Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Comenity to recover statutory damages for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to demonstrate that four billing-rights disclosures made to her by Comenity in connection with plaintiff's opening of a credit card account violated the TILA. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the concrete injury required for standing to pursue two of her disclosure challenges and thus dismissed those two claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that, although plaintiff established standing to pursue the two remaining claims, those challenges fail as a matter of law. In this case, Comenity’s notice that certain TILA protections applied only to unsatisfactory credit card purchases that were not paid in full is substantially similar to Model Form G–3(A) and, therefore, cannot as a matter of law demonstrate a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1637(a)(7). Furthermore, because neither the TILA nor its implementing regulations require unsatisfactory purchases to be reported in writing, Comenity’s alleged failure to disclose such a requirement cannot support a section 1637(a)(7) claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Comenity on those TILA claims. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of her cross-motion for class certification as moot. View "Strubel v. Comenity Bank" on Justia Law

After plaintiff purchased a "1 Day Diet" weight loss product containing sibutramine, a controlled substance that had been removed from the market in October 2010, on Amazon.com, he filed suit alleging claims under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. 2051 et seq., and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint based on the ground that the parties are bound by the mandatory arbitration provision in Amazon's Conditions of Use. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and held that Amazon failed to show that plaintiff was on notice and agreed to mandatory arbitration as a matter of law. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not establish a likelihood of future or continuing harm where, even assuming his past purchase of the product resulted in injury and that he may continue to suffer consequences as a result, he failed to show that he is likely subjected to further sales by Amazon of products containing sibutramine. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district courtʹs denial of plaintiffʹs motion for a preliminary injunction, but vacated the dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e, alleging that they received collection notices that were misleading because they stated the “current balance,” but did not disclose that the balance might increase due to interest and fees. The court held that Section 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' other claims in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "Avila v. Riexinger & Assoc., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging common-law fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that she never agreed to the mortgage loan at issue. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting an attorney's testimony under FRE 406 regarding the fact that he had met with plaintiff and had not asked her to sign blank sheets of paper; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the loan documents at issue under FRE 901(a) for authenticated records and the court rejected plaintiff's argument that admission of the photocopies violated the best evidence rule where the original documents had been lost; plaintiff's FRCP 50 argument fails where the evidence was more than adequate to warrant the jury in finding for defendants' on the case's central issue; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59 motion for a new trial where nothing in the record warranted upsetting the verdict. Accordingly, the court found no error and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Northland, alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by sending him and other class members a debt collection letter that gave a call‐back number but did not specify the name of the person at that number. The district court denied class certification, and then dismissed the complaint for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff’s allegations concerning the failure to include the name of a person to call back do not state a claim under the FDCPA. However, the court disagreed with the district court that the claim is so insubstantial that it does not even support federal‐question jurisdiction.  The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gallego v. Northland Group Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Ocwen and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging various causes of action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. At issue is whether a debtor who has received a claim on a debt that has been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding can sue the claimant in a district court under the FDCPA. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Code does not broadly repeal the FDCPA for purposes of FDCPA claims based on conduct that would constitute alleged violations of the discharge injunction; none of plaintiff's individual FDCPA claims conflicts with the discharge injunction under the Bankruptcy Code; and, in regard to the claim of piecemeal litigation, the court concluded that the remote possibility of a need for clarification provides no basis for routing all FDCPA claims exclusively into the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate plaintiff's FDCPA claims against Ocwen. View "Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692k, as untimely. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that the FDCPA violation “occurred” when defendant sent the restraining notice. The court held instead that where a debt collector sends an allegedly unlawful restraining notice to a bank, the FDCPA violation does not “occur” for purposes of Section 1692k(d) until the bank freezes the debtor’s account. Because the record is unclear as to when the freeze actually took place, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Benzemann v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that she was the victim of an identity theft scheme perpetrated by employees of Chase, and seeks to hold Chase liable for this identity theft under the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. 380-1, 380-s. At issue was whether plaintiff's suit is preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. The court held that 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts only those claims that concern a defendant’s responsibilities as a furnisher of information under the FCRA. The court concluded that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the complaint advances claims against Chase for identity theft under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. 380‐l and 380‐s based on acts of identity theft perpetrated by Chase employees, as distinct from any erroneous or otherwise wrongful actions by Chase in furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies. These identity theft claims are not preempted because they do not concern Chase’s responsibilities as a furnisher. The court further concluded that, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief based on Chase’s erroneous or otherwise improper furnishing of information to consumer reporting agencies, those claims are preempted. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims against Staples for breach of contract and for violations of New York General Business Law (N.Y. G.B.L.) Sections 349 and 350 for failure to state a claim. Sections 349 and 350 prohibit deception of consumers and false advertising. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the district court erred in finding that the language of the Protection Plan Brochure (the Contract) that plaintiff purchased for his computer was unambiguous. The court concluded that plaintiff has adequately alleged both a materially misleading practice and an actual injury under N.Y. GBL Sections 349 and 350; with respect to the breach of contract claim, the district court erred in finding the Contract to be unambiguous, in requiring plaintiff to allege a “material” breach, and in finding that plaintiff had failed to adequately allege damages; construing the contract’s ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor, he has alleged Staples’s failure to perform in the first year of the contract and damages in the amount of his restitution interest; and should plaintiff seek damages beyond his restitution interest, he should amend his complaint. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Orlander v. Staples, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., against FCI, his mortgage loan servicer and a debt collector, alleging that FCI violated the FDCPA by sending him two written communications that failed to comply with FDCPA requirements that debt collectors timely provide certain notices to debtors. The district court granted FCI's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ruling principally that the letter, which the district court viewed as primarily a transfer‐of‐servicing informational notice sent pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, was not also a communication sent “in connection with the collection of any debt” under the FDCPA. The district court also ruled that plaintiff failed to allege that FCI violated the FDCPA by mailing the payment statement and the district court denied plaintiff leave to filed a second amended complaint. The court applied an objective standard to resolve the question and concluded that plaintiff adequately alleged that the Letter was an “initial communication . . . in connection with the collection of [a] debt,” so as to obligate FCI to provide plaintiff a section 1692g notice. Therefore, the district court erred in granting the motion, and the court vacated and remanded. View "Hart v. FCI Lender Serv." on Justia Law