Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant motioned the Second Circuit to consider his pro se filing in addition to his counseled brief and to supplement the record. Appellant’s underlying appeal arises from the government’s dismissal, on May 8, 2019, of several indictments against him. Those indictments had been pending since 1999 when Appellant was charged for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.   The Second Circuit denied Appellant’s motion for the court to consider his supplemental pro se brief and his motion to supplement the record. Further, the court granted the government’s motion or an extension of time to file its brief to a date three weeks after the date of resolution of Appellant’s motion. The court explained that Appellant’s motion to supplement the record does not explain why he did not submit them to the district court. Appellant asked the Court to draw factual inferences from the letter and the declaration—inferences the government contests—but a motion to supplement the record “is not a device for presenting evidence to this Court that was not before the trial judge.” View "United States v. Hage (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who operate small venue theaters in New York City, brought claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and nominal damages, alleging that the City’s Key to NYC program—which required certain indoor venues to check the COVID-19 vaccination status of patrons and staff before permitting entry—violated their rights to free speech and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the expiration of the Key to NYC program, the district court dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for nominal damages for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an injury in fact. Plaintiffs now appeal that order.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged Article III standing. However, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal on the alternative ground of failure to state a claim. The court explained that Key to NYC does not impair a fundamental right because it does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Nor does it target a suspect class. These are locations where large numbers of unassociated individuals are likely to gather and spend significant amounts of time exposed to one another, thereby posing a relatively high risk of spreading COVID-19. Requiring individuals in those settings to be vaccinated mitigated that risk and incentivized vaccination among the people most likely to be in a position to spread the virus. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an equal protection violation. View "Clementine Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment in his Section 1983 suit arising from those portions of Plaintiff’s imprisonment that occurred as a result of an improper imposition of administrative post-release supervision (“PRS”) by New York State agencies, and subsequent improper imposition of PRS by a New York state court. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in limiting relief to $1 in nominal damages, denying him punitive damages as a matter of law, and granting summary judgment for Appellees on his false imprisonment claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court instructed the district court to consider further whether, under Vincent, compensatory damages may still be available to Plaintiff. Further, the court agreed with Plaintiff that material issues of disputed fact preclude summary judgment. Appellees’ Rule 56.1 statement stated that as of May 30, 2000, the maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s sentence was February 13, 2008, and as of July 30, 2007, it was June 6, 2008. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure in the district court to object to Appellees’ statement of material facts does not preclude him from relying on inconsistencies in Appellees’ own evidence to identify a disputed issue of material fact that made it erroneous to enter summary judgment. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on the false imprisonment claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s challenge to his post-resentencing confinement is precluded by Appellees’ qualified immunity defense. View "Aponte v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of racketeering conspiracy (Count One); murder in aid of racketeering (Count Two); and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count Three). Defendant argued that his Count Three conviction must be vacated because his predicate offense of murder in aid of racketeering was not a crime of violence.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contention that the VICAR murder statute is indivisible and held that the modified categorical approach applies to the court’s consideration of whether his conviction for murder in aid of racketeering, a substantive VICAR offense, constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of Section 924(c). The court explained that first-degree manslaughter, regardless of whether it may be completed by commission or omission, “can only be committed by a defendant who causes death—the ultimate bodily injury—while intending to cause at least serious physical injury,” necessarily requiring the use of physical force. The court wrote that to hold otherwise would preclude courts from recognizing even intentional murder as a categorically violent crime, an untenable consequence. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to the City of Kingston’s prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the Common Council held at Kingston City Hall. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Common Council meetings are limited public fora in which the City is permitted to reasonably restrict speech that undermines the purpose for which the forum had been opened. The district court granted the City’s motion, noting that government entities are permitted to regulate the manner in which the public participates in limited public fora. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the City’s sign prohibition was unreasonable in light of the potential disruption or distraction that signs at Common Council meetings might pose.