Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition to vacate his 2006 guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. Defendant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not warn him of the risks of denaturalization and possible subsequent deportation arising from his guilty plea.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Effective assistance includes warning defendants of the “direct” consequences of pleading guilty, such as the offense’s maximum prison term and the likely sentence as set forth in a plea agreement. However, the court explained that it has long held that an attorney need not warn of every possible “collateral consequence of conviction. And such collateral consequences are “categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment.” Thus, a defendant can only establish an ineffective assistance claim as to a collateral consequence if his attorney affirmatively misadvises him. Failing to warn of the collateral risk alone is not enough. The court explained that the instant appeal is resolved by the straightforward application of this direct/collateral framework. Accordingly, the court held that the distinction remains valid, that it applies to civil denaturalization, and that such denaturalization is a collateral consequence of the conviction, and so is not covered by the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Farhane v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment revoking his original, three-year term of supervised release and sentencing him to three months imprisonment followed by a new, one-year term of supervised release for violating certain conditions of his supervised release. Defendant contends that the district court erred in finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by possessing marijuana on January 27, 2021, in violation of New York Penal Law Section 221.05. First, Defendant argued that the offense defined by Section 221.05 was simply a state “violation,” not a state “crime,” and therefore, his offense did not violate the mandatory condition of supervised release that he “not commit another federal, state or local crime.” Second, Defendant argued that even if the offense, as defined by Section 221.05, constituted a “crime” for purposes of a violation of supervised release, New York’s March 31, 2021 repeal of the statute operated retroactively, such that his pre-repeal conduct in contravention of it cannot serve as the basis for a violation of supervised release.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Defendant violated a condition of his supervised release based on his possession of marijuana. The court explained that irrespective of New York’s classification of the offense, Defendant’s underlying conduct constituted a “crime” under federal law. Because this holding disposes of Defendant’s appeal in its entirety, the court did not reach Defendant’s retroactivity argument. View "United States v. Francis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing her claims of age, race, and gender discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to her retaliation claim and that it erroneously concluded that she had failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ race-neutral explanations for not selecting her for two internal promotions were pretextual.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants’ explanations for her non-promotions were pretextual. Second, the court held that although the district court applied an incorrect standard to her retaliatory hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation and did not demonstrate that her employer’s non-retaliatory explanations were pretextual. The court explained that Defendant’s evidence supporting summary judgment established that Plaintiff received negative performance evaluations because she was not adequately or timely completing her duties and had become increasingly challenging to work with. The court wrote that Plaintiff has not rebutted this showing with evidence demonstrating that the reasons the NYCTA provided for the poor performance reviews were pretextual. Instead, she argues that the performance reviews must have been retaliatory due to their temporal proximity to her complaints. But she offers nothing more to establish causation. View "Carr v. New York City Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing claims against Defendants, challenging Public Act 21-6, which revised the Connecticut General Statutes to repeal religious exemptions from state immunization requirements for schoolchildren, college and university students, and childcare participants. Plaintiffs are two organizations and three individuals who allege that the Act violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and other federal constitutional and statutory guarantees. The district court granted the motions of Defendants to dismiss certain of Plaintiffs’ claims against the state agencies as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, to dismiss the organizational Plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing, and to dismiss all counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The court explained the district court's distinction between "special services" and "special education" was overly strict. The IDEA and its associated regulations do not use the phrase "special services." A reasonable inference from the allegation that Plaintiff’s son suffers from "a speech and learning disorder for which he now receives special services," combined with the allegation that he "is disabled within the meaning of the IDEA," is that the "special services" the complaint mentions constitute "special education" rather than "related services." Therefore, the court concluded that because the district court parsed the complaint too restrictively, failing to draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the court erred when it found Plaintiff had not stated a plausible claim for relief under the IDEA. The court, therefore, vacated this portion of the judgment. View "We The Patriots USA, Inc. et al. v. Conn. Office of Early Childhood Dev." on Justia Law

Defendant was twice sentenced for violating conditions of supervised release. The first time, he was sentenced to six months in prison plus four years of supervised release. The second time, he was sentenced to three years in prison plus five years of supervised release. The parties agreed that this most recent sentence of supervised release was longer than allowed by statute. The district court was authorized to impose a term of supervised release of no more than the statutory maximum of five years for the underlying offense, minus the aggregate amount of prison time imposed for violations of supervised release. The parties disagree on the remedy. Defendant sought de novo resentencing, but the government seeks only a limited remand to reduce the term of supervised release to eighteen months.   The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing. The court concluded that the district court should be afforded the opportunity to exercise its discretion as to how much time Defendant should spend in prison and how much time on supervised release. The court explained that under Section 3583(h), the maximum allowable term of supervised release upon revocation decreased in direct proportion to the term of imprisonment imposed. With a three-year prison sentence, Defendant faced at most eighteen months of supervised release. For every month above an eighteen-month term of supervised release, the court would have needed to shave a month off the three-year prison term. The court concluded that the sentencing calculation is best left to the informed discretion of the district court, so that it may decide in the first instance how to strike the right balance. View "United States v. Gaye" on Justia Law

