Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant sought a hearing under United States v. Monsanto to recover restrained monies to fund his counsel of choice in a civil action. The court held that a defendant seeking a Monsanto or Monsanto-like hearing must demonstrate, beyond the bare recitation of the claim, that he or she had insufficient alternative assets to fund counsel of choice. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion because the district court gave defendant ample opportunity to demonstrate that he had insufficient unrestrained assets to fund his defense with counsel of choice in his parallel criminal case - which he failed to do. View "United States v. Bonventre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissal of his civil rights complaint. At issue was the interpretation of the three strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that neither the dismissal of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition seeking to vacate his conviction in the Jones v. Herbert case nor the dismissal of his appeals related to that petition constituted strikes under the PLRA. Because this holding negated three of plaintiff's five alleged strikes, the district court erred in denying plaintiff IFP status under the three strikes provision. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered the court to permit plaintiff to proceed with his complaint in forma pauperis. View "Jones v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging, inter alia, the denial of visitation rights, telephone usage, and access to a law library, and deprivation of proper temperature control, ventilation, and various amenities. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). The district court dismissed plaintiff's action with prejudice on the basis of his initial pleading, denying him leave to file an amended complaint alleging that he in fact sent his letter to the Warden complaining of prison conditions. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismissed the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity with prejudice and without leave to file an amended complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Grullon v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Sheraton, alleging state law claims and invoking subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The district court dismissed plaintiff's first and second complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sheraton subsequently moved for "just costs" including attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1919 and the district court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiff's second complaint was engineered to re-assert diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that section 1919 did not authorize an award of attorney's fees and that, although such fees could be awarded on a non-statutory basis for bad faith in the conduct of litigation, fees were not warranted under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with directions to delete the award of attorney's fees. View "Castillo Grand, LLC v. Sheraton Operating Corp." on Justia Law

This suit stemmed from plaintiff's suit for breach of contract against his former employer, ICD, and tortious interference with contract against ICD's president. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order, which amended a judgment to provide that plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1961, contending that he was entitled to a post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in C.P.L.R. 5004. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to .25% post-judgment interest where section 1961's plain terms governed the rate of post-judgment interest applicable in this case. Accordingly, the district court correctly and constitutionally applied section 1961, notwithstanding that the judgment had been entered in a diversity action and had been docketed by plaintiff in a New York state court. View "Cappiello v. ICD Publ'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent appealed the district court's grant of her husband's petition for repatriation of their son from New York to Singapore. At issue was whether respondent's affirmative defenses to repatriation should have prevailed in the district court. The court concluded that, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, and its implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601-10, the evidence did not establish that the child faced a grave risk of physical or psychological harm upon repatriation (Article 13 defense). The court also held that it was not inclined to conclude that the presence of a Syariah Court in a foreign state whose accession to the Convention had been recognized by the United States was per se violative of all notions of due process; the court was also mindful of the need for comity; and, therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting respondent's Article 20 defense. Respondent's remaining arguments were without merit and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Souratgar v. Fair" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiring to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana knowing that it would be unlawfully imported into the United States and conspiring to import 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. The court held that ongoing, formalized collaboration between an American law enforcement agency and its foreign counterpart did not, by itself, give rise to an "agency" relationship between the two entities sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment abroad; the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule did not impose a duty upon American law enforcement officials to review the legality, under foreign law, of applications for surveillance authority considered by foreign courts; defendant was not entitled to discovery of the wiretap application materials, submitted by Jamaican law enforcement to courts in that nation, underlying the electronic surveillance abroad; the district court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the foreign wiretaps and his motion to compel the documentation underlying the foreign wiretap orders; defendant's amended judgment of conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and the district court properly admitted expert testimony at defendant's trial regarding the values and quantities of marijuana generally used by drug traffickers in the course of distribution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former New York state prisoners who brought separate actions in the district court and whose appeals have been consolidated in this court, appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing their complaints against officials of the New York State DOCS and the Parole Division. The complaints, brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for damages and declaratory relief, alleged that defendants violated plaintiffs' due process rights as announced in Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler and described in Earley v. Murray, by administratively imposing and enforcing conditions of supervision on plaintiffs following their release from prison, despite the absence of any order for such supervision by the courts that sentenced plaintiffs for their crimes. The court concluded that Earley I did not rule that the rights asserted by plaintiffs were clearly established by Wampler with respect to a defense of qualified immunity; but the court concluded that Earley I itself did clearly establish the unconstitutionality of the administrative imposition or enforcement of postrelease conditions that were not judicially imposed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Vincent v. Yelich; Earley v. Annuci" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, labor organizations and state employees, brought this action contending that defendants, state officials, violated their First Amendment right to freedom of association. The court concluded that, on the stipulated facts, defendants violated plaintiffs' rights by targeting union employees for firing based on their union membership. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants; remanded to the district court with instruction to grant summary judgment to plaintiffs on their First Amendment claim and to craft appropriate equitable relief; reversed the district court's dismissal on the pleadings of plaintiffs' claims against defendants in their individual capacities; and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland" on Justia Law

In this suit - which was originally filed in state court in California, later removed to federal court in California, and then voluntarily transferred to the district court - the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) rule, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, on the basis that New York law governed plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. The court held that the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss under California's anti-SLAPP rule constituted an immediately appealable collateral order because it (1) conclusively determined the disputed issue; (2) resolved an important question that was completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) would be effectively unreviewable in a later appeal. The court also held that the district court erred in concluding that California's anti-SLAPP rule could not apply to a claim transferred from a California federal court to a New York federal court and governed, under the Erie doctrine, by New York law. Accordingly, the district court's order denying defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP rule was vacated, and the cause was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd." on Justia Law