Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

These two appeals challenge gun-control legislation prohibiting the possession of certain semiautomatic “assault weapons” and large‐capacity magazines. The district courts granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that the core provisions of the New York and Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault weapons and large‐capacity magazines do not violate the Second Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not void for vagueness; the particular provision of New York’s law regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite scrutiny; and Connecticut’s prohibition on the non‐semiautomatic Remington 7615 unconstitutionally infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the judgment of the district court insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines; reversed in part its holding with respect to the Remington 7615; reversed in part certain vagueness holdings; and otherwise affirmed the judgment insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines and invalidated the load limit. View "New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

TAG filed suit against the City, arguing that the City's zoning policies perpetuated racial segregation and had a disparate impact, thus violating the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. In 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of TAG on the disparate impact claim, but the district court granted the City's motion for a new trial. In 2012, a second jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on both TAG's perpetuation of segregation and disparate impact claims. The court held that TAG’s lost upfront economic expenditures on a detailed development proposal for a specific piece of property, coupled with the denial of a necessary special use permit, constitute injuries-in-fact that are fairly traceable to the City’s actions, thus affording TAG standing to maintain this action. The court also held that the City waived its argument regarding the inconsistency of the jury verdict; the district court should not have reached the merits of that argument, and it therefore erred when it ordered a new trial on that ground. Further, having concluded that the district court erred in ordering a new trial, and that the City has waived its remaining claims of error relating to the 2010 trial, the court reinstated the 2010 judgment in favor of TAG on its disparate impact claim; remanded with instructions that the district court grant a new trial limited only to the issue of damages unless TAG agrees to a remittitur reducing its award to $100,000; and denied reassignment on remand. View "The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under, inter alia, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794; and 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because a trier of fact could find that defendants did not grant the accommodation plaintiff requested for his mental‐health condition and failed to provide a “plainly reasonable” alternative or attempt to show that plaintiff’s proposed modification was unreasonable. The court concluded, however, that having received notice of potential termination from the program and a“careful and deliberate” decision plaintiff was, as a matter of law, provided the procedural process due for an academic dismissal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his procedural due process rights in connection with a disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel in his appeal from the district court's dismissal of his complaint. The court extended its reasoning in Bedoya v. Coughlin and concluded that an inmate may likewise implicitly waive the right to attend his disciplinary hearing by refusing to attend after receiving notice and being given an opportunity to attend. Accordingly, the court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal as frivolous. View "Smith v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that New York General Business Law Section 518 violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and is void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Section 518 provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.” The district court entered a final judgment declaring Section 518 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court reversed, concluding that Section 518 does not violate the First Amendment as applied to single-sticker‐price sellers. And, because it is unclear whether the law applies outside that specific context, there is no basis for the court to conclude that the law violates the First Amendment in any of its applications, much less on its face. The district court also erred in holding that Section 518 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Having concluded that Section 518 enjoys a core set of applications in which it is not unconstitutionally vague - namely, its application to sellers who post single sticker-prices - the court found abstention appropriate in this context also, and therefore did not reach the balance of plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge. The court remanded for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the New York law criminalizing the possession of “gravity knives,” N.Y. Penal Law 265.00(5), 265.01(1), is unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that plaintiffs did not have standing. The court concluded that Plaintiffs Native Leather, Copeland, and Perez have standing to challenge defendants’ application of the statute because each has expressed a present intent to possess such knives (but for defendants’ challenged enforcement actions) and each has demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution based on defendants’ (a) recent enforcement actions against them, (b) express threat to prosecute Native Leather further under the terms of a deferred prosecution agreement, and (c) continued defense of the wrist‐flick test that allegedly prompted plaintiffs’ past violation charges. The court further concluded that its precedent precludes Knife Rights and Knife Rights Foundation from asserting standing on behalf of their members under 42 U.S.C. 1983; nor can these organizational plaintiffs demonstrate standing to sue on their own behalf based on claimed injury to their activities from expenditures diverted to oppose defendants’ actions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint a second time to address defects in standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of the State of Vermont, filed suit against the State, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiffs first filed suit in state court and defendants removed to federal district court. The district court subsequently granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that, while defendants may, by removing the action, have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal forum, defendants have not expressly waived Vermont’s general sovereign immunity from private FLSA suit, and their litigation conduct does not constitute such a waiver. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Beaulieu v. State of Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, a former prosecutor and a former audit-investigator, alleging that defendants deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial by intentionally manipulating the information contained on spreadsheet summary charts before they were presented to the grand jury in order to create the false impression that plaintiff billed Medicaid for dental services that he did not provide. The jury rendered a verdict in plaintiff's favor and the district court subsequently denied defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial. The court concluded that the actions of defendants upon which plaintiff bases his claims were the knowing creation of false or misleading evidence by a government officer acting in an investigative capacity; the court has held that such activity by a government official qualifies as an unconstitutional deprivation of the victimʹs rights; moreover, this was clearly established at the time of defendantsʹ conduct; and therefore, defendants not entitled to qualified immunity. The court further concluded that defendants waived their general‐verdict rule argument and are therefore not entitled to a new trial despite the district courtʹs conclusion that one of the three factual bases for the juryʹs conclusion as to liability was insufficiently substantiated by the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morse v. Fusto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New York state law, against the City, the Police Department, and two Police Department employees, alleging constitutional and tortious injuries resulting from the use of physical force to eject him from the Albany City Court. The district court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims against Officer Blesser, in his individual capacity. The court concluded that, while the law in this circuit holds that an order to depart a public place that allows a person to go anywhere else he wishes does not, without more, effect a Fourth Amendment seizure, under Sheppard v. Beerman, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that the ordering official used physical force intentionally to restrain plaintiff and control his movements, the officer’s conduct may or may not be reasonable, but the Fourth Amendment claim cannot be dismissed for failure plausibly to plead seizure. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff's First Amendment claim was correctly dismissed because he has not alleged either his engagement in expressive conduct or any impairment of his access to judicial records, plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was correctly dismissed because defendant Blesser’s alleged conduct falls well within the ambit of a traditional battery claim. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and affirmed in all other respects, remanding for further proceedings. View "Salmon v. Blesser" on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit against Sterling under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that Sterling engaged in a nationwide practice of sex‐ based pay and promotion discrimination. The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation finding after conducting discovery and found that the EEOC failed to prove that it satisfied its statutory obligation to conduct a pre‐suit investigation and recommended summary judgment on that basis. The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation, granting summary judgment to Sterling. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the magistrate judge improperly reviewed the sufficiency of the EEOC investigation rather than whether there was an investigation. Under Title VII, courts may review whether the EEOC conducted an investigation, but not the sufficiency of an investigation. Because the EEOC conducted an investigation in this case, the court vacated the summary judgment order and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc." on Justia Law