Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings relating to his claim of derivative citizenship. Under the statute in effect when petitioner was born - the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the 1952 Act) - a child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother and non‐citizen father has citizenship at birth so long as the mother was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the child’s birth. A child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and non‐citizen mother has citizenship at birth only if the father was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child’s birth for a period or periods totaling at least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of fourteen. In this case, petitioner's father satisfied the requirements for transmitting citizenship applicable to unwed mothers but not the more stringent requirements applicable to unwed mothers. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the gender‐based distinction at the heart of the 1952 Act’s physical presence requirements is not substantially related to the achievement of a permissible, non‐stereotype‐based objective. The court saw no reason that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to their child’s birth in order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen children born abroad. Conforming the immigration laws Congress enacted with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, the court concluded that petitioner is a citizen as of his birth. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Morales-Santana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against DSS to enforce the Food Stamp Act's, 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9), time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. The district court certified a class consisting of all past, current, and future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely manner and the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring DSS to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. The court concluded that plaintiff can maintain a private lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits in section 2020(e)(3) and (9). The court also concluded that federal regulations do not excuse DSS from processing food stamp applications within the statutory time limits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Briggs v. Bremby" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, 26 N.Y. Exec. Law 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as his defamation claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court except with respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary judgment based on plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff submitted evidence that the principal of the school changed the person who conducted plaintiff's year-end evaluation without providing notice to plaintiff, that the principal relied on the 2008-2009 evaluations at issue in isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews were aberrational. These irregularities, when combined with the principal's alleged remarks, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Tolbert v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New York corporation, filed suit attempting to collect money owed to it under defaulted Sub Notes issued by a now-dissolved entity, Hellas. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting defendantsʹ motion to dismiss its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff also argued that the district court erred in failing to grant to it the opportunity to cure any standing defect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff has not carried its burden of showing a valid assignment of a claim. Nor has plaintiff pointed to anything in the assignment, or to other evidence in the record, suggesting that title to claims arising under the Sub Notes was assigned to it. Although the court determined that plaintiff did not forfeit its rights under Rule 17, the court concluded that the district courtʹs decision to deny relief under that rule was not an abuse of discretion because neither of the requests made by plaintiff in its effort to cure the standing problem would have been consistent with Rule 17(a)(3). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecommunications" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, incarcerated for 18 years for a murder he did not commit, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state common law, for damages. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning violations of due process where plaintiff alleged that investigating police officers used unconstitutionally suggestive identification procedures and coerced witnesses. The court concluded, however, that there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning malicious prosecution because no facts in dispute support a lack of probable cause to charge him with the relevant crime. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bermudez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of minor child A.R., filed suit against a real estate agency and its agent for disability discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made housing unavailable on the basis of disability; provided different terms, conditions, and privileges of rental housing on the basis of disability; expressed a preference on the basis of disability; and misrepresented the availability of rental housing on the basis of disability. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held, however, that the district court erred because there was sufficient evidence presented that A.R. qualifies as disabled under the FHA; the FHA’s prohibition against statements that “indicate[ ] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap,” pursuant to section 3604(c), may be violated even if the subject of those statements does not qualify as disabled under the FHA; and the “ordinary listener” standard is not applicable to claims under section 3604(d) for misrepresenting the availability of housing. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff's Department and others, alleging that he was severely beaten by deputy sheriffs while being detained in a holding cell. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings because failure to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), is an affirmative defense, and because the evidence adduced by defendants - principally in the form of a conclusory affidavit - does not suffice to establish the defense as a matter of law. The court need not consider plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Hubbs v. Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

CFF, a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting adoption, filed suit against the DMV after the DMV rejected CFF's application for a "Choose Life" custom license plate. The district court concluded that DMV violated CFF's First Amendment rights and, in the alternative, that the entire license plate program was unconstitutional on its face because it afforded the DMV Commissioner unbridled discretion over which custom plates to approve. The court concluded, however, that the content of New York’s custom license plates constitutes private speech and that the plates themselves are a nonpublic forum; CFF’s facial challenge fails because New York’s custom plate program did not impermissibly vest the DMV Commissioner with unbridled discretion in approving custom plate designs; and that program, as applied in this case, was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, which is all that the First Amendment requires of restrictions on expression in a nonpublic forum. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rex v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a software engineer, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 296, against his employer for disability discrimination, alleging that the employer did not accommodate his deafness by arranging that all video files stored on its corporate intranet be captioned when posted and that all audio files be posted with transcripts. The court concluded that the employer provided plaintiff with reasonable accommodations by providing an American Sign Language interpreter. There is no evidence that the interpreters the employer provided were unqualified or that the use of interpreters was somehow inconsistent with plaintiff’s position as a software engineer. Plaintiff's objection - that he had to look back and forth between an interpreter and his screen - did not, without more, make that accommodation unreasonable. The court held that the ADA imposes no liability for an employer’s failure to explore alternative accommodations when the accommodations provided to the employee were plainly reasonable. In this case, because the employer provided reasonable accommodation to plaintiff, any failure to engage in an interactive process - even if supported by the record - did not give rise to a discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer. View "Noll v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp." on Justia Law