Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed a motion to dismiss his federal habeas petition where he retained an attorney in or around August 2007, instructed the attorney to file the petition before the deadline on November 20, 2007, and the attorney admitted affirmatively and knowingly that he mislead petitioner by promising him that he would file the petition before the deadline. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the federal habeas petition on the basis that the petition, submitted one day late, was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The court vacated the judgment and held that the district court erred in determining that equitable tolling did not apply where, under the totality of the circumstances presented, extraordinary circumstances prevented the filing of the petition on time.

Defendant appealed a conviction of interstate stalking and interstate violation of a protective order when he tracked his ex-wife's vehicle through a G.P.S. device he placed on her vehicle. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and whether the district court issued an appropriate limiting instruction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's abuse of his ex-wife, the district court did abuse its discretion when it allowed the ex-wife to testify that defendant's brother beat her in 1990 and that defendant later pressured her to lie in court about the brother's assault of a police officer in 1994; and the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence that police stopped defendant while he was driving a reportedly stolen rental car in January 2008 and found three black powder rifles, ammunition, a bulletproof vest, a ski mask, and a last will and testament in the vehicle. The court also held that the limiting instructions did not suffice to protect defendant from unfair prejudice and that the district court's errors affected his substantial rights. Therefore, the court held that the district court's errors were not harmless and vacated the conviction.

Plaintiff sued defendants, public school officials in Burlington, Connecticut, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, among other things, violations under the First Amendment when they prohibited her from running for Senior Class Secretary in response to her off-campus internet speech and prohibited her from wearing a homemade printed t-shirt at a subsequent school assembly. At issue was whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims that they violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights, whether plaintiff was entitled to money damages based on a "final policymaker" theory of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, and whether plaintiff was entitled to Equal Protection pursuant to a "selective enforcement" argument under LeClair v. Saunders. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the asserted First Amendment rights at issue were not clearly established. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claims under Monell where she failed to properly assert the claim against defendants. The court further held that plaintiff was not entitled to Equal Protection where she failed to show that any other Student Council member went unpunished after engaging in similarly offensive speech in light of the circumstances. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to identify a single Connecticut decision that suggested that free speech protections for public students were broader under the Connecticut Constitution than under the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.