Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, formerly a participant in the Justice Department's Witness Security Program, brought suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, alleging that he was terminated from the Program without being afforded procedural due process. Plaintiff also alleged that following his termination he was placed in a Segregated Housing Unit (SHU) for 188 days and that this confinement violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim concerning his termination based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of 18 U.S.C. 3521(f). However, with respect to SHU detention, the district court should have sua sponte granted plaintiff leave to replead before sua sponte dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. T'Kash" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, who are supervisors or officials at the Ulster County, New York Sheriff's Office and the county jail, took adverse employment actions against them in retaliation for a parody created by one of the plaintiffs that suggested corruption among jail officials, and subsequently filing a lawsuit based upon this alleged retaliation. The court held that the district court correctly determined that none of the conduct for which plaintiffs alleged they suffered retaliation touched on a matter of public concern, and that plaintiffs as public employees, could therefore not sustain First Amendment claims under section 1983 against defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Singer v. Ferro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are motorists who use the Grand Island Bridge but, because they are not residents of Grand Island, did not qualify for the lowest toll rate. Plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the toll discount policies violated the dormant Commerce Clause as well as the constitutional right to travel that courts have located in the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, both in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the November 28, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order of the district court, among other things, that granted judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that plaintiffs have standing under Article III, the toll policy at issue was a minor restriction on travel and did not involve "invidious distinctions" that would require strict scrutiny analysis pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court correctly used, in the alternative, the three-part test set forth in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, to evaluate both plaintiffs' right-to-travel and dormant Commerce Clause claims; and the Grand Island Bridge toll scheme was based on "some fair approximation of use" of the bridges; was not "excessive in relation to the benefits" it conferred; and did not "discriminate against interstate commerce." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Selevan, et al. v. New York Thruway Authority, et al." on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law

MES claimed that the Corps unfairly terminated three of its construction/renovation contracts. On appeal, MES and its President contended that the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that their Bivens action was precluded by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. The court held as a preliminary matter that it lacked jurisdiction to review MES's President's claim because the text and caption of the original timely notice of appeal failed to identify MES's President as a party appealing from the judgment. Accordingly, the court dismissed MES's President's appeal and only address MES's challenge to the judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that, in enacting the CDA, Congress created a comprehensive scheme for securing relief from the United States for any disputes pertaining to federal courts. The existence of that statutory scheme precluded MES from pursuing Bivens claims against federal employees in their individual capacities for alleged violations of due process or the First Amendment in terminating MES's federal construction contracts with the Corps. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell" on Justia Law

The Companies, Cookson and Vesuvius, appealed the district court's judgment denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion of the Union. After the Companies closed a facility that Vesuvius had operated, Vesuvius and the Union entered into a Facility Closure Agreement (FCA). Both parties subsequently disputed whether the agreement required Vesuvius to pay a retiree medical allowance (RMA) to certain eligible employees. The district court held that the FCA imposed such a requirement. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly interpreted the parties' agreement and that the Union, as party to that agreement, had standing to enforce it even where the benefits of enforcement accrued to third-party retirees. View "United Steel v. Cookson America, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found that plaintiff failed to prove her claim that the shooting of her family's dog by a law enforcement officer during the execution of a search warrant of her home was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiff contended that defendants' failure to train its officers regarding non-lethal means to secure dogs and to formulate a plan to restrain plaintiff's dog using non-lethal means rendered the officer's shooting of her dog unconstitutional as a matter of law. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that no amount of planning or training would have changed the outcome in this case. Plaintiff offered no evidence that any non-lethal means of controlling her dog would have allowed the officer to quickly escape the "fatal funnel" and effectively execute the no-knock warrant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Carroll v. County of Monroe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the City pursuant to, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., claiming that the City's response to his request for accommodations was insufficient. Plaintiff's severe disability, schizophrenia, required treatment that prevented him from arriving to work at a consistent time each day. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and dismissed plaintiff's claims with prejudice, noting that it could not distinguish between absenteeism and tardiness. The court concluded that the district court did not conduct a sufficiently detailed analysis of the facts that tended to undermine the City's claim that a specific arrival time was an essential function of plaintiff's position before granting summary judgment for the City. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "McMillan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white male employed as captain of the City of Buffalo Police Department, sued the Department and its police chief claiming that their failure to promote him was impermissibly motivated by race. Plaintiff claimed racial discrimination after the results of a civil service examination were replaced by the results of an updated version. The court declined to address the 42 U.S.C. 1983, defamation, and equal protection claims because they were insufficiently argued; the court agreed with the district court that Ricci v. DeStefano did not indicate that defendants' actions were prohibited; plaintiff provided no other evidence of unlawful discrimination and his Title VII claim failed; and plaintiff's remaining claims were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, manufacturers and distributors of smokeless tobacco products, filed suit challenging the validity of a New York City ordinance governing the sale of flavored tobacco products. Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance, New York City Administrative Code 17-715, was preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 387 et seq., and sought an injunction against enforcement. The district court awarded summary judgment to the City and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the ordinance was a regulation of sale and not a veiled attempt to regulate the manufacture of tobacco products. The ordinance represented an exercise of local police power that Congress specifically allowed in enacting the Act and was therefore not preempted. View "U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., et al. v. City of New York" on Justia Law