Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, robbery, and related crimes and was sentenced principally to 319 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court properly limited cross-examination of a government witness at trial by barring his use of a state court's finding that the witness had given false testimony in a prior judicial proceeding. The court held that the district court's evidentiary ruling was erroneous but found that the error was harmless where the witness testified primarily about the arrest of two co-conspirators and the discovery of incriminating evidence during their arrest and mentioned in passing the police's non-custodial questioning of defendant and where other officers fully corroborated the testimony.

Defendants, corrections officers at Queens Private Correctional Facility ("QPCF"), appealed from convictions of conspiracy to obstruct justice, attempted intimidation and corrupt persuasion, and making false statements when defendants submitted false reports of an investigation involving the use of excessive force to an inmate. At issue was whether an internal investigation, by a privately owned prison that housed federal prisoners, of an allegation of excessive force involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The court found no basis to reverse defendants' convictions for obstruction of justice under section 18 U.S.C. 1519 and held that QPCF's internal investigation into whether the defendants' conduct violated QPCF's internal regulations involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the DOJ for purposes of section 1519.

Plaintiffs, a Specialist in the United States Army and her infant son, sued defendants, former and senior government officials, alleging that defendants caused the September 11th, 2001 attacks against the United States in order to create a political atmosphere in which they could pursue domestic and international policy objectives and to conceal the misallocation of $2.3 trillion in congressional appropriations to the Department of Defense. Plaintiffs were in the Pentagon on September 11th and assert violations of their constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal narcotics Agents, a common law tort of conspiracy to cause death and great bodily harm, and a violation of the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a). At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and concluding that plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal and held that the few conceivably "well-pleaded" facts in the complaint were frivolous and were pure speculation and conjecture. The court also ordered plaintiffs' counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

Kristan Peters, an attorney admitted to the bars of both New York and Connecticut and formerly a partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, appealed from an order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Grievance Committee") suspending her from practicing law before that court for a period of seven years. The Grievance Committee found that she had engaged in misconduct which involved instructing a junior attorney to deface transcripts ("Brackett allegation") and violating a confidentiality order ("Confidentiality Order allegation"). At issue was whether the Grievance Committee's failure to hold an independent hearing, and its reliance on a prior sanctions hearing in the underlying litigation, violated her due process rights and the district court's local rules. Also at issue was whether the two charges of misconduct now at issue did not, as a matter of law, support the Grievance Committee's imposition of discipline. The court held that Peters was not provided adequate prior notice of the Brackett allegation or adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The court also held that evidence concerning the Confidentiality Order allegation was not adequately developed during that prior proceeding so as to permit the Grievance Committee to forego an independent evidentiary hearing in the present matter. Therefore, the court vacated the Grievance Committee's suspension order and remanded the matter for the further proceedings.

Petitioner appealed a motion to dismiss his federal habeas petition where he retained an attorney in or around August 2007, instructed the attorney to file the petition before the deadline on November 20, 2007, and the attorney admitted affirmatively and knowingly that he mislead petitioner by promising him that he would file the petition before the deadline. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the federal habeas petition on the basis that the petition, submitted one day late, was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The court vacated the judgment and held that the district court erred in determining that equitable tolling did not apply where, under the totality of the circumstances presented, extraordinary circumstances prevented the filing of the petition on time.

Defendant appealed a conviction of interstate stalking and interstate violation of a protective order when he tracked his ex-wife's vehicle through a G.P.S. device he placed on her vehicle. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and whether the district court issued an appropriate limiting instruction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's abuse of his ex-wife, the district court did abuse its discretion when it allowed the ex-wife to testify that defendant's brother beat her in 1990 and that defendant later pressured her to lie in court about the brother's assault of a police officer in 1994; and the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence that police stopped defendant while he was driving a reportedly stolen rental car in January 2008 and found three black powder rifles, ammunition, a bulletproof vest, a ski mask, and a last will and testament in the vehicle. The court also held that the limiting instructions did not suffice to protect defendant from unfair prejudice and that the district court's errors affected his substantial rights. Therefore, the court held that the district court's errors were not harmless and vacated the conviction.

Plaintiff sued defendants, public school officials in Burlington, Connecticut, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, among other things, violations under the First Amendment when they prohibited her from running for Senior Class Secretary in response to her off-campus internet speech and prohibited her from wearing a homemade printed t-shirt at a subsequent school assembly. At issue was whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims that they violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights, whether plaintiff was entitled to money damages based on a "final policymaker" theory of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, and whether plaintiff was entitled to Equal Protection pursuant to a "selective enforcement" argument under LeClair v. Saunders. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the asserted First Amendment rights at issue were not clearly established. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claims under Monell where she failed to properly assert the claim against defendants. The court further held that plaintiff was not entitled to Equal Protection where she failed to show that any other Student Council member went unpunished after engaging in similarly offensive speech in light of the circumstances. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to identify a single Connecticut decision that suggested that free speech protections for public students were broader under the Connecticut Constitution than under the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.