In 2005, a federal district court entered a permanent injunction against several pro-life advocates enjoining them from entering the public sidewalk within fifteen feet of the entrance of any abortion clinic in the Western District of New York. Twelve years later, in 2017, Plaintiff, who was not a named party to the 2005 permanent injunction, started sidewalk counseling near the Planned Parenthood facility in Rochester, New York. After Defendants, the New York Attorney General and the City of Rochester decided that Plaintiff was bound by the 2005 permanent injunction, he sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not bound by the injunction. He also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from applying the injunction to his counseling activities. The district court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim and denied his motion for a preliminary injunction.   The Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint and vacated the judgment insofar as it denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court remanded for further proceedings. The court held that a person who is not a named party to an injunction or legally identified with a named party is bound by the injunction only from acting for the benefit of, or to assist, an enjoined party in violating the injunction. The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not establish that he so acted and therefore state a claim for declaratory relief. View "Havens v. James" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Doe alleged that for a period of seven years, she suffered sexual, physical, and psychological abuse at the hands of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer. Four years after the alleged abuse ended, Doe brought this action against the officer, the United States, the Department of Homeland Security, and two senior DHS officials, asserting various federal and state claims. The district court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on the applicable statutes of limitations and denied Doe’s request for equitable tolling.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the evidence in the record could have allowed it to conclude that the prerequisites for equitable tolling were met. The court explained that the record makes plausible the inferences that years of violent sexual abuse and threats to Doe’s life constituted an extraordinary circumstance preventing Doe from sooner pursuing her claims and that she acted with reasonable diligence. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Defendants, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, alleged she was sexually and psychologically abused by Defendant, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Four years after the abuse ended, Doe initiated this action against Rodriguez and various government defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Doe’s claims were untimely. Doe asked the district court to equitably toll the applicable statutes of limitations. The court granted summary judgment to Defendants.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that in this case, the district court denied equitable tolling as a matter of law, purporting to draw every inference in favor of Doe. The court vacated its judgment because the record allows for a finding that Doe faced extraordinary circumstances and acted with reasonable diligence. On remand, the district court should act in a fact-finding capacity and determine whether Doe has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances and reasonable diligence. The court explained that if the court determines that she has established these prerequisites for equitable tolling, then it should engage in the discretionary determination of whether to grant her request for equitable tolling. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. Defendant’s underlying criminal conduct included facilitating a bribe that resulted in the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (“COBA”), investing $20 million with Platinum Partners (“Platinum”), a hedge fund that ultimately declared bankruptcy amid government investigations into fraud. Following his guilty plea, Defendant’s case was reassigned to another district judge for sentencing. After his sentencing hearing but prior to his final restitution determination, Defendant moved to have his case reassigned to another district judge. His motion was premised on the recently discovered personal relationship between the district judge in his case and a defendant and a cooperating witness in the ongoing prosecutions against those involved in the Platinum fraud. The district court denied that motion and ordered Defendant to pay restitution to COBA for all of its remaining losses. On appeal, Defendant argued that his case should have been reassigned for resentencing or, in the alternative, that the district court erred in imposing restitution for all of COBA’s losses.   The Second Circuit remanded the case for reassignment to a different district judge and for plenary resentencing. The court held that the district judge erred in not recusing himself under Section 455(a). The judge not only had a close, near-paternal relationship with the witness, but he also advised the witness on how to proceed in his pending criminal case arising from the Platinum fraud. The judge’s relationship with the witness was sufficiently close, and his case was sufficiently related to Defendant’s case that a reasonable person would have questioned the district court’s impartiality. View "United States of America v. Rechnitz" on Justia Law

Appellant motioned the Second Circuit to consider his pro se filing in addition to his counseled brief and to supplement the record. Appellant’s underlying appeal arises from the government’s dismissal, on May 8, 2019, of several indictments against him. Those indictments had been pending since 1999 when Appellant was charged for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.   The Second Circuit denied Appellant’s motion for the court to consider his supplemental pro se brief and his motion to supplement the record. Further, the court granted the government’s motion or an extension of time to file its brief to a date three weeks after the date of resolution of Appellant’s motion. The court explained that Appellant’s motion to supplement the record does not explain why he did not submit them to the district court. Appellant asked the Court to draw factual inferences from the letter and the declaration—inferences the government contests—but a motion to supplement the record “is not a device for presenting evidence to this Court that was not before the trial judge.” View "United States v. Hage (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim)" on Justia Law