Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, a group of textbook authors, entered into publishing agreements with McGraw Hill, which included provisions for royalty payments based on the net receipts from sales of their textbooks. The agreements also stipulated that McGraw Hill would publish the textbooks at its own expense. The authors alleged that McGraw Hill breached these agreements by reducing royalty payments for textbooks sold through its online platform, Connect, which also includes additional course materials.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the authors' breach-of-contract claims, ruling that the contract definitions of "net receipts" unambiguously limited royalties to sales of the textbooks themselves, excluding other products sold through Connect. The court also found that McGraw Hill's reduction of royalties did not violate the contracts' requirement to publish the textbooks at its own expense, reasoning that Connect was more than just a publishing platform.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's interpretation of the "net receipts" clauses, affirming that the authors were only entitled to royalties based on the sales of their textbooks, not on additional content sold through Connect. However, the appellate court found merit in the authors' claim that McGraw Hill breached the "own expense" clause. The court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that McGraw Hill's new royalty calculation method effectively shifted some of the publishing expenses to the authors, contrary to the agreements.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the breach-of-contract claims related to the "own expense" clause and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Flynn v. McGraw Hill LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to New York City's Guaranty Law, which was enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The law rendered personal guaranties of commercial lease obligations arising between March 7, 2020, and June 30, 2021, permanently unenforceable and identified efforts to collect on such guaranties as proscribed commercial tenant harassment. Plaintiffs, a group of New York City landlords, argued that the law violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Guaranty Law was unconstitutional.The City of New York appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the City did not enforce the Guaranty Law. The Second Circuit found that while the plaintiffs had standing at the pleadings stage due to the presumption of enforcement, they failed to meet the heightened burden on summary judgment to show a credible threat of imminent enforcement by the City. The City had unequivocally disavowed any intent to enforce the Guaranty Law against the plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award of summary judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the City's request to vacate its earlier judgment reversing the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and denied the City costs on the appeal due to its negligent delay in raising the enforcement-based standing challenge. View "Bochner v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over fees related to contracts between independent solar generators (the plaintiffs) and National Grid USA Services Co., Inc. and its affiliate Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the defendants). The plaintiffs are required to pay costs for interconnecting their solar energy projects to the defendants' electric distribution grid, which includes a "tax gross-up adder" to offset the defendants' federal income tax liability. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that these interconnection payments are not taxable income and also sought to recover the allegedly unlawful tax-related fees through state-law claims for damages.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the case, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment was barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act because the federal tax issue would only arise as a defense to a state-law breach of contract claim. The court also found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims did not raise a substantial federal question, as the federal tax issue was not significant to the federal system as a whole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief did not meet the threshold requirement for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, as the federal tax issue would only arise as a defense in a hypothetical state-law breach of contract claim. The court also found that the federal issue in the plaintiffs' state-law claims was not substantial, as it was fact-bound and situation-specific, and did not have broader significance for the federal government. Therefore, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was upheld. View "Sunvestment Energy Group NY 64 LLC v. National Grid USA Services Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Malcolm H. Wiener, the plaintiff, purchased three life insurance policies from AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company in 1986. Over the years, Wiener's policies lapsed multiple times due to insufficient funds, but he managed to reinstate them each time. In 2013, the policies lapsed again, and AXA terminated them after Wiener failed to make the necessary payments within the grace period. Wiener claimed that AXA and his insurance agent, David Hungerford, caused the lapse by not sending premium notices and by changing the mailing address without his authorization. He also alleged that AXA wrongfully denied his application to reinstate the policies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of AXA and Hungerford on all claims. The court found that AXA was not obligated to send premium notices after the policies lapsed and that Wiener had waived any objection to the address change by acquiescing for nearly five years. The court also concluded that Hungerford had no duty to notify Wiener of the lapse. Regarding the reinstatement claim, the court ruled that AXA's denial was not arbitrary and capricious, as it was based on Wiener’s low serum albumin levels, which were consistent with AXA’s underwriting guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the termination claims, agreeing that Wiener could not show that AXA’s failure to send premium notices caused the policies to lapse and that he had waived any objection to the address change. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the reinstatement claim, finding that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the actual reasons for AXA’s denial and whether those reasons were arbitrary. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reinstatement claim. View "Wiener v. AXA Equitable Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a contract dispute between Kenneth E. Salamone and RUFSTR Racing, LLC (Plaintiffs) and Douglas Marine Corporation (Defendant). Plaintiffs contracted with Douglas Marine to purchase a custom-made race boat and trailer for $542,117, making payments totaling $501,500. Douglas Marine failed to deliver the boat on time, leading Plaintiffs to cancel the contract. Douglas Marine sold the boat and engines for $375,000 but only remitted $50,000 to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, seeking damages.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York held a jury trial, which found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding them $131,171 in damages. Plaintiffs moved to alter the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing the jury's calculation was fundamentally erroneous and should be increased to $451,500. The district court agreed, ruling that the jury's verdict constituted a fundamental error and increased the damages to $451,500. Douglas Marine appealed, arguing the district court erred in increasing the damages and in not instructing the jury on a mitigation-of-damages defense. They also challenged the court's personal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It found merit in Douglas Marine's argument that the district court improperly increased the damages award, ruling that the jury's verdict did not constitute fundamental error. The appellate court reversed the amended judgment to the extent it increased the damages and remanded the case for entry of a second amended judgment consistent with the jury's original award of $131,171. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Douglas Marine's post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Salamone v. Douglas Marine Corp." on Justia Law

