Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging that defendants fraudulently procured a mortgage on her home, and thereafter sought to foreclose on that mortgage, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the New York General Business Law, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, and common law. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them, ruling that, because plaintiff failed to disclose these claims in a 2006 proceeding under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, her present suit was barred for lack of standing or by collateral estoppel. The court considered all of the parties' arguments and, except to the extent indicated, have found them to be without merit. The court affirmed the judgment in regards to the denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in her favor and the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing her claims under RICO, ECOA, New York Business Law 349, and for negligent misrepresentation. The court vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed plaintiff's claims for violation of TILA and for common-law fraud, and remanded for further proceedings.View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against defendants alleging that defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and New York statutory and common law. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants obtained unauthorized attorneys' fees and costs in connection with actions to foreclose liens on plaintiffs' properties arising out of unpaid municipal property taxes and water and sewer charges. The court held that liens for mandatory water and sewer charges imposed by New York City as an incident to property ownership, which are treated as akin to property tax liens, are not subject to the FDCPA because they do not involve a "debt" as that term is defined in the statute. The court also held that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CitiMortgage's responses to requests for information about her mortgage violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601-2617; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p; and N.Y. General Business Law (GBL) section 349. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege that CitiMortgage did not properly designate a qualified written address (QWR) or that any or her lawyer's letters were sent to the designated address. Because plaintiff's lawyer's letters are not QWRs, CitiMortgage's RESPA duties were not triggered, and therefore the district court properly dismissed the RESPA claims. The district court did not err in dismissing the FDCPA claims where the amended complaint failed to alleged that CitiMortgage qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA. The district court did not err in dismissing the section 349 claim where CitiMortgage's QWR address notice was not inadequate. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied her request for leave to amend. View "Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc." on Justia Law

StreetEasy filed suit under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d). This appeal arose out of the attempted resolution of a dispute between a real estate listing website and one of its co-founders over the propriety of actions taken by the co-founder when he separated from the company, and the validity of corporate actions that occurred before his departure. Because the order of dismissal failed to retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the parties' settlement agreement, or to incorporate the terms of that agreement, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's orders enforcing the settlement agreement and holding defendant in contempt for noncompliance. Because defendant was properly sanctioned for only one of the three factual contentions identified by the district court as the basis for its sanctions award, the court vacated that award and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of monetary sanctions in light of this decision. View "StreetEasy, Inc. v. Chertok" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against MERS in state court asserting claims related to MERS's facilitation of the provision of "Esign" mortgages to consumer-borrowers. MERS appealed the district court's grant of a motion to remand to New York state court on the ground that MERS's notice of removal was untimely. The court reversed and held that, in Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) cases, the 30-day removal periods of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not triggered until the plaintiff serves the defendant with an initial pleading or other paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought or sets forth facts from which an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained. The court also held that where a plaintiff's papers failed to trigger the removal clocks of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3), a defendant may remove a case when, upon its own independent investigation, it determines that the case is removable. Therefore, the 30-day removal periods of sections 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) are not the exclusive authorizations for removal in CAFA cases. In this instance, plaintiffs never served MERS with a complaint or subsequent document explicitly stating the amount in controversy or providing MERS with sufficient information to conclude the threshold amount in controversy was satisfied. Therefore, the removal clocks of section 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) did not commence. After MERS determined upon its independent investigation that section 1332(d) conveyed CAFA federal jurisdiction because the amount in controversy, number of plaintiffs, and minimal diversity requirements were satisfied, it properly removed the case by alleging facts adequate to establish the amount in controversy in its notice of removal. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Cutrone v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, an attorney, for an alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. At issue on appeal was whether a defendant remained liable for plaintiff's attorney's fees accrued after defendant offered a settlement that included the maximum available damages and, as mandated by statute, plaintiff's fees and costs, but that did not include an offer of judgment. The court concluded that because defendant's initial offer to settle did not include an offer of judgment, it did not fully resolve the dispute between the parties, and thus further litigation by plaintiff was not per se unreasonable; the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding full attorney's fees to plaintiff; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cabala v. Crowley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., claims and denial of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of an earlier dismissal of their Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., claims against The Money Store. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that The Money Store was not a "debt collector" under the false name exception to FDCPA liability. Where a creditor, in the process of collecting its own debts, hires a third party for the express purpose of representing to its debtors that the third party is collecting the creditor's debts, and the third party engages in no bona fide efforts to collect those debts, the false name exception exposes the creditor to FDCPA liability. In regards to the TILA claims, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that, because plaintiffs' mortgage documents did not name The Money Store as the person to whom the debt was initially payable, The Money Store was not a "creditor" under TILA and was therefore not subject to liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vincent v. The Money Store" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Midland, a debt collector, for damages after Midland called him between 22 and 28 times over the course of 2011 when none of the calls were intended for plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff contended that neither of two putative offers of judgment extended by Midland could have rendered his action moot because neither offer complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The court held that an offer need not comply with Rule 68 in order to render a case moot under Article III. Consequently, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's refusal to settle the case in return for Midland's offer, notwithstanding plaintiff's acknowledgement that he could win no more, was sufficient ground to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doyle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against Forman Holt, a debt collector within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6), alleging a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692g. Plaintiffs alleged that Forman Holt's collection notice violated the FDCPA by stating that plaintiffs could only dispute the validity of a debt in writing. The district court granted Forman Holt's motion to dismiss, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that section 1692g(a)(3) did not impose a writing requirement that required the consumer debtor to notify the debt collector in writing in order to dispute the validity of the debt. View "Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their Second Amended Class Action Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs challenged the veracity of certain advertisements in which Time Warner allegedly described its Road Runner Internet service. Plaintiffs asserted that Time Warner's allegedly deceptive advertisements violated New York General Business Law 349 and various California consumer protection statutes, and gave rise to claims for common law fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The court concluded that the allegations of the Complaint were materially inconsistent with the sole advertisement plaintiffs have submitted. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims lacked the facial plausibility necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fink v. Time Warner Cable" on Justia Law