Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to a two-count information that charged him with producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for 240 months and 120 months and 40 years of supervised release with numerous conditions. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his plea was defective because the district court did not advise him of the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person at the end of his prison term under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a) (2006).The court was not required by due process or Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to advise of the possibility of civil commitment. View "United States v. Youngs" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant of conspiracy, (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court upheld the firearm conviction, but vacated the RICO conviction and dismissed the conspiracy count from his indictment. The court stated that the attempt to prosecute conspiracy to violate the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 2341, failed for unconstitutional vagueness in New York Tax Law, 471, which delineated the parameters of a CCTA violation. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a prior decision to certify questions regarding Section 471 to the state’s highest court did not indicate that that statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected a claim that the CCTA was inapplicable to defendant given New York’s “forbearance policy,” under which the state refrained from collecting taxes on cigarette sales transacted on Native American reservations. The forbearance policy did not signal a choice not to enforce tax laws when enforcement would be possible, but represented a concession to the difficulty of state enforcement, complex jurisdictional issues surrounding reservation-based cigarette sales, and the politically combustible nature of bootlegging prosecutions. Congress enacted the CCTA to provide federal support to states struggling with those circumstances. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Zaleski was convicted of possessing machine guns, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), 924(a)(2); possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k), 924(a)(1)(B); and possessing firearms, silencers, and destructive devices not registered to him, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5861(d), and 5871. The district court imposed a 101-month sentence and ordered forfeiture of machine guns and pistols, a shotgun, homemade silencers, hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices, all unlawfully in his possession. Weapons Zaleski lawfully possessed remained in government custody while the government sought an order (All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)), authorizing it to destroy them. Zaleski estimates the value of non-forfeited weapons at $100,000, including guns, 65,000 rounds of ammunition, body armor, grenades, a grenade launcher, explosive chemicals, and materials for pipe bombs. As a convicted felon, Zaleski was prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) from possessing the items; he sought to have the weapons transferred to a dealer for sale. The court determined that the government did not need the requested order, that the proposed sale arrangement would violate 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and that appraisal would be useless because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars claims for damages. The Second Circuit vacated in part; 922(g) does not categorically prohibit the proposed sale arrangement. View "United States v. Zaleski" on Justia Law

In 1986, minority inmates commenced a class action, alleging racial discrimination in housing, job assignment, and discipline. The trial judge found a “pattern of racism” and, in 1993, issued a decision requiring that the percentage of minority inmates in “preferred” jobs, including jobs in the print shop, correspond to the percentage of minority inmates in the general prison population. In 1999, plaintiffs, inmates formerly employed in the print shop, filed complaints alleging racial discrimination by civilian supervisors and prison administrators. After four years of discovery, plaintiffs sought to file an amended class action complaint. In addition to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, the complaint claimed violations of the earlier order, and the state Human Rights Law and constitution. Plaintiffs contended that the pattern-or-practice method of proof used in Title VII class actions could be employed against individual defendants. The court denied class certification and leave to amend and analyzed plaintiffs’ individual complaints under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework generally employed in assessing individual disparate treatment claims under Title VI and granted defendants summary judgment on individual claims. The Second Circuit affirmed; the pattern-or-practice framework is ill-suited to establish liability of individual defendants named in the proposed amended complaint. View "Reynolds v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are non-immigrant aliens, authorized by the federal government to reside and work as pharmacists in the U.S. All reside in New York and are licensed pharmacists there pursuant to a statutory waiver to New York Education Law 6805(1)(6)’s requirement that only U.S. citizens or Legal Permanent Residents are eligible to obtain a pharmacist’s license in New York. The waiver provision was set to expire in 2009. The district court permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the law. The Second Circuit affirmed. A state statute that discriminates against aliens who have been lawfully admitted to reside and work in the United States should be viewed in the same light under the Equal Protection Clause as one which discriminates against aliens who enjoy the right to reside here permanently. Applying strict scrutiny and finding, as the state conceded, that there are no compelling reasons for the statute’s discrimination based on alienage, the court found the statute unconstitutional. View "Paidi v. Mill" on Justia Law

Rivas, serving an indeterminate life sentence in New York for the second-degree murder of his former girlfriend, sought habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed the petition as barred by the statute's one-year limitations period. On remand, the district court again dismissed, after hearing evidence of actual innocence. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Rivas raised a credible and compelling claim of actual innocence, based on new information not presented to the jury that dramatically undermines the central forensic evidence linking him to the crime of which he was convicted. There was essentially unchallenged testimony from a respected forensic pathologist, that the victim was almost certainly killed at a time when he had an uncontested alibi, and not earlier. That evidence warrants an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitation period, allowing the petitioner to have his otherwise time-barred claims heard by a federal court. View "Rivas v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Freeman was convicted in New York of second-degree assault, second-degree vehicular assault, common law driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in identifying as harmless the erroneous admission of evidence obtained from a blood draw compelled pursuant to a warrant found invalid under state law. The Second Circuit affirmed denial. The challenged harmlessness determination regarding an error of state law was itself a decision of state law that cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief. View "Freeman v. Kadien" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8)(A), and 2256(8)(C). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated because he was compelled as a parolee to make self-incriminating statements during a mandatory polygraph examination and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Hearing that Warren had called him an insulting name, Darnell notified his friends to leave the area, entered the store, followed by his brother, Darryl. Darryl grabbed Warren and said “I told you to stay out of this store.” Darryl’s gun fired. Darnell drew his gun and pointed it at another. Darryl fired four more shots into Warren. After Darryl pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder, Darnell was convicted of second-degree depraved-indifference murder and sentenced to 17-1/2 years to life in prison, the same sentence received by his brother. The appellate court affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to convict Darnell as an accomplice to depraved-indifference murder. Before the conviction became final, the New York supreme court reversed a depraved-indifference murder conviction based on accomplice liability where the attack on the victim was “quintessentially intentional.” State courts rejected a motion to vacate Darnell’s conviction. He filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this was the fourth case to advance the “somewhat perverse argument” that petitioner should be released from custody because the evidence suggests he is more culpable than he was found to be. View "Epps v. Poole" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, was knocked unconscious and injured when a prison transport bus, in which he was riding with his wrists and ankles shackled, took a sharp turn. He claimed defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by transporting him on a bus without a seatbelt. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. Failure of prison officials to provide seatbelts to prison inmates does not, standing alone, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. View "Jabbar v. Fischer" on Justia Law