Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chabad and Rabbi Joseph Eisenbach filed suit against defendants, alleging that defendants violated their rights by denying an application to expand an existing property to accommodate Chabad's religious mission. Chabad filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.; and Connecticut state law, seeking damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and the appointment of a federal monitor. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Rabbi Eisenbach's RLUIPA claims for lack of standing; vacated the district court's ruling insofar as it concerned the Rabbi and remanded for consideration, instead, whether the Rabbi failed to state a claim under RLUIPA; affirmed the remainder of the judgment due to the Rabbi's failure to brief his remaining claims; concluded that the HDC's review of the Chabad's application was an "individual assessment" subject to RLUIPA's substantial burden provision and that the Chabad need not cite an "identical" comparator to establish a claim under RLUIPA's nondiscrimination provision; vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it concerned these RLUIPA claims and remanded for consideration whether these claims survive summary judgment; and affirmed the remainder of the district court's February 2012 judgment largely due to the Chabad's failure to brief most of its remaining claims. View "Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield v. Litchfield Historic District Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employers, BoA, on his claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and breach of contract. Under the McDonald Douglas Corp v. Green framework, assuming arguendo that plaintiff met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination, the court agreed with the district court that BoA has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. BoA has explained that plaintiff's employment was terminated as part of a company-wide reduction in force; two months prior to his termination, plaintiff received a negative mid-year performance review; and as of September 2010, plaintiff was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year and his performance was the worse of all employees in his group. In regards to the breach of contract claim, the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was an at-will employee and that although annual bonuses were discretionary, there is no record evidence, or even an allegation, indicating that plaintiff was promised a mid-year bonus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Delaney v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Safelite appealed from the denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Connecticut's Public Act 13-67, "An Act Concerning Automotive Glass Work." The court held that the district court erred in applying rational basis review under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, but rather should have applied intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. Under Central Hudson, the court concluded that there is no claim, much less evidence, that Safelite's communications to its customers were false, misleading, or illegal; the court was skeptical that the government's asserted consumer protection interests are genuine and not merely post-hoc rationalizations; even if the government had a substantial interest in consumer choice, PA 13-67 advances that interest, if at all, in an indiscernible or de minimus fashion; PA 13-67 is more restrictive than necessary to effectuate the government's legitimate interests; and PA 13-67 is underinclusive because it only applies to third-party insurance claims administrators who also own an affiliated glass shop. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction and for further proceedings. View "Safelite Group, Inc. v. Jepsen" on Justia Law

VRLC is a non-profit corporation and VRLC-FIPE is a political committee formed under Vermont law. VRLC challenged three disclosure provisions of Vermont's election laws as unconstitutionally vague and violating freedom of speech. The court concluded that the Vermont statutory disclosure provisions concerning electioneering communications and mass media activities are constitutional and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee due to vagueness nor the First Amendment's free speech guarantee; Vermont's "political committee" definition did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because of vagueness nor violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee; and Vermont may impose contribution limits on VRLC-PC, an entity that makes contributions to candidates, and the statute's contribution limits were constitutionally applied to VRLC-FIPE, which claims to be an independent-expenditure-only PAC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against four trusts to which their loans and mortgages were assigned in transactions involving the mortgagee bank, and against those trusts' trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that plaintiffs were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the assignment agreements and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims. It is undisputed that in 2009 or 2010, each plaintiff was declared to be in default of his mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings were instituted in connection with the institution of said foreclosure proceedings, the trustee claimed to own each of plaintiff's mortgage and that plaintiffs are not seeking to enjoin foreclosure proceedings. Assuming that these concessions have not rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to defendants' ownership of the loans and entitlement to payments. Plaintiffs neither established constitutional nor prudential standing to pursue the claims they asserted. View "Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his original complaint against DIL and his amended complaint against DIL's wholly-owned subsidiary, Daikin America. Plaintiff, a white male of United States origin, alleged that DIL and Daikin discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin. Plaintiff claimed that, for discriminatory reasons, Daikin America did not consider terminating any of the Japanese rotational employees or any employees of Japanese national origin who had been hired directly by Daikin America. The court concluded that, under the standards articulated in Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., plaintiff sufficiently alleged that DIL was part of a "single integrated enterprise" with Daikin America to be properly named as a codefendant; plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of race and national origin discrimination against both defendants; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim because he failed to allege that either defendant maintained a written policy of terminating employees only for cause. View "Brown v. Daikin America Inc." on Justia Law

Non-Settling Defendants seek to overturn a partial final judgment approving the settlement of certain putative class actions. The settled claims were brought by Investor Plaintiffs who were individual and institutional investors in so-called Bernard Madoff feeder funds managed by the Fairfield Greenwich Group (Settling Defendants). The Non-Settling Defendants challenged a provision in the settlement agreement that provides that investors who filed claims under the settlement submit to the district court's jurisdiction for the sole purpose of participating in the settlement and not for any other purpose. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that a settlement which does not prevent the later assertion of a non-settling party's claims, does not cause the non-settling party "formal" legal prejudice. Therefore, the court concluded that the Non-Settling Defendants did not have standing to object to the settlement. The court declined to address the remaining issues on appeal and dismissed for lack of standing. View "Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, et al. v. Bhatia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after she was temporarily removed from the office of the Clinton County Election Commissioner during her candidacy for Beekmantown Town Justice. Plaintiff alleged that her removal from office under Clinton County Local Law No. 1 was an unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights in running for elective office. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's evidence failed to show a genuine issue of material fact supporting her claim of unconstitutional retaliation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed her federal claim. The court vacated, however, the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 1 is void under New York state law. The timing of the claim raises a substantial question whether the claim was moot. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider the question of mootness in the first instance. View "Castine v. Zurlo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Governor and DCJS on plaintiff's as-applied constitutional challenges to the enforcement of certain amendments to the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), N.Y. Correct. Law 168-h. The amendments were enacted after plaintiff pleaded guilty to misdemeanor attempted possession of a sexual performance by a child, as a result of which he was classified as a level-one sex offender required to register under SORA. The court concluded, among other things, that requiring plaintiff to comply with these post-plea amendments did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fourth Amendment, nor deprived him of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doe v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed from the district court's dismissal of their claims under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, as well as the Religions Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. Appellants challenged two statutory provisions, 31 U.S.C. 5112(d)(1) and 5114(b), which require that the country's motto, "In God We Trust," be placed on all coinage and paper currency. Joining its sister circuits, the court held that sections 5112(d)(1) and 5114(b) do not violate the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, or RFRA because the statutes at issue have a secular purpose and neither advance nor inhibit religion and appellants have failed to identify a substantial burden upon their religious practices or beliefs. The court considered appellants' remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Newdow v. United States" on Justia Law