Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff sought to obtain records from the SSA related to his father's disability status in order to support his efforts to obtain proceeds of his father's life insurance policy, plaintiff filed suit pro se alleging that the failure to provide the requested records violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. The SSA eventually voluntarily provided the requested records to plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his claim for damages and litigation fees under the Privacy Act and FOIA. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim for damages under the Privacy Act because the Act guarantees access only to an individual's own records and does not require federal agencies to provide information that pertains to a requesting individual, but is contained in another individual's records. However, because FOIA allows for fee shifting where, as here, a federal agency voluntarily complies with a requested disclosure following the filing of a FOIA lawsuit, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment denying plaintiff's request for $350 in litigation costs and remanded with instructions. View "Warren v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their son in a specialized private school designed to educate children with learning disabilities and filed suit against the District for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) awarded tuition reimbursement but the State Review Officer (SRO) reversed. The court held that the SRO's decision was insufficiently reasoned to merit deference and deferred to the IHO's decision, which was more thorough and carefully considered. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, where the parents had not presented sufficient evidence of bad faith or gross misjudgment. View "C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of her state-law tort claims as time-barred, arguing that the statute of limitations applicable to her tort claims was tolled by her filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The court joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding as a matter of federal law that filing an EEOC charge did not toll the limitations period of state-law tort claims, even if those claims arose out of the same factual circumstances as the discrimination alleged in the EEOC charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's tort claims. View "Castagna v. Luceno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se, filed suit against defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference. After plaintiff was beaten by police officers, he was taken to the emergency room where was evaluated doctors. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Rabin, one of the doctors, allowed herself to be influenced by the officers who told Rabin that plaintiff had attacked a female police officer and that he should be ignored and left alone. The district court concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not state a claim for deliberate indifference because he did not adequately allege that Rabin acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The court concluded that if plaintiff's complaint were amended to include the allegations in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, the complaint would sufficiently set forth the mental state element of his deliberate indifference claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend and remanded for further proceedings where amendment in this instance would not be futile. View "Nielsen v. Bloomberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that the procedures employed by the Commission in investigating, evaluating, and resolving his claim of discrimination violated due process. As defendants did not have a duty to perform any activity that they allegedly failed to perform, the court agreed with the district court that not performing such actions was not a violation of the process to which plaintiff was entitled. Further, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the Commission's procedures facially violated due process. The court held that the procedures of the Commission, which included administrative and judicial review, satisfied due process and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rosu v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

A Vermont statute requires all "health insurers" to file with the State reports containing claims data and other "information relating to health care." Liberty Mutual sought a declaration that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., preempted the Vermont statute and regulation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vermont. The court held that the reporting requirements of the Vermont statute and regulation have a "connection with" ERISA plans and were therefore preempted as applied. The court's holding was supported by the principle that "reporting" is a core ERISA function shielded from potentially inconsistent and burdensome state regulation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Liberty Mutual. View "Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Donegan" on Justia Law

This litigation arose out of the failure of WaMu and the assumption of WaMu's assets and liabilities by Chase from the FDIC, acting in its capacity as WaMu's receiver. On appeal, the FDIC and Chase challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hillside. The district court concluded that Hillside, which owned premises leased by WaMu before the financial crisis, had third-party standing to enforce the alleged assignment of WaMu's real estate lease to Chase under a purchase agreement between the FDIC and Chase, even though the FDIC validly repudiated the lease under section 212(e) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. 1821(e), and the parties to the purchase agreement asserted that it did not in fact assign the lease. The court held that Hillside lacked prudential standing to litigate whether WaMu's liabilities were assigned to Chase under the agreement because it was neither a contracting party nor a third-party beneficiary under the agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Hillside Metro Associates, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prisoner serving a New York State sentence, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with necessary medical treatment during his incarceration at a correctional facility and by punishing him for his efforts to secure such treatment. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice, nor did it err in its underlying finding that plaintiff acted in bad faith such that no other sanction would suffice. The court clarified that the offending conduct for which the sanction was imposed was not plaintiff's accusations that the Magistrate Judge was biased against him, but rather his offensive, abusive, and insulting language. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Koehl v. Bernstein" on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's grant of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Local Law 17. Local Law 17, inter alia, requires pregnancy services centers to make certain disclosures regarding the services that the centers provide. The court concluded that the law was not impermissibly vague; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to one of the challenged disclosures, which requires pregnancy services centers to disclose if they have a licensed medical provider on staff; plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to other provisions challenged by plaintiffs that require other forms of disclosure and impermissibly compel speech; and because the provisions are severable, the court severed the enjoined provisions from the rest of Local Law 17. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "The Evergreen Association, Inc v. City of New York" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose out of a permanent injunction entered by the Bankruptcy Court and affirmed by the district court, enjoining state law tort actions asserted by appellants, two of Madoff's defrauded investors, against the estate of one of Madoff's alleged co-conspirators and related defendants (Picower defendants). The court concluded that appellants' complaints impermissibly attempted to "plead around" the Bankruptcy Court's injunction barring all claims "derivative" of those asserted by the Trustee. The court also concluded that the Bankruptcy Court operated within the confines of Article III, as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall. Accordingly, the court held that the Bankruptcy Court did not exceed the bounds of its authority under the Bankruptcy Code or run afoul of Article III. View "In Re: Bernard Madoff" on Justia Law