Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1993, a jury found Rivas guilty of second-degree murder for killing his former girlfriend (Hill) on March 27, 1987. Rivas was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life. In 1999, Rivas sought post-conviction relief (NY Criminal Procedure Law 440.10), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and presenting essentially unchallenged expert testimony persuasively demonstrating that Hill could not have died on Friday, March 27, 1987. The Onondaga County trial court denied Rivas’s petition. In 2002, Rivas filed an amended federal petition for habeas corpus. After a remand, the district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a credible and compelling showing of actual innocence warrants an equitable exception to the limitation period set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and that Rivas had made such a showing. The court stated that a reasonable juror, apprised of all the evidence in the record, would more likely than not vote to acquit. On second remand, the court denied Rivas’s petition in its entirety. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the state court’s denial of Rivas’s ineffective-assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s decision, Strickland v. Washington. View "Rivas v. Fischer" on Justia Law

More than nine months after someone using Raymonda’s IP address accessed thumbnail images of child pornography on the Internet, government agents obtained a search warrant for his home and discovered more than 1000 files of child pornography. The district court granted Raymonda’s motion to suppress, finding that the government’s evidence that Raymonda had accessed child pornography on a single occasion nine months earlier was too stale to establish probable cause that he would still possess illicit images at the time of the search. The Second Circuit reversed, rejecting the government’s arguments that the recognized propensity of persons interested in child pornography to collect and hoard such images supports an inference that Raymonda would still possess child pornography when the warrant was sought, but holding that, even if probable cause was lacking, the evidence should not be suppressed because the agents who executed the search relied in good faith on a warrant duly issued by a judicial officer. View "United States v. Raymonda" on Justia Law

Officer Matthews sued, alleging that the City of New York retaliated against him for speaking to his commanding officers about an arrest quota policy at his precinct. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Matthews spoke as a public employee, not as a citizen, and that his speech was, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. The Second Circuit vacated, reasoning that because Matthews’s comments on precinct policy did not fall within his official duties and because he elected a channel with a civilian analogue to pursue his complaint, he spoke as a citizen. View "Matthews v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 1984, V.J. was raped. She lost an eye and suffered broken ribs. The NYPD collected a rape kit, with pubic and head hair, swabs, and microscope slides. Based on line‐ups, V.J. and a witness identified Newton as her assailant. The rape kit was not tested for DNA. Newton was convicted. In 1988, by court order, the sample was tested by the Chief Medical Examiner, which reported that it contained no testable spermatozoa. In 1994, based on new law, Newton sought testing, alleging that technological advances had enabled testing of samples previously deemed untestable. The District Attorney’s Office responded that the evidence could not be found. Newton’s motion was denied. In 1995 Newton sought habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), unsuccessfully, because the evidence was not found. In 1998, Newton again sought testing; the DA’s Office indicated that the kit “must have been destroyed,” noting a 1995 fire and that the Property Clerk had a practice of destroying records after six years. In 2005 Newton again requested a search; the evidence was found. The Chief Medical Examiner concluded that the rape kit DNA profile did not match Newton. The state court vacated Newton’s conviction. Newton sued the city and NYPD officials, claiming that the inadequate evidence management system had deprived him of due process and access to the courts. The district court set aside a verdict in Newton’s favor. The Second Circuit vacated. New York law does provide a convicted prisoner a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with newly available DNA evidence and such a prisoner is entitled to reasonable procedures that permit him to vindicate that interest. View "Newton v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor, filed suit against WCC, alleging violations of her state and federal constitutional rights when WCC terminated her employment for purportedly making offensive comments in class. On appeal, WCC challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that WCC is not an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court concluded that a finding of sovereign immunity for WCC would not serve the twin aims of the Eleventh Amendment because immunity would not further the state's interest in preserving its treasury, nor would it protect the integrity of the state. View "Leitner v. Westchester Community College" on Justia Law

Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred. View "National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. Although the court affirmed the ADEA portion of the judgment, the court reiterated that district courts who exercise pendant jurisdiction over NYCHRL claims are required by the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85, to analyze those claims under a different standard from that applicable to parallel federal and state law claims. In this case, the court vacated the NYCHRL portion of the judgment and remanded to the district court because the district court did not analyze plaintiff's claim separately and independently. View "Velazco v. Columbus Citizens" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the creation in Westhampton Beach of an "eruv," a delineated geographic area significant to certain adherents of Judaism. The district court dismissed the complaint based on Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) and plaintiffs appealed. The court rejected defendants' two jurisdictional challenges and concluded, on the merits, that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause against any of defendants. Two of the remaining three defendants are plainly not state actors and claims against these defendants must be dismissed for lack of state action. As to the remaining defendant, LIPA, plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded that there was no secular purpose to the governmental action here. LIPA entered into a paid licensing agreement allowing the installation of items of religious significance on utility poles. Further, no reasonable observer who notices the strips on LIPA utility poles would draw the conclusion that a state actor is thereby endorsing religion, even assuming that a reasonable observer is aware that a state actor was the entity that contracted with a private party to lease the space. Finally, there is no risk of excessive government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, the court found no merit in plaintiffs' arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of Westhampton Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against the Secretary on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries who were placed into "observation status" by their hospitals rather than being admitted as "inpatients." Placement into "observation status" allegedly caused these beneficiaries to pay thousands of dollars more for their medical care. The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395, claims where plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the adequacy of the notices they received and nothing in the statute entitles plaintiffs to the process changes they seek. However, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Due Process claims where the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in being treated as "inpatients," because the district court accepted as true the Secretary's assertion that a hospital's decision to formally admit a patient is "a complex medical judgment" left to the doctor's discretion. The district court's conclusion constituted impermissible factfinding, which in any event is inconsistent with the complaint's allegations that the decision to admit is guided by fixed and objective criteria. View "Barrows v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the county and the police commissioner, alleging that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Because defendants do not challenge them on appeal, the court did not revisit the district court's conclusions that plaintiff's media communications enjoyed First Amendment protection. The court expressed no opinion as to whether plaintiff would have been able to prevail on the basis of his indirect evidence of retaliatory intent; concluded that plaintiff has proffered sufficient direct evidence of retaliatory intent from which a reasonable jury could find a causal connection between his protected speech and the Department's adverse employment actions and, therefore, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation; concluded that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment based on the Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle defense; and concluded that the record raises several genuine questions of material fact such that an award of summary judgment in defendants' favor is unjust. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment otherwise and remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. County of Suffolk" on Justia Law