Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
Billie R. Banks v. General Motors, LLC
Plaintiff, an African American woman, claims that her employer, defendant-appellee General Motors, LLC ("General Motors"), subjected her to a hostile work environment, race and sex discrimination, and retaliation at her place of employment, the General Motors plant in Lockport, New York. In the district court, Plaintiff presented evidence that, for example: a manager called her a "dumb n****r" in front of other employees; racist and sexist words or material were displayed around the plant; sexist comments were directed at her; the Confederate flag was depicted on employees' vehicles and clothing; and nooses were displayed on three separate occasions near the workstations of Black employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of General Motors, dismissing initially Plaintiff’s hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims and eventually her retaliation claim as well.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that the district court erred because a reasonable jury could find that General Motors's decisions to delay Plaintiff’s return to work and to reassign her upon her return are adverse actions that give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court explained that a reasonable jury could also infer discriminatory intent in General Motors's decision to require that Plaintiff obtain psychiatric approval in contravention of company policy and contrary to the approval process Plaintiff had undergone for her prior disability leaves. The district court erred in determining that Plaintiff did not establish an inference of discrimination" when the proper inquiry was, instead, whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer a discriminatory motive. View "Billie R. Banks v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Constitutional Law
U.S. v. Minter
Defendant was arrested in the Bronx after discharging a pistol. He was subsequently indicted for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, to which he pleaded guilty in April 2021. The government notified Defendant just before he entered his plea that it intended to seek an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence that, it claimed, had been triggered under the ACCA by Defendant’s three prior felony convictions in New York. The district court concluded that Defendant was not a career offender under the ACCA and therefore declined to impose a sentencing enhancement sought by the government. The issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s 2014 conviction under New York Penal Law Section 220.39(1) for the sale of cocaine was for a “serious drug offense” and therefore qualifies as a predicate offense for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that New York’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than its federal counterpart, thus, Defendant’s cocaine conviction cannot serve as a predicate ACCA offense. The government argued that under Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, that even if the New York definition of cocaine is broadly construed to criminalize all its isomers, Minter must show a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that New York’s statute is broader in practice. The court explained that here, the New York statute applies on its face to all cocaine isomers; the CSA does not. In citing Hylton, the court wrote, “When the state law is facially overbroad, we look no further.” View "U.S. v. Minter" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Wheatley v. New York State United Teachers, et al.
A school bus driver filed an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two public-sector unions and her employer, the New Hartford Central School District, alleging that their continued deduction of union fees from her paycheck following her resignation from both unions violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). She appealed the dismissal of her claims, arguing that the district court erred by prematurely dismissing her claims against the unions for, among other things, failing to adequately plead state action.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because Appellant voluntarily became a union member and affirmatively agreed to pay union dues through payroll deductions for a set period, the district court properly dismissed her claims. The court explained that New York’s Taylor Law guarantees public employees the right to choose whether to join the union as members, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law Section 202 and prohibits any union or public employer from “interfering with, restraining or coercing public employees in the exercise of their rights.” Here, it is undisputed that Appellant voluntarily joined the Unions and authorized dues deductions from her wages when she signed the Membership Agreement in 2018. View "Wheatley v. New York State United Teachers, et al." on Justia Law
United States v. Percoco
Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in district court after a jury found him guilty of two counts of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud (Counts Nine and Ten), and one count of solicitation of bribes and gratuities (Count Eleven). Finding no merit in the arguments raised on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court for review, asking that Court to decide, as pertinent to Count Ten, whether a private citizen who has informal political or other influence over governmental decision-making can be convicted of honest services fraud. The Supreme Court reversed the court’s judgment – holding that the district court’s jury instructions, based on our decades-old decision in United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), were clearly erroneous – and remanded for further proceedings.
The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences on Counts Nine and Eleven, vacated his conviction and sentence on Count Ten, and remanded to the district court. The court explained that although the Supreme Court held that a private citizen “nominally outside public employment” can, in certain circumstances, be convicted of defrauding the public of honest services it nonetheless concluded that the Margiotta-based jury instructions given at trial in this case were erroneous, and that “it was far from clear that the erroneous jury instructions would be harmless.” The court explained that, on remand, the government has made no argument that the instructional error was harmless. Thus vacatur of Defendant’s conviction and sentence on Count Ten is therefore warranted. View "United States v. Percoco" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Tavarez v. United States
Petitioner challenged his conviction for brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Petitioner argued that his firearms conviction cannot survive United States v. Barrett. Petitioner argued that (1) his plea allocutions did not connect the robbery conspiracy to the “separate” drug conspiracy, such that the latter cannot serve as a predicate for the Section 924(c) conviction; and (2) his arguable allocution to substantive robbery (an uncharged offense) likewise cannot predicate the gun count.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a petitioner may seek collateral relief to challenge the constitutional validity of a guilty plea where a subsequent substantive constitutional or statutory holding creates “a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal.” The court wrote that because the government has not argued otherwise, it assumes without deciding that Petitioner has not procedurally defaulted his claim. On the merits, the court applied the new substantive rule the Supreme Court announced in Davis and that the court applied in Barrett, recognizing that a Section 924(c) conviction based on an invalid predicate is error. The court reasoned that when Petitioner admitted to brandishing a firearm in furtherance of one, he necessarily admitted to brandishing it in furtherance of the other. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to collateral relief based on the fact that the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy is no longer a valid predicate for a Section 924(c) charge. View "Tavarez v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Heim v. Daniel
