Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and denial of a fair trial. Defendants Velez and Lukeson, officers of the NYPD, and Defendant Calhoun, an NYPD sergeant, appealed from the district court's order that Velez and Lukeson each pay to plaintiff $180,000 in compensatory and punitive damages, and ordering Calhoun to pay $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The court rejected defendants' claims of various evidentiary errors, including the admissibility of the Norman Confession, framing plaintiff, under Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(3). The court also rejected defendants' claims of error regarding jury deliberations where each issue was appropriately dealt with by the district court and none of defendants' contentions warrant extended discussion. Finally, defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the claims against them for malicious prosecution where, even if the court were persuaded that the malicious prosecution claims against Lukeson and Calhoun should have been dismissed, there would be no basis on which to overturn the verdicts against them for denial of a fair trial or to find that the damages awarded were impermissible with respect to the fair trial verdicts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. Velez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are commercial trucking companies, their national trade association, and a putative class of commercial truckers. Plaintiff filed suit against the Thruway Authority under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Thruway Authority charges excessive tolls in violation of the Commerce Clause because it diverts excessive highway tolls to fund maintenance and improvements of unrelated projects. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join the State of New York as a necessary party under Rule 19. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion because the State of New York is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a). View "Am. Trucking Ass'n v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and three supervisors at ACS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment based on race, and retaliated against because of complaints about such discrimination. Plaintiff also alleged that she was sexually harassed in violation of Title VII. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court vacated the district court's judgment granting defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's disparate treatment and retaliation claims against the City under Title VII; plaintiff's disparate treatment claim against Defendant Baker under sections 1981 and 1983 where only Baker was involved in the decision to demote plaintiff; and plaintiff's retaliation claim against Baker under section 1981 where she alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court affirmed as to the other claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Littlejohn v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the revocation of his medical license, challenging New York's use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in revocation proceedings as violating the Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Constitution does not require a higher standard of proof in fraud-based medical disciplinary proceedings. In this case, there is nothing exceptional about plaintiff's hearing that rendered the Hearing Committee's use of the preponderance standard unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. View "Tsirelman v. Daines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3) by retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment right as a member of the Inmate Liaison Committee (ILC) at a correctional facility. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that action as a member of an ILC, i.e. the filing or voicing of grievances on behalf of a prison population, qualifies as constitutionally protected conduct under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that retaliation for such conduct is therefore actionable under Section 1983. The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed the conspiracy claim because plaintiff failed to allege membership in a class protected under Section 1985(3). The court appointed plaintiff counsel in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dolan v. Connolly" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination claims because the court concluded that an affidavit attached as an exhibit to a complaint is not a "written instrument" that is deemed part of the complaint under Rule 10(c); affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, a motion which was first made following the entry of the final judgment. View "Smith v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut rule restricting the use of certain teeth‐whitening procedures to licensed dentists. Specifically, the rule stated that only a licensed dentist could shine a light emitting diode (“LED”) lamp at the mouth of a consumer during a teeth‐whitening procedure. The court concluded that the rule does not violate either due process or equal protection given that at least some evidence exists that LED lights may cause some harm to consumers, and given that there is some relationship between the rule and the harm it seeks to prevent. The court joined the Tenth Circuit and concluded that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of its review of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if the only conceivable reason for the LED restriction was to shield licensed dentists from competition, the court would still be compelled by an unbroken line of precedent to approve the Commission’s action. The court concluded that there are a number of constitutionally rational rounds for the rule and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, Dr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a police officer under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New York State law for false arrest. The officer arrested plaintiff for theft of services after she rebuffed his flirtatious advances, entered the back door of the bus she was intending to ride because the driver could not fix the stuck lift at the front entrance and told passengers to enter through the rear. When she was in line to swipe her MetroCard, the officer intercepted her and made her get off the bus. On appeal, plaintiff challenged portions of the district court's summary judgment order in favor of the officer on the false arrest claims. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue for a jury as to whether a reasonable officer in this officer's position could have had reasonable grounds to believe that she intended to commit, or was committing, theft of services and whether the officer had probable cause to arrest or reasonably hold the mistaken belief that he did. Therefore, the officer is not entitled to summary judgment on either the section 1983 or state law false arrest claims. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Simpson v. City of New York" on Justia Law