Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of one count of depraved indifference murder in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25(2) after his estranged wife died from a single gunshot wound to the head at point-blank range. At issue was whether, under the law as it existed when petitioner's conviction became final, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court erred in finding that the applicable law of depraved indifference murder was the law in effect when petitioner was convicted at trial. The court held that, although perhaps some point-blank shootings could still have been categorized as depraved indifference murder when petitioner's conviction became final, by that time, under any reasonable view of the evidence adduced at trial, petitioner's point-blank shooting, which was either undoubtedly intentional or accidental in the course of a struggle, could not support a depraved indifference murder conviction. As such, by upholding petitioner's conviction for depraved indifference murder in July 2004, the state courts unreasonably applied federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appealed her conviction of immigration offenses after the district court denied her motion to suppress testimony from the officer who questioned her without Miranda warnings on her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At issue was whether the district court correctly ruled that the officer's questioning failed to rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and thus, whether that court properly admitted into evidence defendant's statements to the officer. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have considered what occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, it followed that defendant was not in "custody" and that, for this reason alone, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the officer's testimony.

Following a jury trial in district court, plaintiff won partial victory on his claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615. Plaintiff and defendant cross-appealed. Plaintiff argued that, on his unsuccessful retaliation claim, the jury should have adopted the standard set forth for Title VII retaliation in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. Plaintiff also appealed the award of only $204 in attorneys' fees on his one successful claim, that defendant interfered in his exercise of FMLA rights. Defendant cross-appealed the denial of its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion. The court vacated and remanded for a new trial on the retaliation claim because the district court erred in rejecting the Burlington Northern jury charge and this error prejudiced plaintiff. The court also vacated the award of attorneys' fees and remanded for recalculation in conformity with the lodestar method.

This instant appeal arose from the suppression of certain custodial statements made by defendant shortly after his arrest. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the government sought reconsideration and reversal of an order of suppression entered by the district court and previously affirmed by this court. The court reconsidered the district court's order of suppression in this case and vacated that order because the court agreed with the government that Berghuis constituted "an intervening change in controlling law," and because the court further agreed that Berghuis compelled a different outcome on these facts.

Defendant appealed from an order of the district court insofar as that order denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112 et seq. At issue was whether a New York court's judgment dismissing on timeliness grounds a plaintiff's Article 78 petition seeking review of an adverse administrative determination of her employment discrimination claims precluded the plaintiff from bringing federal discrimination claims in federal court. The court held that this issue warranted certification to the New York Court of Appeals.

Defendant appealed convictions for conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, causing death by use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, murder in the course of drug conspiracy, and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. Defendant contended that he was entitled to acquittal on some counts by reason of double jeopardy and the sufficiency of the evidence, to resentencing on other counts, and to a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant where a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant had inferentially instructed another individual to kill the victim; that Judge Jones' decision to exclude certain portions of the tapes of jailhouse telephone conversations was not an abuse of discretion and, if the Judge had committed an error, it was harmless; that any residual prejudice from a witness's statement was negligible because the information regarding defendant's arrest was already before the jury; that the record was insufficient to allow adjudication of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and that the Double Jeopardy clause did not bar the government from getting "one complete opportunity" to achieve a conviction on the greater offense by retrial of that count where the jury in the first trial convicted defendant on the lesser offense and failed to reach a verdict on the greater offense. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, once a practicing psychiatrist, defrauded Medicare by receiving funds he was not entitled to receive and then fled the country to live as a fugitive in the Philippines. There, defendant created the website www.liver4you.org, fraudulently promising to provide critically ill patients liver or kidney transplants for certain sums of money. Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of health care fraud and five counts of wire fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court committed four procedural errors in calculating defendant's offense level and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The government argued that the court should not consider the four procedural errors because at sentencing the district court stated it would impose "the same sentence" even without some of the alleged errors. The court rejected this contention and emphasized that such predictions were only rarely appropriate. Defendant argued that his website was not mass-marketing pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii) because he did not initiate contact with his victims where they found his website, which was publicly available online, and emailed him at an address listed on the website. The court rejected defendant's distinction and held that he committed fraud by using the internet to solicit a large number of persons to buy his organ transplant services. Therefore, the court held that the enhancement applied even if defendant did not use the most active marketing method possible. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This criminal appeal arose from a "finite reinsurance" transaction between American International Group, Inc. (AIG) and General Reinsurance Corporation (Gen Re). Defendants, four executives of Gen Re and one of AIG, appealed from judgments convicting them of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, and making false statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Defendants appealed on a variety of grounds, some in common and others specific to each defendant, ranging from evidentiary challenges to serious allegations of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. Most of the arguments were without merit, but defendants' convictions must be vacated because the district court abused its discretion by admitting the stock-price data and issued a jury instruction that directed the verdict on causation.

Defendant appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus where he was convicted of crimes stemming from his involvement in a violent street gang. At issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant alleged that trial counsel failed to advise him as to whether he should accept or reject a particular plea offer by the government. The court held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to flesh out the sparse record before the court. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court for dismissing as untimely his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court assumed that defendant satisfied the requirements for equitable tolling of a three-month period when he was hospitalized but, nevertheless, concluded that the petition was untimely because he failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in pursuing his claim in the two-month period between his hospital discharge and filing. The court held that no such demonstration of diligence was required where the petition was filed within one year of the total untolled time after the challenged conviction became final. Accordingly, the district court's judgment of dismissal was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.