Plaintiff, an adjunct professor of economics at SUNY Albany, alleged that his failure to advance within his department to his colleagues’ unfavorable view of the methodology he employs in his scholarship. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants, two of Plaintiff’s colleagues who were involved in the hiring decisions at issue. Plaintiff asserted three causes of action: (1) a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 ; (2) a claim pursuant to Section 1983 for injunctive relief against SUNY Albany President in the form of a court order to “prevent ongoing discrimination against Keynesian economists” in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) an age discrimination claim under New York State’s Human Rights Law. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it disagrees with much of the district court’s reasoning, it nonetheless agrees with its ultimate disposition. The court held that Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), does not apply to speech related to academic scholarship or teaching and that Plaintiff’s speech addressed matters of public concern, but that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim nonetheless fails because under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), a public university’s interest in deciding for itself what skills, expertise, and academic perspectives it wishes to prioritize in its hiring and staffing decisions outweighs Plaintiff's asserted interest in competing for academic positions unencumbered by university decisionmakers’ assessment of his academic speech. View "Heim v. Daniel" on Justia Law
United States v. Hagood
Around 1:00 a.m. on October 14, 2020, New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers drove by Defendant near a New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) complex in the Bronx. Defendant was wearing a fanny pack across his chest and standing next to a double-parked car. According to the officers, Defendant was visibly nervous when he saw them, and one officer noticed that Defendant’s fanny pack appeared to contain a bulging object with a straight line on top—the same shape as a handgun. The officers stopped and frisked Defendant and found a loaded semiautomatic pistol in the fanny pack. Defendant was arrested and charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2): possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He moved to suppress the firearm, and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity.The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the totality of circumstances in this case—including the officer’s observations of the fanny pack (as informed by his experience recovering firearms from fanny packs), Defendant’s unusual manner of wearing the fanny pack, his nervous appearance, and the late hour in a high-crime neighborhood—established reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Hagood" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. Avenatti
Defendant, a California licensed attorney, challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for transmitting extortionate communications in interstate commerce to sportswear leader Nike, attempted Hobbs Act extortion of Nike, and honest-services wire fraud of the client whom Defendant was purportedly representing in negotiations with Nike. Defendant further challenged the trial court’s jury instruction as to honest-services fraud and the legality of a $259,800.50 restitution award to Nike.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for the two charged extortion counts because a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s threat to injure Nike’s reputation and financial position was wrongful in that the multi-million-dollar demand supported by the threat bore no nexus to any claim of right. Further, the court held that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for honest-services fraud because a reasonable jury could find that Defendant solicited a bribe from Nike in the form of a quid pro quo whereby Nike would pay Defendant many millions of dollars in return for which Defendant would violate his fiduciary duty as an attorney. The court further explained that the district court did not exceed its authority under the MVRA by awarding restitution more than 90 days after initial sentencing, and Defendant has shown no prejudice from the delayed award. Finally, the court wrote that the MVRA applies in this case where Nike sustained a pecuniary loss directly attributable to those crimes as a result of incurring fees for its attorneys to attend the meeting demanded by Defendant at which he first communicated his extortionate threat. View "United States v. Avenatti" on Justia Law
United States v. Vinales
Defendant challenged the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement under Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which applies when a defendant has “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” The principal question is whether the enhancement applies to defendants who use their residence to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Defendant maintained an apartment where he had at one point lived for the purpose of distributing controlled substances. The court reasoned that the commentary in the Guidelines manual confirms that the district court properly applied the drug-distribution premises enhancement using a “totality of the circumstances” test, which is appropriate given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. Further, Defendant challenged the district court’s failure to consider a downward departure from the Guidelines sentence in order to give effect to the parties’ plea bargain. He claimed that the court misunderstood its authority to do so under United States v. Fernandez. However, the court wrote that a district court’s silence concerning its refusal to depart downward generally does not support an inference that the district court misapprehended its scope of authority. The court, therefore, rejected Defendant’s argument that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable on this ground. View "United States v. Vinales" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
United States v. McPartland, Spota
Defendants appealed from their judgments of conviction. Following a five-week jury trial, Defendants-Appellants were convicted on counts of conspiracy to tamper with witnesses and obstruct an official proceeding, substantive witness tampering and obstruction of an official proceeding, obstruction of justice, and being accessories after the fact to the deprivation of the civil rights of a victim. The district court sentenced Defendants, principally, to five years’ imprisonment each. On appeal, Defendants raised challenges to the district court’s admission of certain testimony at trial—in particular, testimony about subordinates’ fear of retaliation and testimony about bad acts that formed the basis for that fear of retaliation. Defendants also challenge the district court’s denial of their application to admit the government’s bill of particulars, and Defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for an evidentiary hearing and new trial.
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the government specifically mentioned the demotion and the retirement party only once each, as examples of retaliation by the co-conspirator against an enemy. Discussion of the tasks performed by the detectives was similarly brief. These remarks by the government could have been made based only on the properly admitted testimony from other high-ranking members of the SCPD and, accordingly, could not have misled the jury. As a result, the court concluded that although the admission of cumulative evidence regarding the demotion and retirement party, and the tasks performed for the co-conspirator, was in error, it was ultimately harmless. View "United States v. McPartland, Spota" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law