Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against FBI agents alleging that they violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510‐2522, when they listened to her private calls with her husband. The agents had an authorized wiretap on the telephone of plaintiff's husband as part of an investigation into a conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The calls were intercepted during the authorized wiretap. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the complaint does not plausibly state a claim because it recites only legal conclusions. The court also concluded that the district court, in its qualified immunity analysis, should have assessed the reasonableness of the agents' minimization efforts as they relate to each defendant. View "Drimal v. Makol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against defendants and defendants subsequently offered to settle plaintiff's individual claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 for an amount greater than the statutory damages to which plaintiff would have been entitled if successful. Plaintiff refused to accept and defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, holding that although plaintiff’s individual claims were rendered moot by the unaccepted Rule 68 offer, his putative class action claims were not. The court held that the district court maintained Article III subject matter jurisdiction over the case because, under the law of the Circuit, an unaccepted Rule 68 offer alone does not render a plaintiff’s individual claims moot before the entry of judgment against the defendants. Therefore, the district court maintained Article III subject matter jurisdiction over the case regardless of plaintiff’s putative class action claims. Accordingly, because it is unnecessary to the disposition of this case, the court did not reach the certified question of whether putative class action claims brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules generally provide an independent basis for Article III justiciability. The court affirmed the district court’s decision that it maintained subject matter jurisdiction over the case, albeit on the alternative ground that plaintiff's individual claims were not moot at the time the district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, on statutory and constitutional grounds, the telephone metadata program under which the NSA collects in bulk "on an ongoing daily basis" the metadata associated with telephone calls made by and to Americans. The NSA aggregates those metadata into a repository or data bank that can later be queried. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs have standing to sue; the court disagreed with the district court insofar as it held that plaintiffs are precluded from bringing suit against the government and hold that they have a right of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702; on the merits, the court concluded that § 215 of the PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, section 215, does not authorize the telephone metadata collection program; the court did not address the constitutionality of the program; and the court declined to conclude that a preliminary injunction is required, leaving it to the district court to reconsider, in the first instance, the propriety of preliminary relief in light of a correct understanding of the governing law. Therefore, the district court erred in ruling that section 215 authorizes the telephone metadata collection program. The telephone metadata program exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized and therefore violates § 215. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "ACLU v. Clapper" on Justia Law

Defendant and his counsel, D&B, (collectively, "petitioners") appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss their petition asserting an interest found in property found subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(2) after defendant's co-defendant was convicted. The district court determined that both parties had standing but that petitioners failed to state any claims for relief. The court concluded that because the government’s forfeiture claim qualifies it as a creditor under New York law, the government has standing to challenge D&B's assignment as a fraudulent conveyance; because the record fails to establish whether the transferor of the contested funds was insolvent at the time of the transfer so as to render D&B’s assignment a fraudulent conveyance, the petitioners have, at this stage in the proceedings, alleged a plausible interest in the property sufficient to create standing to seek an ancillary hearing; because the contested funds are subject to forfeiture as “proceeds” of the co-defendant's criminal activity and therefore only came into existence following the commission of his criminal act, petitioners cannot claim that D&B had a superior interest in those funds at the time of the offense as required by 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A); and because the criminal forfeiture statute limits a third party’s right to challenge a post‐indictment forfeiture order to the two grounds identified in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), petitioners may not challenge the inclusion of the contested funds in the forfeiture order under § 982(a)(2). The court concluded, however, that because D&B accepted the assignment of the contested funds shortly after a Monsanto hearing in which the district court determined that the government failed to establish probable cause to restrain the contested property, and because the petition alleges no additional facts suggesting that D&B had reason to know that the property was forfeitable as a matter of law, petitioners have plausibly alleged that D&B was a bona fide purchaser reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "United States v. Watts" on Justia Law

Cox was convicted in 2001 on narcotics and firearms charges and was sentenced to 540 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Cox’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. In 2004, he sought a new trial, arguing that the government knowingly allowed witnesses to testify falsely to his transactions in guns of a type that had not yet been manufactured. The district court denied the motion. Later in 2004, Cox unsuccessfully moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to set aside the convictions. The district court later vacated the firearms convictions and resentenced Cox on the narcotics convictions. Cox appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed. In 2011, Cox filed another section 2255 motion, seeking to overturn the narcotics convictions, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in their failure to detect and protest the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. The district court denied the motion, finding the claims time-barred because they “relate[d] only to the original sentencing,” and procedurally barred as first raised on collateral review; Cox had not demonstrated cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his failure to raise them previously. The Second Circuit denied certificates of appealability. On some claims, Cox failed to make a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right; others are procedurally barred. View "Cox v. United States" on Justia Law