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Complaint itself and common sense offer a satisfactory rationale for the City’s sign prohibition, which undermines Plaintiffs’ assertions of unreasonableness. To be sure, there may be cases where restrictions on the form or manner of speech—including the use of signs—in a limited public forum would be unreasonable, but Plaintiffs have not pled such facts here. View "Tyler v. Kingston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim against prison officials for their conduct during an electrical fire at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. Meanwhile, the prison officials claim that Plaintiff received a denial but failed to appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the officials. Plaintiff claimed that he received a denial and then appealed through the second and third stages of review.The Second Circuit vacated. The court explained that drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. The prison officials may have mistakenly failed to consolidate Plaintiff’s grievance with those of the other inmates who were affected by the electrical fire—in a possible violation of state regulations requiring full consolidation. Plaintiff’s declaration is consistent with a belief that his grievance was denied as part of the consolidated group of grievants. He may have appealed that denial, but the prison system might not have a record of his appeal because it failed to record the denial of his initial grievance in the first place. Plaintiff’s declaration—combined with (1) the undisputed evidence that he filed an initial grievance, (2) the absence of documentary evidence that his complaint was ever denied, and (3) the apparent failure of the prison officials to consolidate his complaint with those of the other inmates—creates a dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff actually did pursue all administrative remedies that were “available” to him. 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(a). View "Garcia v. Heath" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on two counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. On appeal, she argued that the government failed to prove that venue was proper in the Southern District of New York.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the government adduced evidence sufficient to prove that Defendant damaged a protected computer within that District and that venue was, therefore, proper. The court explained that the jury was entitled to conclude that Defendant’s actions impaired the availability of data on the JazzHR system on her supervisor’s computer. The fact that the deletion might also have damaged the Amazon servers located in Virginia and California makes no difference. Thus, the fact that the email addresses of some New Jersey residents were obtained from AT&T’s servers was merely a “circumstance element” that could not support the venue in New Jersey where the “essential conduct elements” of the crime all occurred in other states. View "United States v. Calonge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution, sued pro se under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the defendants failed for years to provide him with adequate medical care for painful infections and lesions on his scalp, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His initial complaint (“Initial Complaint”) named five administrators (collectively, the “Administrator Defendants”) and three John Doe medical professionals. That complaint was dismissed sua sponte prior to service on the defendants and without leave to amend as to the administrators. An Amended Complaint omitted the administrators (no leave to amend having been given as to them) and named in addition three nurse defendants.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that the appeal from the judgment brings up for review the dismissal of both complaints, that the Initial Complaint should not have been dismissed against the Administrator Defendants on the ground of frivolousness prior to service and without leave to amend, and that the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed on the qualified immunity ground adduced by the district court. The court explained that it was error to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to satisfy the objective component of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. While it may be that Defendants did not act with “deliberate indifference” or that some or all of the conduct can be classified as malpractice at worst, the district court did not pass on those issues, and the court wrote that it will not consider them now. View "Collymore v. Commissioner of D.O.C." on Justia Law

Defendants were prosecuted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) for conspiring to traffic drugs on the high seas using a stateless vessel. Before ultimately pleading guilty to the offense, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss their indictments on the ground that conspirators operating from a foreign country who were never physically on the high seas and who had no ties to the United States could not constitutionally be subject to prosecution under the MDLEA.The district court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendants argued that their prosecution under the MDLEA violated due process because their conduct lacked a nexus with the United States and that, by applying the MDLEA to their conduct, Congress exceeded its Article I powers.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Antonius" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841 and 846 and concealment money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). During his plea colloquy, speaking through a Spanish-English interpreter, Defendant repeatedly failed to acknowledge that he had intended to conceal the proceeds of his drug trafficking, an element of concealment money laundering. On appeal, Defendant contends that his conviction for concealment money laundering should be reversed because an insufficient factual basis existed for his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) conviction and sentence and remanded. The court explained that the district court’s error is “plain.” In this case, Defendant did not admit to a concealment purpose—an offense element—and the other evidence did not establish that intent either. Thus, it is clear and obvious that Rule 11(b)(3) was not satisfied. Second, the district court’s error prejudicially affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The court reasoned that it appears likely that Defendant would not have pled guilty to violating Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) had he understood its mens rea requirement and been told that he needed to state a concealment purpose. Defendant was consistent and persistent in maintaining that his purpose was otherwise. Last, the plain and prejudicial error seriously harmed the legitimacy of the judicial proceeding. The district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea without Defendant’s acknowledgment that he intended to conceal the source of his funds casts serious doubt upon the “fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” View "U.S. v. Aybar-Peguero" on Justia Law