Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a former Senator in the New York State Legislature, appealed from a judgment entered in district court following his conviction of two counts of mail fraud; one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and federal-program fraud; and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, federal-program fraud, and wire fraud. On appeal, defendant contended principally that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, erred in calculating the imprisonment range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and erred in ordering restitution without proof that the persons characterized by the government as victims were directly harmed by his offense conduct. The court considered all of the parties' contentions in support of their respective positions and, except as indicted, have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court vacated the August 23, 2010 order and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the amount of restitution to be ordered and the judgment of conviction, as well as all other aspects of defendant's sentence, were affirmed.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17, claiming compensatory damages for disparate treatment and hostile work environment. Plaintiff also brought parallel state law claims and sought backpay and reinstatement under Title VII and attorneys' fees. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's rulings on the post-trial motions regarding backpay, her state law claims, and the hourly rate applied to the award of attorneys' fees. The court held that because a backpay award required a separate inquest, a district court could not deny an award of backpay because it believed that an award of compensatory damages was sufficient. Accordingly, on remand, the district court was directed to hold a separate inquest as to backpay. The court also held that because the district court abused its discretion in its "specific finding" that plaintiff was not entitled to backpay, the district court should consider in the first instance on remand whether plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay. The court further held that plaintiff abandoned her state law claims because she did not pursue the matter diligently. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to remove its "abandonment" reference. The court finally held that the district court's award of attorneys' fees, while perhaps lagging behind the market, was not an abuse of discretion.

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of multiple fraud-related felonies. Defendant timely appealed his criminal conviction and moved to withdraw his direct criminal appeal with leave to reinstate it after he had finished pursuing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In the alternative, defendant moved for a six month extension to file his appellate brief. The court held that the interests of judicial economy and fairness disfavored staying defendant's direct appeal. The court held, however, that staying the direct appeal by six months would not seriously prejudice the government or the co-defendant. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his direct appeal and granted defendant's request for the six month extension.

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners.

Plaintiff moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel in this appeal from an order of the district court that dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The motions were denied on the ground that plaintiff had filed three or more frivolous lawsuits in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).

Petitioner challenged the manner by which the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated Good Conduct Time (GCT) under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), maintaining that he should be eligible to receive GCT for the 94 months he spent in state and federal custody prior to the date on which he was sentenced in district court, even though those 94 months were credited to a prior state sentence. At issue was whether section 3624(b) permitted the award of GCT for presentence custody served by an inmate, that under 18 U.S.C. 3585(b), could not be credited to the inmate's federal sentence. The court held that the BOP's interpretation of section 3624(b) was persuasive under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and deferred to the agency's interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court granting petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against his former employer, seeking monetary and equitable relief for alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq., and state law. At issue was whether the separation agreement between the parties was unenforceable because its provisions did not comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. 626(f), and applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, that the separation agreement be written in a manner calculated to be understood. The court held that the separation agreement was written in a manner calculated to be understood by the relevant employees of defendant. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that summary judgment should have been denied because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried and that the separation agreement was unenforceable because plaintiff was not advised in writing to consult with an attorney. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from convictions of possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of cocaine base, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant also appealed the district court's denial of a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during his detention because the search and seizure of defendant's person and property were conducted in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and whether the district court erred in denying defendant's section 2255 motion because he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that defendant's detention during the search of his residence was justified pursuant to Michigan v. Summers and that the district court, therefore, did not err in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during that detention. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance was prejudicial and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the section 2255 motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments of the district court.

The New York State Department of Education and related defendants appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to vacate an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff where the district court had awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) after he successfully challenged on equal protection grounds New York State Education Law 6704(6), which restricted professional veterinarian licenses to United States citizens and aliens who were lawful permanent residents of the United States. The Department appealed the district court's ruling and while the appeal was pending, the United States granted plaintiff permanent legal resident status, which meant that section 6704(6) no longer precluded him from obtaining the license. Accordingly, a panel of the court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the judgment. The Department then moved to vacate the fee award. The court agreed with the district court that because the judgment in plaintiff's favor, though later vacated, had brought a judicially-sanctioned, material alteration of the parties' legal relationship that had not been reversed on the merits, plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).