that both conclusions are the result of legal error.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the rest of Section 1915’s requirements. The court concluded that Plaintiff demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his own necessities of life and those of his dependents. The court explained that Plaintiff would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402 filing fee; he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his dependents. View "Rosa v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a practicing Baptist, was incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility from 2002 until 2018. After prison officials failed to update the Protestant services “call-out list,” Wiggins was excluded from all religious services for over five months. He sued Green Haven officials Thomas Griffin, M. Kopp, D. Howard, and Dr. G. Jebamani under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that (1) Defendants did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion, (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) if there were a constitutional violation, Kopp was not personally involved in it.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. First, the court concluded that Defendants’ failure to update the Protestant services call-out list, which prevented Plaintiff from attending worship services for over five months, substantially burdened his religious exercise. Second, because disputed issues of material fact remain, qualified immunity cannot shield Defendants from liability at this juncture. Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Kopp’s personal involvement in a First Amendment violation by pleading that Kopp took no action even after she was informed that Plaintiff’s rights were being infringed. Finally, the court held that a Section 1983 free exercise claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights. View "Wiggins v. Griffin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction entered by the district court convicting him on his plea of guilty to possession and receipt of child pornography, and (b)(1), and obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2), contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a probation officer’s search of his cell phone and a further search by New York State Police and that the trial court erred in failing to allow him allocution at sentencing.   The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but rejected the government’s argument and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Defendant argued that resentencing is required because he was not afforded his right to allocute. He argued that the court’s failure to provide allocution calls for automatic resentencing, even under plain error review, given that he made no objection during the sentencing proceeding. The government’s brief focuses on enforcement of his waiver of appeal and advances no argument against ordering resentencing in the event we do not enforce the appeal waiver. The court concluded that it should remand for resentencing, as Defendant has made a reasonable argument that he is entitled to resentencing, and the government has made no argument to the contrary. Because the government makes no argument to the contrary, the court explained that it does so without ruling as to the appropriate standard of review for an unpreserved claim of failure to grant allocution. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate his sentence and resentence, affording him the right of allocution. View "United States v. Lajeunesse" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law

This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the forty-five-year sentence imposed by the district court following her guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to sexually exploit a child and two substantive counts of sexual exploitation of a child. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred when it (1) predetermined her sentence at the outset of the sentencing proceeding, (2) failed to verify at sentencing whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the presentence investigation report, (3) miscalculated her offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and (4) imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contentions that the district court predetermined her sentence and imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that the district court’s purported miscalculation of her offense level under the Guidelines warrants remand in this case. With respect to Defendant’s remaining argument, the court agreed that the district court failed to verify whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the PSR in advance of sentencing, as is required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A). The court concluded that the error was not prejudicial. View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed from orders of the district court denying their petitions for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, following their 2012 convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence – specifically, the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy – that caused the death of another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) and (j). On appeal, Petitioners contend that the district court erroneously enforced the collateral-attack waivers in their plea agreements, which they argue are unenforceable in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal and explained that subsequent changes in the law do not allow Petitioners to back out of their valid agreements with the government; the waivers are enforceable. The court explained that a waiver of the right to bring a postconviction challenge is presumptively enforceable, even after the legal landscape shifts. A defendant who wishes to maintain his right to collaterally attack his conviction in the event of unforeseen legal developments may, of course, attempt to negotiate more favorable waiver terms with the government before pleading guilty. But where the waiver itself is clear, unambiguous, knowingly and voluntarily entered, and supported by consideration – here, the government’s agreement not to pursue charges or arguments that could have resulted in a much higher sentence – the terms of the plea agreements must be enforced. View "Cook v. United States" on Justia Law

While riding a bicycle, Plaintiff ran into an open car door being operated by a recruiter for the U.S. Marines. Plaintiff brought a claim for negligence against the United States, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the United States liable but concluded Plaintiff was also negligent and, therefore, partially liable.On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the evidence of Plaintiff's negligence was "dubious," and, even if Plaintiff was negligent, the district court failed to make the findings necessary to any holding that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct sufficiently caused the collision so as to make Plaintiff 40% responsible for the damages. View "Dooley v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including attempted murder in aid of racketeering and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis and Taylor because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that here, unlike Hobbs Act robbery, the crime of second-degree murder cannot be committed through the mere threat of force and must instead involve the actual use of force. Since attempted murder requires both an intent to use physical force and a substantial step towards the use of physical force, it satisfies the “attempted use . . . of physical force” element under section 924(c), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A), and thereby qualifies as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Pastore" on Justia Law