Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from Judge Jones's quashing of a subpoena directed to Jesse Eisinger, a former Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reporter, based on New York's journalists' Shield Law, New York Civil Rights Law 79-h. At issue was the qualified privilege under the Shield Law with regard to news that was both unpublished and not obtained under a promise of confidentiality. The underlying action in this matter was brought by plaintiffs against Goldman Sachs where plaintiffs' claims arose out of Goldman's service as plaintiffs' financial advisor in a sale of their company. Plaintiffs sought to depose Eisinger regarding two articles published in the WSJ. The district court granted Eisinger's motion to quash, holding that: (i) Eisinger, as a journalist, could claim the Shield Law's protection; (i) the information sought was covered by the Shield Law; and (iii) plaintiffs failed to overcome the privilege by establishing through "clear and convincing evidence" that the testimony "would be critical and relevant" to the maintenance of their claim. The district court noted that the testimony "invariably require[d] disclosure of the unpublished details of the newsgathering process." The court affirmed and held that the description of the oral argument and the findings of the district court rendered it virtually self-evident that the Shield Law would protect Eisinger from compelled testimony.

Defendant appealed his conviction for substantive and conspiratorial racketeering stemming from his involvement with the Genovese organized crime family. The court concluded that: (1) Racketeering Act One stated valid subpredicate offenses under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), (b)(2), for substantive and conspiratorial extortion of intangible rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 501(a), and the jury's finding that such offenses were proved was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the requisite pattern of racketeering proved; (3) the district court's admission of challenged evidence did not exceed its discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, or 801(d)(2)(E); various challenges to the district court's jury instructions were without merit; and the challenged sentence was reasonable both as a matter of procedure and substance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner was convicted in New York state court of second-degree murder on a theory of depraved indifference to human life in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25[2]. Petitioner appealed the judgment of the district court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, arguing that the killing could only properly have been found to have been intentional, and not reckless as required under New York law for a conviction of depraved indifference murder. The court could not conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's entirely reasonable verdict where petitioner impulsively decided to confront his ex-girlfriend, the victim, just hours before the attack, which occurred on a public street, and struck multiple blows with his knife in the direction of both the victim and the victim's daughter.

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a multi-count superseding indictment, including a charge of conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence. Because there was an inadequate factual basis for defendant's guilty plea with respect to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and for further proceedings.

The City appealed from a district court order requiring it to pay plaintiff damages, attorneys' fees, and costs for retaliation against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and state law, for making complaints of gender discrimination. Plaintiff cross-appealed, principally challenging the dismissal of her retaliation claims against individual defendants and denying her additional damages and attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the City's appeal provided no basis for overturning the judgment against the City. The court also concluded that plaintiff's cross-appeal merited only in its challenges to (A) the dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of her New York State Human Rights Law (HRL), N.Y.Exec. Law 296 et seq., claim against defendant Rick Guy, and (B) the grant of summary judgment dismissing her main discrimination claims under the HRL against the City and defendant Roy Bernardi, and that plaintiff was entitled to trial of those discrimination claims. The court held, however, that a trial of the erroneously dismissed HRL discrimination claims alone could lead to an award of damages that would be duplicative, in whole or in part, or the compensation plaintiff was awarded in the present judgment. Accordingly, the court concluded that if there was to be a trial of the HRL discrimination claims, that trial must be combined with a retrial of plaintiff's Title VII and HRL retaliation claims against the City and her HRL retaliation claim against Guy.

Defendant was convicted of numerous offenses relating to her involvement in a fraudulent "high-yield investment program." Before defendant was indicted and before the applicable statute of limitations had run, the district court granted a government application to suspend the statute of limitations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3292 while the government sought the assistance of the Hungarian government in recovering records relating to transfers of the scheme's proceeds into Hungarian bank accounts. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the indictments should have been dismissed because insufficient evidence supported the district court's order to suspend the running of the statute of limitations. The court held (1) that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the district court's order; (2) that section 3292 did not require that the foreign evidence sought be necessary for an indictment, nor that it be obtainable only through an official request to a foreign government; and (3) that district courts could rely on ex parte proceedings when deciding to issue section 3292 orders. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed the district court's order denying his post-judgment motion for an order directing the Social Security Administration (SSA) to re-tender a check for retroactive supplemental social security benefits that he was owed. The court held that the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act, Pub. L. No. 111-114, 123 Stat. 3029, barred the SSA from making any payment to an incarcerated individual covered by the Act, regardless of when the underlying obligation to pay the individual arose. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion.

Defendants appealed from judgments following a jury trial that resulted in their convictions for racketeering and related offenses. Defendants all contended, inter alia, that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the relatedness and continuity factors required to establish a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). The court concluded that the district court's RICO instruction was legally erroneous and this error was prejudicial with regard to Chris Cain. With regard to the racketeering convictions of David Cain, Jr. and Jamie Soha, however, applying a plain error standard of review, the court concluded that it was not reasonably likely that a properly instructed jury would have failed to find a pattern of racketeering. Accordingly, the court reversed the RICO convictions with regard to Chris Cain only and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions in all other respects.

In 1988 petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery. After his release, he was arrested for murder and attempted murder and, in 2001, entered a plea of guilty in New York state court. Treating the attempted murder as a second violent felony, the state court imposed three consecutive terms of 25 years. The Department of Correctional Services determined that an undischarged portion of the robbery prison term should be added to the 2001 sentence. Direct review ended in 2005; from 2005-2008, petitioner pursued post-conviction motions in state court. In 2008, he filed a federal petition for habeas corpus, which was dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The petition did not mention the DOC sentencing calculation. The Second Circuit affirmed. State applications for post-conviction relief did not toll the one-year statute of limitations. Section2244(d)(2) limits tolling to those applications for post-conviction or other collateral review that are made with respect to the pertinent judgment: the 2001 conviction and sentence. The applications at issue were directed neither to the conviction nor to the sentence; they concerned only a post-conviction administrative determination that the sentence ran consecutively to the earlier undischarged prison term.

Petitioner was convicted in a New York state court of second-degree murder. Petitioner subsequently appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The court held that because the evidence was sufficient to support petitioner's conviction of "depraved indifference" murder under New York law, his counsel's failure to preserve a claim of insufficiency in the trial court was not prejudicial.