Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was sitting on a bus when police officers boarded the bus, removed him, and arrested him on a misdemeanor bench warrant. Plaintiff, then 67 years old, was a resident of the City of Elmira (the "City"), in Chemung County (the "County"), New York. Plaintiff was taken to the County Jail, where an officer subjected him to a visual body cavity strip search. In addition, although Plaintiff’s girlfriend promptly posted his bail, his release was delayed about two hours. Plaintiff sued the County, the City, and officers in the County Sheriff's Department and City Police Department in the Western District of New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed the claims against the City and County at the outset of the case and eventually granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the individual defendants as well.  Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that on the record, a reasonable jury could find that, instead of simply following the orders of a superior officer, the corrections officer was a party to harassment and demeaning conduct culminating in the search -- conduct that he, and other reasonable officers, should have known had no legitimate penological purpose and was therefore unconstitutional. The court explained that a jury may find otherwise, but in light of these disputed material facts, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s strip search claim. View "Murphy v. Hughson et al." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition after previously having been convicted of a felony. The district court determined that Defendant’s recommended range of imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines was 15 to 21 months. On July 7, 2021, the court nevertheless sentenced Defendant principally to an above-Guidelines sentence of 48 months of imprisonment. Defendant argued that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain its rationale for the sentence it imposed on Defendant and because the district court’s stated justifications were insufficient to support the sentence imposed.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court explained that to hold that Defendant’s sentence was not ultimately reasonable, the court would need to conclude that the sentence he received was “shockingly high.” Defendant argued that his sentence meets that standard because, inter alia, he had a difficult upbringing, completed many rehabilitative program hours while in prison, and does not have a lengthy history of violence. The court explained that these facts weigh in Defendant’s favor and likely were part of the district court’s reasons for not sentencing Defendant to a 70-month imprisonment term as the government requested and as Defendant received when he was convicted of the same offense in 2005. However, they are not strong enough to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when sentencing Defendant to a 48-month imprisonment term. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not commit any plain procedural error when imposing Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

In the months following the 2020 presidential election, Defendant-Appellant threatened prominent elected officials in several posts on various social media platforms. A jury convicted Defendant of one count of threatening to assault and murder members of Congress. The district court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of nineteen months. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, a jury instruction, the partial closure of the courtroom due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and his sentence.The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the constitutional fact doctrine’s requirement that courts “determine for themselves whether the fact-finder appropriately applied First Amendment law to the facts” is inapplicable where, as here, the First Amendment is not implicated. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.   Defendant also argued that the district court violated his right to a public trial by excluding his father from the courtroom during the trial. The court explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants in a criminal prosecution the right to a public trial. However, the court reasoned as a general matter, courts may constitutionally close a courtroom under certain circumstances. Applying the relevant four-part test, the court found that the district court did not plainly err by excluding Defendant’s father from the trial courtroom.   Defendant also challenged the district court’s sentence on the ground that it improperly considered a rehabilitative purpose in sentencing him to prison. The court explained that in sentencing Defendant, the district court did not impermissibly consider rehabilitation. Rather, it considered the factors prescribed by 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, nineteen children in New York City’s foster care system, filed suit alleging “systemic deficiencies” in the administration of the City’s foster care system in violation of federal and state law. The named Plaintiffs moved to represent a class of all children who are now or will be in the foster care custody of the Commissioner of New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services and two subclasses. As remedies, they sought injunctive and declaratory relief to redress alleged class-wide injuries caused by deficiencies in the City’s administration—and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services’ oversight—of foster care. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis of the commonality and typicality requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying class certification and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in its analysis of commonality and typicality under Rule 23. The court explained that the district court did not determine whether commonality and typicality exist with respect to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. Instead, it concluded that commonality was lacking as to all alleged harms because “Plaintiffs’ allegations do not flow from unitary, non-discretionary policies.” The court held that this approach was legal error requiring remand. Further, the court wrote that here, the district court largely relied upon its commonality analysis to support its finding that typicality was not satisfied. Thus, the deficiencies identified in its commonality inquiry can also be found in its handling of typicality. View "Elisa W. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two couples, both engaged to be married when they filed suit and a New York-based minister. Together, the individuals brought a constitutional challenge to state COVID-19 regulations that limited to fifty the number of attendees at social gatherings. After the expedited briefing, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction just forty-five minutes before the start time of the first of the two scheduled weddings. The first of the couples married in their planned ceremony and held their wedding celebration involving over 100 guests. A Second Circuit judge issued a temporary administrative stay of the district court’s order. A separate panel later dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the district court’s order after the second couple announced that, regardless of the outcome of the appeal, they no longer planned to hold a wedding. All five Plaintiffs then sought an award of attorney’s fees in the district court. The district court denied their motion.