Jonathan Michel, a sophomore at Yale University during the Spring 2020 semester, filed a putative class action against Yale after the university transitioned to online-only classes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Michel sought tuition refunds, claiming promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment under Connecticut law, arguing that Yale's refusal to refund tuition was inequitable since the online education provided was of lower value than the in-person education promised.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted Yale's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Michel did not present evidence of financial detriment caused by the transition to online classes, a necessary element for both promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. The court dismissed Michel's suit on January 31, 2023.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Michel's quasi-contract claims were barred by a "Temporary Suspension Provision" in Yale's Undergraduate Regulations. This provision, which acted as a force majeure clause, allowed Yale to transition to online-only classes during the pandemic without issuing tuition refunds. The court concluded that Michel and Yale had a contractual relationship governed by this provision, which precluded Michel's quasi-contract claims. Therefore, Yale was entitled to summary judgment. View "Michel v. Yale University" on Justia Law

Windward Bora LLC purchased a junior promissory note signed by Constance and Royston Browne, secured by a junior mortgage on real property. Windward's predecessor had already obtained a final judgment of foreclosure on the junior mortgage. Without seeking leave from the court that issued the foreclosure, Windward filed a diversity action to recover on the promissory note. Both parties moved for summary judgment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Brownes' motion for summary judgment and denied Windward's. The court found diversity jurisdiction by comparing the national citizenship of the Brownes with that of Windward’s sole member, a U.S. lawful permanent resident, and concluded that state domiciles were irrelevant. It also held that the suit was precluded by New York’s election-of-remedies statute because Windward did not seek leave before suing on the note after its predecessor had already sued on the mortgage. The court found no special circumstances to excuse Windward’s failure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that diversity jurisdiction was present but clarified that the state domiciles of the parties were relevant. The court resolved a divide among district courts, stating that there is no diversity jurisdiction in a suit between U.S. citizens and unincorporated associations with lawful permanent resident members if such jurisdiction would not exist in a suit between the same U.S. citizens and those permanent resident members as individuals. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the Brownes under New York’s election-of-remedies statute, finding no special circumstances to excuse Windward’s failure to seek leave. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Bora v. Browne" on Justia Law

The case involves Indemnity Insurance Company of North America ("Indemnity") and Unitrans International Corporation ("Unitrans"). Indemnity, as the insurer of Amgen, a pharmaceutical company, paid for the loss of a pallet of pharmaceutical drugs that was damaged while being unloaded from a truck at an airport. The pallet was being transported from Amgen's facility in Dublin, Ireland to Philadelphia, and Unitrans, a logistics company, had been engaged to arrange the transportation. Indemnity, as Amgen's subrogee, sued Unitrans for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of bailment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted Unitrans's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Unitrans qualified as a contracting carrier under the Montreal Convention, and therefore, Indemnity's action was time-barred by the Convention's statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that contracting carriers are subject to the Montreal Convention, but found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Unitrans was a contracting carrier. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that a contracting carrier, as defined by Article 39 of the Montreal Convention, is a person that, as a principal, makes a contract of carriage governed by the Montreal Convention with a consignor, and an actual carrier performs the whole or part of the carriage by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier. The court found that there was enough evidence cutting both ways to create a genuine question as to whether Unitrans qualifies as a contracting carrier. View "Indemnity Inssurance Co. of North America v. Unitrans International Corp." on Justia Law

This case is about a dispute between Richard Roe and St. John’s University (SJU) and Jane Doe. Roe, a male student at SJU, was accused of sexually assaulting two female students, Doe and Mary Smith, on separate occasions. SJU's disciplinary board found Roe guilty of non-consensual sexual contact with both Doe and Smith and imposed sanctions, including a suspension and eventual expulsion. Roe then sued SJU, alleging that his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and state contract law had been violated. He also sued Doe for allegedly defaming him in an anonymous tweet accusing him of sexual assault. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Roe's Title IX and state law claims, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over his defamation claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Roe's complaint failed to state a plausible claim of sex discrimination under Title IX. The court found that, while Roe had identified some procedural irregularities in SJU's disciplinary proceedings, these were not sufficient to support a minimal plausible inference of sex discrimination. Furthermore, the court ruled that Roe's hostile environment claim was fatally deficient, as the single anonymous tweet at the center of his claim was not, standing alone, sufficiently severe to support a claim of a hostile educational environment under Title IX. View "Roe v. St. John's University" on Justia Law

In the dispute between fashion designer and social media influencer Hayley Paige Gutman and her former employer, JLM Couture, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the preliminary injunction and contempt order issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The lower court had awarded JLM control of two social media accounts previously managed by Gutman and enforced a five-year restrictive covenant that prohibited Gutman from identifying herself as a designer of certain goods. The court also held Gutman in civil contempt for posts on Instagram that it deemed as marketing, violating an earlier version of the preliminary injunction.The Court of Appeals dismissed Gutman's appeal from the contempt order due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. It affirmed the district court's refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction based on the law of the case. However, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order that modified its preliminary injunction. The court found fault in the lower court's determination of the ownership of the disputed social media accounts and its failure to evaluate the reasonableness of the five-year noncompete restraint on Gutman. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman" on Justia Law