Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Spies petitioned for a rehearing on the court's decision in United States v. Nadirashvili where the court vacated appellant Solomonyan's sentence because the district court used the incorrect standard, preponderance of the evidence, in applying two offense level enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the involvement of: (i) 200 or more firearms, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(E); and (ii) a destructive device, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A). The court found that the district court used the incorrect standard in applying the enhancements of appellants Spies and Kharabadze. Therefore, the court vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court following his plea of guilty to a violation of the conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court exceeded its authority by imposing a post-revocation term of supervised release that extended beyond the end-date of the originally imposed term of supervision. Therefore, defendant argued that his sentence was impermissible under Johnson v. United States. The court joined a number of other circuits in rejecting the approach urged by defendant where the court failed to see how the decision could be read to impose the limitation which defendant sought. In the alternative, defendant argued that the term of supervised release was a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that because this was not an exceptional case where the trial court's decision could not be located within the range of permissible decisions, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 59-month term of supervised release. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendants, moved the district court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Mathew Trainor, a Fulton County Assistant District Attorney, was absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims. The court affirmed the district court to the extent it found Trainor absolutely immune from plaintiff's claim that Trainor violated her constitutional rights by making false statements in support of a material witness order. The court vacated and remanded the rest of the order and judgment because absolute immunity did not immunize prosecutors from liability for making defamatory statements to the press, accessing a person's voicemail without consent, or persuading a party to a conversation to record its contents; and, the district court should consider in the first instance whether Trainor was absolutely immune for continuing to withhold/preserve evidence - plaintiff's cell phone.

Defendant, former Majority Leader of the New York State Senate, appealed his conviction for honest services mail fraud, arising from defendant's failure to disclose conflicts of interest related to his receipt of substantial payments from individuals seeking to do business with the State. While defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Skilling, and held that 18 U.S.C. 346, the honest services statute, criminalized only fraudulent schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks and did not criminalize mere failures to disclose conflicts of interest. At issue was whether defendant could be retried under the standard announced in Skilling on certain counts. Although the court held that Skilling required the court to vacate the convictions on Counts Four and Eight, because the court's review of the record convinced it that the government adduced sufficient evidence under the Skilling standard, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on those two counts. The court also held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial on Count Three because, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude a retrial on a charge that resulted in a hung jury. Accordingly, the court vacated the counts of conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a New York state prisoner who practiced Rastafarianism, sued New York Department of Corrections officials, among others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging inter alia that these two defendants infringed his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by touching his dreadlocks without his consent. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff but awarded him only $1.00 in actual damages. Plaintiff appealed from the part of an amended judgment awarding him $1.50 in attorney's fees and ordering defendants to pay $1.40 of the fee award. Plaintiff contended that the district court erred in concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), capped the maximum possible fee award in this case at 150 percent of the $1.00 monetary judgment. The court agreed with the district court and held that Section 1997e(d)(2) limited the possible award of attorney's fees in this case to 150 percent of the monetary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the amended judgment.

Plaintiff, employed as a security officer by defendant, contended that he was sexually harassed by a co-worker and brought an action against defendant, asserting claims for constructive discharge, hostile environment sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the district court properly granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the retaliation claim because a reasonable employee in plaintiff's situation would not have been deterred from engaging in protected activities. The district court also correctly held that, even assuming the jury could have reasonably found plaintiff on his retaliation claim, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the award of punitive damages because a reasonable jury could find that defendant sought to, and did, address defendant's claims in good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, a New York state prisoner serving a 10-year sentence for first-degree robbery, appealed a judgment by the district court denying his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although the district judge granted petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (COA), the COA did not specify the issue or issues on which it was granted. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2)-(3), the court remanded the case for specification of the issue or issues on which the COA was granted.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of four counts of use of the mail or wires in furtherance of fraud that deprived the United Nations, his former employer, of its intangible right to his honest services in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1346; one count of corrupt receipt of things of value with intent to be rewarded with respect to official business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666; and one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. The court held that the United Nations expressly waived defendant's immunity, and even if it had not, defendant himself waived any claim of immunity by failing to raise the issue until the trial was complete. The court also held that the United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. 287e, which authorized the payment of the United States' dues to the United Nations, was both a "federal program" and a "benefit" within the meaning of Section 666, which encompassed bribes as well as illegal gratuities. The court further held that Section 1346 was broad enough to encompass honest services fraud committed by a foreign worker of the United Nations, that defendant was properly sentenced as a "public official" under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1., and that the district court committed no error in ordering defendant to pay restitution in the form of remitting a portion of his salary at the United Nations, which amounted to what defendant was paid during the time he was suspended pending investigation of the conduct underlying his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant, a previously convicted felon, appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court's failure to suppress his pre-arrest statements made without Miranda warnings violated the Fifth Amendment, and that the warrantless search of his bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that while the public safety exception to Miranda justified the officers' initial questioning of defendant, their subsequent warrantless search of his bedroom violated the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant was a crack cocaine offender who was convicted after trial and sentenced in 1996 to a 292-month term of imprisonment. On January 14, 2008, defendant filed a motion in district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) seeking a reduction of his sentence. Specifically, defendant sought to benefit from the 2007 decisions by the United States Sentencing Commission to (a) reduce the sentences for offenses involving crack and (b) make the reductions retroactive. The district court denied the motion on the ground that defendant was not eligible for a sentence reduction. Defendant timely appealed. The court held that defendant was indeed eligible for a reduction where the district court should exercise its broad discretion under section 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether defendant should receive a reduction.