Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after her arrest and detention pursuant to a material witness warrant. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration as to the individual defendants. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that detaining an individual for two days pursuant to a material witness warrant was a prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity. The court agreed and held that defendants were not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to plaintiff's allegation that she was unlawfully detained for investigative interrogation. In the absence of any discovery by plaintiff, the record was insufficiently developed at this stage. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Simon v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Entergy, owner and operator of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, filed suit against Vermont, raising claims challenging Vermont statutes governing Vermont Yankee (Acts 74, 160, and 189) and other claims related to Vermont's attempt to condition its grant of permission to operate Vermont Yankee on the execution of a power purchase agreement that favored Vermont retail consumers. The court affirmed the district court's grant of declaratory judgment that Act 74 and Act 160 were facially preempted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2011-2281; reversed the district court's determination that Vermont's efforts to condition a new Certificate of Public Good for Vermont Yankee on the execution of a favorable power purchase agreement violated the dormant Commerce Clause; affirmed the district court's determination that Entergy's challenge under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791-828c, was unripe; affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing sections 6522(c)(2) or 6522(c)(4) in title 10 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 74, or sections 248(e)(2), 248(m), or 254 in title 30 of the Vermont Statutes, as enacted by Act 160; and vacated the district court's permanent injunction enjoining defendants from conditioning the issuance of a Certificate of Public Good on the execution of a below-wholesale-market power purchase agreement between Entergy and Vermont utilities or otherwise requiring Vermont Yankee to sell power to Vermont utilities at preferential rates.View "Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Department imposed penalties on plaintiffs for their violation of a New York law that taxes the sale of cigarettes and provides for the issuance of tax stamps evidencing payment of the required taxes. On appeal, the Department challenged a permanent injunction issued by the district court forbidding it from imposing penalties on plaintiffs under N.Y. Tax Law 481(1)(b)(i). The court concluded that the district court was barred by the comity doctrine from granting injunctive and declaratory relief to plaintiffs because such relief would interfere with the state's administration of its tax laws; the district court erred in finding that section 481(1)(b)(i) constituted a criminal penalty; and, instead, the court concluded that section 481(1)(b)(i) provided for a civil penalty and plaintiffs therefore did not suffer double jeopardy when the Department imposed the penalties on them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the suit with prejudice. View "Abuzaid, et al. v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Fahs, a general contractor, filed suit against defendant, a construction supervisor with DOT, alleging First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. On appeal, Fahs challenged the district court dismissal of its claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment claim where Fahs's speech was not on a matter of public concern but rather on matters of purely personal significance, and affirmed the dismissal of the Equal Protection claim where the only differential treatment alleged in the complaint took place outside the limitations period. The court considered Fahs's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. View "Fahs Construction Group, Inc. v. Gray" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a due-process complaint against the DOE seeking tuition reimbursement after plaintiffs enrolled their autistic child in a private school because the DOE failed to provide the child with a free and appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court affirmed the state review officer's determination that the hearing record did not support the impartial hearing officer's determination that the lack of a functional behavior assessment (FBA) rose to the level of denying the child a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) where the individualized education program (IEP) addressed behavioral needs. Further, the IEP's failure to include parental counseling did not deny the child a FAPE; the SRO did not rely upon impermissible retrospection and the court deferred to her analysis; and the court found plaintiffs' remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "M.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Animal Rights Front (ARF) and two of its members, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendant, a Hartford Police Sergeant, violated their constitutional rights when he arrested two of ARF's members at a children's foot race while they were protesting the treatment of animals by the race sponsor Ringling Brothers. The court concluded that the district court properly entered judgment in favor of defendant on the basis of qualified immunity because there was arguable probable cause that plaintiffs engaged in disorderly conduct with the predominant intent required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-182(a)(5). The court remanded for clarification as to whether the district court awarded costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil of Procedure 26(g)(3). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zalaski v. City of Hartford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Section 1021(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298, which appears to permit the President to detain anyone who was part of, or has substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Plaintiffs, journalists and activists, sought an injunction barring enforcement of Section 1021 and a declaration that it violated, among other things, their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. The court concluded that the American citizen plaintiffs lacked standing because Section 1021 says nothing at all about the President's authority to detain American citizens; while section 1021 had no real bearing on those who were neither citizens nor lawful residents and who were apprehended abroad, the non-citizen plaintiffs also failed to establish standing because they had not shown a sufficient threat that the government would detain them under Section 1021; and, therefore, the court vacated the permanent injunction, having no need to address the merits of plaintiffs' claims. View "Hedges v. Obama" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a maritime contract entered into by Blue Whale and Development. Blue Whale filed a complaint in district seeking to attach property belonging to Development's alleged alter ego, HNA, in anticipation of a future arbitration award against Development pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The court concluded that the district court properly applied federal maritime law to the procedural question of whether Blue Whale's claim sounded in admiralty, and the claim did sound in admiralty because it arose out of a maritime contract; the issue of the claim's prima facie validity was a substantive inquiry; however, the district court's application of English law to this question was improper because the charter's party's choice-of-law provision did not govern Blue Whale's collateral alter-ego claim against HNA; and drawing on maritime choice-of-law principles, the court held that although federal common law did not govern every claim of this nature, federal common law did apply here, primarily because of the collateral claim's close ties to the United States. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration of the prima facie validity of Blue Whale's alter-ego claim under federal common law. View "Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd., et al." on Justia Law