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Plaintiffs managed to secure a preliminary injunction with just forty-five minutes to spare after an abbreviated briefing schedule. The court further wrote that their initial success was fleeting: Defendants succeeded in obtaining a stay of the injunction from the court within two weeks of its issuance, and the district court’s order was later vacated after Plaintiffs intentionally mooted their claims during the pendency of Defendants’ appeal. The preliminary injunction in this case does not support a determination that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties eligible for attorney’s fees under Section 1988. View "DiMartile v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several family members of a United States citizen killed in an overseas terrorist attack, appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing their claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Government, as intervenor in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 2403(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(c), also appealed from that judgment. On appeal, both Plaintiffs and the Government argued that the district court erred in finding unconstitutional the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”), the statute on which Plaintiffs relied to allege personal jurisdiction over Defendants.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the PSJVTA specifically provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in any civil action pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333, irrespective of “the date of the occurrence of the act of international terrorism” at issue, upon engaging in certain forms of post-enactment conduct, namely (1) making payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertaking any activities within the United States, subject to a handful of exceptions. Thus, the court concluded that the PSJVTA’s “deemed consent” provision is inconsistent with the dictates of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. View "Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of United States citizens injured during terror attacks in Israel and the estates or survivors of United States citizens killed in such attacks, brought an action against the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), seeking damages. The Second Circuit concluded on appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA and vacated the judgment entered against Defendants. Plaintiffs later moved to recall the mandate based on a new statute, the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018. The Second Circuit denied that motion. Congress responded with the statute now at issue, the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (“PSJVTA”). The district court concluded that Defendants had engaged in jurisdiction-triggering conduct under the statute but that the PSJVTA violated constitutional due process requirements. Plaintiffs and the Government disputed the latter conclusion, and Plaintiffs argued generally that the PSJVTA justifies recalling the mandate.   The Second Circuit denied Plaintiffs’ motion to call the mandate. The court explained that the PSJVTA provides that the PLO and the PA “shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction” in any civil ATA action if, after a specified time, those entities either (1) make payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertake any activities within the United States, subject to limited exceptions. The court concluded that the PSJVTA’s provision for “deemed consent” to personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. View "Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African American woman, claims that her employer, defendant-appellee General Motors, LLC ("General Motors"), subjected her to a hostile work environment, race and sex discrimination, and retaliation at her place of employment, the General Motors plant in Lockport, New York. In the district court, Plaintiff presented evidence that, for example: a manager called her a "dumb n****r" in front of other employees; racist and sexist words or material were displayed around the plant; sexist comments were directed at her; the Confederate flag was depicted on employees' vehicles and clothing; and nooses were displayed on three separate occasions near the workstations of Black employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of General Motors, dismissing initially Plaintiff’s hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims and eventually her retaliation claim as well.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that the district court erred because a reasonable jury could find that General Motors's decisions to delay Plaintiff’s return to work and to reassign her upon her return are adverse actions that give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court explained that a reasonable jury could also infer discriminatory intent in General Motors's decision to require that Plaintiff obtain psychiatric approval in contravention of company policy and contrary to the approval process Plaintiff had undergone for her prior disability leaves. The district court erred in determining that Plaintiff did not establish an inference of discrimination" when the proper inquiry was, instead, whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer a discriminatory motive. View "Billie R. Banks v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested in the Bronx after discharging a pistol. He was subsequently indicted for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, to which he pleaded guilty in April 2021. The government notified Defendant just before he entered his plea that it intended to seek an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence that, it claimed, had been triggered under the ACCA by Defendant’s three prior felony convictions in New York. The district court concluded that Defendant was not a career offender under the ACCA and therefore declined to impose a sentencing enhancement sought by the government. The issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s 2014 conviction under New York Penal Law Section 220.39(1) for the sale of cocaine was for a “serious drug offense” and therefore qualifies as a predicate offense for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that New York’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than its federal counterpart, thus, Defendant’s cocaine conviction cannot serve as a predicate ACCA offense. The government argued that under Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, that even if the New York definition of cocaine is broadly construed to criminalize all its isomers, Minter must show a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that New York’s statute is broader in practice. The court explained that here, the New York statute applies on its face to all cocaine isomers; the CSA does not. In citing Hylton, the court wrote, “When the state law is facially overbroad, we look no further.” View "U.S. v. Minter" on Justia Law

A school bus driver filed an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two public-sector unions and her employer, the New Hartford Central School District, alleging that their continued deduction of union fees from her paycheck following her resignation from both unions violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). She appealed the dismissal of her claims, arguing that the district court erred by prematurely dismissing her claims against the unions for, among other things, failing to adequately plead state action.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because Appellant voluntarily became a union member and affirmatively agreed to pay union dues through payroll deductions for a set period, the district court properly dismissed her claims. The court explained that New York’s Taylor Law guarantees public employees the right to choose whether to join the union as members, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law Section 202 and prohibits any union or public employer from “interfering with, restraining or coercing public employees in the exercise of their rights.” Here,  it is undisputed that Appellant voluntarily joined the Unions and authorized dues deductions from her wages when she signed the Membership Agreement in 2018. View "Wheatley v. New York State United Teachers, et al." on Justia Law