Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged Section 1021(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298, which appears to permit the President to detain anyone who was part of, or has substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Plaintiffs, journalists and activists, sought an injunction barring enforcement of Section 1021 and a declaration that it violated, among other things, their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. The court concluded that the American citizen plaintiffs lacked standing because Section 1021 says nothing at all about the President's authority to detain American citizens; while section 1021 had no real bearing on those who were neither citizens nor lawful residents and who were apprehended abroad, the non-citizen plaintiffs also failed to establish standing because they had not shown a sufficient threat that the government would detain them under Section 1021; and, therefore, the court vacated the permanent injunction, having no need to address the merits of plaintiffs' claims. View "Hedges v. Obama" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a maritime contract entered into by Blue Whale and Development. Blue Whale filed a complaint in district seeking to attach property belonging to Development's alleged alter ego, HNA, in anticipation of a future arbitration award against Development pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The court concluded that the district court properly applied federal maritime law to the procedural question of whether Blue Whale's claim sounded in admiralty, and the claim did sound in admiralty because it arose out of a maritime contract; the issue of the claim's prima facie validity was a substantive inquiry; however, the district court's application of English law to this question was improper because the charter's party's choice-of-law provision did not govern Blue Whale's collateral alter-ego claim against HNA; and drawing on maritime choice-of-law principles, the court held that although federal common law did not govern every claim of this nature, federal common law did apply here, primarily because of the collateral claim's close ties to the United States. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration of the prima facie validity of Blue Whale's alter-ego claim under federal common law. View "Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint challenging the constitutionality of New York State Penal Law 400.00(14). Penal Law 400.00(14) permits New York City to set and collect a residential handgun licensing fee that exceeds the maximum fee allowable under state law in other parts of New York State. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Admin. Code 10-131(a)(2), which sets the residential handgun licensing fee in New York City at $340 for a three-year license, was a constitutionally permissible licensing fee; the court need not definitively answer the question of whether Admin. Code 10-131(a)(2) should be subject to any form of heightened scrutiny because the court concluded that it survived "intermediate scrutiny" in any event; Penal Law 400.00(14) was subject only to "rational basis" review under the Equal Protection Clause because it "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class;" and Penal Law 400.00(14) survived "rational basis" review. View "Kwong, et al. v. Bloomberg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the SPCA and others, seeking damages as a result of a search of her property and her arrest based on allegations of equine abuse. The district court applied claim splitting principles to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action because she filed a suit for tort damages based on the same facts in state court. Applying the Supreme Court's Colorado River abstention standard, the court concluded, however, that the district court's decision to dismiss the federal claim because of a similar pending state court litigation was erroneous. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton abstention could not apply when plaintiff sought damages in addition to declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Midland, a debt collector, for damages after Midland called him between 22 and 28 times over the course of 2011 when none of the calls were intended for plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff contended that neither of two putative offers of judgment extended by Midland could have rendered his action moot because neither offer complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The court held that an offer need not comply with Rule 68 in order to render a case moot under Article III. Consequently, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's refusal to settle the case in return for Midland's offer, notwithstanding plaintiff's acknowledgement that he could win no more, was sufficient ground to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doyle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the officer who arrested her, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the record established uncontroverted facts that, taken together, provided probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff. Therefore, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Stansbury v. Wertman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that two federal law enforcement officers caused the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress when they maliciously and falsely testified before a federal grand jury about his involvement in a drug conspiracy. Although the court disagreed with the district court about the need to evaluate the possible ambiguity of section 2674, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that, in FTCA suits, the United States could assert common law defenses available to private individuals under relevant state law. The court also concluded that, were Connecticut courts to consider the matter, they would find statements made under oath by federal grand jury witnesses to be privileged. View "Vidro v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for threatening to assault or murder three Seventh Circuit judges with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with them in the performance of their duties or to retaliate against them on account of their performance of official duties. On a blog post, defendant declared that the judges deserved to die for their recent decision in a Second Amendment case. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient, that the jury was properly instructed regarding a "true threat," and that defendant was not prejudiced by any error. The court found defendant's remaining arguments to be without merit. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., alleging that defendants' denial of his leave request from prison for the treatment of his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court concluded that, even assuming, arguendo, that on plaintiff's version of the facts, a reasonable jury could find a violation of his Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment rights, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable jury could conclude, on the record here, that it would have been objectively unreasonable for a public official in the position of these defendants to believe that he or she was acting in a manner consistent with plaintiff's rights to equal protection and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spavone v. N. Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law