Smith alleged that New York State Trooper Campbell began harassing her in 2007, tailgating her in an off-duty vehicle, parking behind her, and questioning Smith about her driving. Smith’s adult son, Tom and Campbell exchanged heated words; Campbell indicated that Smith would receive another ticket because of Tom’s actions. Tom stated that he would speak to Campbell’s supervisor. Campbell left without issuing any tickets. Smith complained about Campbell’s conduct. Hours later, Campbell appeared at Smith’s home and delivered three tickets related to the incident. Smith wrote letters complaining of Campbell’s conduct. Smith’s accusations were dismissed; Smith was convicted on the tickets. Three days later Tom remarked, at a restaurant, that Campbell was harassing his mother. Campbell appeared at Smith’s home that day with another Trooper, resulting in a confrontation with Lilly, Smith’s son-in-law. Two years later, Smith and Lilly filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The judge identified: a First Amendment peaceable assembly claim asserted by Lilly, a retaliatory prosecution claim by Smith, an unlawful seizure claim by Lilly, and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim by both. The district court dismissed, finding the retaliatory prosecution claim time-barred and that Lilly improperly identified the unlawful seizure claim as arising under the Fourth Amendment rather than under section 1983. The Second Circuit vacated as to the unlawful seizure claim, View "Smith v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Taylor sued Nassau County, its police department, and officers and supervisors, alleging that officer Rogich used excessive force when he shot Taylor while apprehending him. After dismissals and partial summary judgment, the only defendant was Rogich. The district judge held that Rogich was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim of qualified immunity, because the claim depended on the resolution of disputed issues of fact and the jury’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. At the close of the liability phase of the trial, the jury found that Rogich used excessive force that caused Taylor injury. Rogich moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the plaintiff had provided no coherent version of events which a jury could have credited one way or the other. Rogich’s motion was denied because his assertion of qualified immunity depended on a view of the facts that was explicitly rejected by the jury” The Second Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction to decide an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that the denial involves only a question of evidence sufficiency. View "Taylor v. Rogich" on Justia Law

Home health care plaintiffs sought to prevent the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, from enforcing the Wage Parity Law, which sets the minimum amount of total compensation that employers must pay home care aides in order to receive Medicaid reimbursements for reimbursable care provided in New York City and Westchester, Suffolk, and Nassau Counties, N.Y. Pub. Health Law 3614‐c. Plaintiffs claim the Law was either preempted by the National Labor Relations 8 Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, or was unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court conclusion that the state law, except for one severable provision subdivision that singles out Taft‐Hartley plans for special treatment, is neither preempted nor unconstitutional. View "Concerned Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with murder, based on a 1996 Bronx armed robbery. The prosecution called an incarcerated witness, Ferguson, to whom Smith had made incriminating statements while in jail, indicating that Ferguson was not a government agent. Ferguson later admitted that he had previously been a paid informant. Defense never moved to suppress the incriminating statements. Following his conviction, Smith’s new counsel uncovered undisclosed evidence that Ferguson had collaborated with law enforcement for four years before Smith’s trial. State courts rejected direct appeals. Smith, pro se, moved to vacate his conviction. The state court denied the motion as unsupported by the record. Smith, through counsel, filed another motion, arguing for the first time that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress. The state court denied the motion as “procedurally barred and meritless … defendant was in the position to adequately raise all issues … in the previous motion [and] failed to establish … ineffective assistance of counsel.” Smith sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasserting the ineffective assistance claim. The district court granted the writ, finding that the state court decision rested on procedural grounds. The Second Circuit reversed: the decision was adjudication on the merits, entitled to AEDPA deference, and not so lacking in justification as to warrant habeas relief. View "Fischer v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a 22-minute traffic stop in Massachusetts, Foreste was given a speeding ticket. During the stop, the officer was concerned about Foreste’s vague answers and that his car rental agreement had expired. After he drove away, the police learned that Foreste was a dealer who transported drugs from New York to Burlington in rental vehicles. Hoping to stop him again, police watched as the car entered Vermont and saw it roll through a stop sign. Officers saw what they believed to be narcotics residue on his clothing and face. About 38 minutes after the stop, a canine alerted to drugs in the car. Foreste was found to be in possession of oxycodone. He entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute, but preserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. The Second Circuit rejected his argument that the duration of the two successive traffic stops was unreasonably intrusive in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but vacated for discovery of the narcotics canine’s field performance records. The district court erred in denying his discovery request. View "United States v. Foreste" on Justia Law