Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, alleging that defendants discriminated against them in administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section 8") program in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, 100.204. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, and 100.204 could not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. 1983; in the analysis of plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim under the FHAA; in factual findings regarding the provision of Section 8 services to the class; in rulings on certain discovery issues; and in decertification. The court adopted the district court's findings and conclusions and held that the district court carefully considered and thoroughly discussed these issues. The court also considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit.

Defendant appealed a judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus where defendant was convicted of Murder in the First Degree for hiring one individual to kill another individual. At issue was whether the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped statement defendant made while in police custody. The court held that the statement was erroneously admitted in violation of defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel where defendant had invoked his right to counsel before making the statements on videotape. The court also held that the error was not harmless where it had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.

The City of New York ("City") brought suit against defendants, retail firearms dealers located in South Carolina and Georgia, alleging public nuisance on the theory that they intentionally or negligently sold firearms in a manner susceptible to illegal trafficking to the City. After engaging in litigation with the City for several years, each defendant defaulted and upon entry of default judgment, the district court issued permanent injunctions prohibiting defendants from further violations of the law and required them to undergo supervision by court-appointed special master. At issue was whether a default judgment should have been entered; whether the default judgment was, in any event, void for lack of personal jurisdiction over each defendant; and, in the alternative, that the injunctions violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) or are unconstitutional. The court held that defendants' withdrawal from the district court proceedings justified the entry of default, followed by default judgment; that defendants forfeited their defense of lack of personal jurisdiction; and that the default judgment was not void. The court also held that the injunctions issued by the district court violated Rule 65(d) and therefore vacated the injunctions and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants appealed convictions of murder in aid of racketeering, witness tampering, and conspiracy to commit witness tampering. At issue was whether defendants should have been granted a new trial after the posttrial discovery of the victim's body, whether there were prejudicial errors in the admission of certain testimony by the victim's widow, whether the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions on the witness-tampering counts; and whether the government improperly withheld information that was material to the defense. Also at issue was whether the admission of certain testimony by the victim's daughter was unduly prejudicial and whether the evidence was sufficient to support one of the defendant's conviction of the murder count. The court considered all of defendants' arguments and found them to be without merit and therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, robbery, and related crimes and was sentenced principally to 319 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court properly limited cross-examination of a government witness at trial by barring his use of a state court's finding that the witness had given false testimony in a prior judicial proceeding. The court held that the district court's evidentiary ruling was erroneous but found that the error was harmless where the witness testified primarily about the arrest of two co-conspirators and the discovery of incriminating evidence during their arrest and mentioned in passing the police's non-custodial questioning of defendant and where other officers fully corroborated the testimony.

Defendants, corrections officers at Queens Private Correctional Facility ("QPCF"), appealed from convictions of conspiracy to obstruct justice, attempted intimidation and corrupt persuasion, and making false statements when defendants submitted false reports of an investigation involving the use of excessive force to an inmate. At issue was whether an internal investigation, by a privately owned prison that housed federal prisoners, of an allegation of excessive force involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The court found no basis to reverse defendants' convictions for obstruction of justice under section 18 U.S.C. 1519 and held that QPCF's internal investigation into whether the defendants' conduct violated QPCF's internal regulations involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the DOJ for purposes of section 1519.

Plaintiffs, a Specialist in the United States Army and her infant son, sued defendants, former and senior government officials, alleging that defendants caused the September 11th, 2001 attacks against the United States in order to create a political atmosphere in which they could pursue domestic and international policy objectives and to conceal the misallocation of $2.3 trillion in congressional appropriations to the Department of Defense. Plaintiffs were in the Pentagon on September 11th and assert violations of their constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal narcotics Agents, a common law tort of conspiracy to cause death and great bodily harm, and a violation of the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a). At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and concluding that plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal and held that the few conceivably "well-pleaded" facts in the complaint were frivolous and were pure speculation and conjecture. The court also ordered plaintiffs' counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

Kristan Peters, an attorney admitted to the bars of both New York and Connecticut and formerly a partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, appealed from an order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Grievance Committee") suspending her from practicing law before that court for a period of seven years. The Grievance Committee found that she had engaged in misconduct which involved instructing a junior attorney to deface transcripts ("Brackett allegation") and violating a confidentiality order ("Confidentiality Order allegation"). At issue was whether the Grievance Committee's failure to hold an independent hearing, and its reliance on a prior sanctions hearing in the underlying litigation, violated her due process rights and the district court's local rules. Also at issue was whether the two charges of misconduct now at issue did not, as a matter of law, support the Grievance Committee's imposition of discipline. The court held that Peters was not provided adequate prior notice of the Brackett allegation or adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The court also held that evidence concerning the Confidentiality Order allegation was not adequately developed during that prior proceeding so as to permit the Grievance Committee to forego an independent evidentiary hearing in the present matter. Therefore, the court vacated the Grievance Committee's suspension order and remanded the matter for the further proceedings.