Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Six defendants appealed from their convictions for a variety of weapons trafficking offenses. On appeal, the court addressed three of the many issues raised by defendants, finding, after due consideration, their remaining arguments lacked merit. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support all of the convictions and rejected a vagueness-as-applied argument raised by one defendant (Kharabadze). The court held, however, that the district court employed the wrong standard of proof at sentencing in imposing increases to another defendant's (Solomonyan) base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(E) and (b)(3)(A). Therefore, the court vacated that defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant was convicted of eleven counts of a thirteen count indictment, including several Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), violations predicated on robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the stipulation at issue was insufficient to establish the requisite jurisdictional element. The court held that the evidence proffered by the government was sufficient to sustain the interstate elements of the Hobbs Act attempted robbery count at issue where the stipulation entered into by the parties, that "marijuana [wa]s grown outside of the state of New York and travel[ed] in interstate and foreign commerce to arrive in the New York City area[,]" conveyed the same information about the interstate nature of the marijuana trade as the court's precedents. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal where, given the ample evidence, a rational juror could find that defendant's conduct went far beyond "mere preparation" and constituted a "substantial step" toward commission of a robbery. The court considered all of defendant's other arguments and found them to be without merit and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the district court in its entirety.

Thirteen present and former female inmates of various New York state prisons appealed from the dismissal of their class action complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) to alter its practices and procedures so as to enhance the protection of the class from sexual assault, abuse, and harassment. The complaint also asserted individual claims for damages. The dismissal was based on the grounds that some of the claims of named plaintiffs were moot and that the remaining named plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that it lacked pendant appellate jurisdiction over the damages claims. The court also held that the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief by plaintiffs who were now free but were in DOCs custody when they brought suit were not moot. The court applied a relation-back theory and determined that plaintiffs' class claims were capable of repetition, yet evading review. The court further held that three plaintiffs have exhausted applicable internal prison grievance proceedings while the remaining ten have not. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court convicting him of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The district court imposed a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for the discharge of the weapon, even though it was the intended victim, and not defendant, who fired the gun. Defendant contended that because he did not possess the gun when it was discharged, the district court erred in applying the enhancement. The court held that the district court correctly held that defendant was subject to the discharge enhancement where, as here, defendant possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug-related crime and the firearm was discharged during the course of that crime. Therefore, by its plain terms, the statute applied. The court also held that when a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, the risk of an intended victim trying to seize the gun was just as real as an accidental discharge and that defendant's reliance on United States v. Daija was unavailing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from the sexual assault of plaintiff by a male sheriff's deputy while she was being held in pretrial confinement at the Erie County Holding Center. At issue was whether plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence of municipal liability for this violation of due process to support a jury verdict returned in her favor against Erie County and its then-policy maker, former County Sheriff Patrick Gallivan. The court held that defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on a municipal liabilities claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that defendants were not entitled to a new trial because the errors they asserted in Question Two of the special verdict form and the verdict itself were not properly preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of defendants on the 1983 claim was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment on that claim consistent with the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.

This case stemmed from appellant's participation in the Bayou Hedge Fund Group (Bayou), a classic Ponzi scheme masked as a group of domestic and offshore hedge funds. Appellant appealed from his sentencing, following a plea of guilty to misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4. At issue was whether the district court's order of restitution in the amount of $60 million was improper because it relied on events occurring outside the relevant time period and the putative victims' losses were neither directly nor proximately caused by his actions as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The court found no error, much less plain error, in the district court's use of appellant's fraudulent 2003 faxes at sentencing. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that appellant's failure to report the Bayou fraud was both the direct and the proximate cause of the victim investors' losses. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a school district and principal on 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims arising out of the treatment of their son, a middle school student with a history of misbehavior in school, who wrote an essay with descriptions of illegal activity, violence, and suicide (Racing Time essay). Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a First Amendment retaliation claim brought on behalf of their son and the dismissal of their own Fourth Amendment substantive due process claim. The court held that none of the principal's actions in response to the student's speech constituted retaliation; and because neither of the principal's actions in response to the essay were adverse, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the principal on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The court also held that the principal's call to Child and Family Services (CFS) did not violate the parents' substantive due process rights where there was no actual loss of the parents' custody and no reasonably jury could conclude that the principal's report to CFS, or the resulting requirement that the student by psychiatrically evaluated, was even remotely "outrageous" or "conscience-shocking." The court did not reach the question of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, an African-American firefighter for the City of New Haven, alleged that the firefighter promotion exams challenged in Ricci v. DeStefano were arbitrarily weighted, yielding an impermissible disparate impact. The district court dismissed the claim as "necessarily foreclosed" by Ricci. The court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings, but expressed no view as to whether dismissal was warranted based on other defenses raised by the city.

Appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, eight counts of attempted obstruction of justice; one count of bribery; and one count each of importation and possession of electronic surveillance equipment. On appeal, appellant challenged, among other things, the government's use of a confidential informant to meet with him and discuss the defense of his client. These meetings, which were recorded, revealed appellant's plans for the bribery and intimidation of potential trial witnesses against his client, who subsequently pled guilty. The court held that, in the circumstances of this case, the government's use of the informant was entirely proper, that the convictions concerning the surveillance equipment should be vacated, and that the convictions on all other counts should be affirmed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause were violated by the application of the 2008 Sentencing Manual to a murder conspiracy that concluded in 1989. Defendant contended that his alleged violation and his ignorance of his ex post facto rights rendered the appeal-waiver provision in his plea agreement unenforceable. The court rejected defendant's claims and held that the plea waiver was enforceable. Accordingly, the court dismissed defendant's appeal.