Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A New York state prisoner, convicted of several serious offenses and serving a life sentence without parole, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied his petition on the merits and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The petitioner missed the deadline to appeal that denial and subsequently moved for an extension of time to appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), arguing that his attorney’s staff absences and communication issues with the petitioner constituted “excusable neglect.” The district court denied this motion, finding the reasons provided were, at most, ordinary attorney error, and again denied a certificate of appealability.The petitioner then appealed the district court’s denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The government argued, and the court agreed, that before the appeal could proceed, the petitioner was required to obtain a certificate of appealability because the order denying his extension motion was a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The petitioner challenged this requirement, but the Second Circuit concluded that its prior precedent remained binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Harbison v. Bell did not remove the certificate requirement for orders that conclude the habeas proceeding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a certificate of appealability is required to appeal the denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion in this context, and it declined to issue such a certificate because no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether the district court abused its discretion. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Griffin v. LaManna" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in December 2017, detonated a homemade pipe bomb in a crowded pedestrian tunnel connecting the Times Square subway station and the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan. The defendant, motivated by propaganda from a foreign terrorist organization, constructed the device using materials from his workplace and filled it with metal screws to act as shrapnel. On the morning of the attack, he strapped the bomb to his body, rode the subway into Manhattan, and triggered the device during rush hour, injuring himself and several bystanders. The attack caused both physical and psychological harm to victims and created a significant risk to public safety.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. After a jury convicted the defendant on six counts—including providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, committing a terrorist attack on mass transportation, and using a destructive device during a crime of violence—the court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and imposed sentences including multiple life terms plus an additional thirty years. The defendant appealed his convictions on three counts and challenged the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the conviction for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, as the defendant acted independently and not under the direction or control of that organization. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction on that count. The court affirmed the convictions for committing a terrorist attack against mass transportation and for using a destructive device during a crime of violence, finding the evidence sufficient and any possible legal errors harmless. The court also upheld the reasonableness of the sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "United States of America v. Ullah" on Justia Law

The defendant engaged in a scheme from 2017 through 2020 in which he impersonated an attorney to obtain personally identifiable information from prisoners. Using this information, he filed unauthorized tax returns in the names of at least nine prisoners, receiving $136,672 in fraudulent refunds from the Internal Revenue Service. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was already under community supervision for a similar offense and had a significant criminal history, including prior convictions for fraud-related and other offenses.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant on multiple fraud and theft charges. He pleaded guilty to fourteen counts of making false claims and one count of theft of government funds. The district court sentenced him to forty-six months in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered forfeiture and restitution. The supervised release included standard and special conditions, one of which allowed for electronic monitoring of all devices capable of accessing the internet, unannounced examinations of such devices, and monitoring of any work-related devices as permitted by his employer. The defendant did not object to these conditions at sentencing but challenged them on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in imposing the special condition of electronic monitoring. The appellate court found the condition was reasonable in light of the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, was not overbroad, and did not amount to an impermissible occupational restriction under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the monitoring requirements did not prohibit the defendant from pursuing any occupation and were necessary to protect the public. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Christopher Pence was investigated after arranging, through the dark web, for the murder of Francesco and Christina Cordero, with whom he and his wife had a contentious relationship following the adoption of the Corderos' children. Pence provided the purported hitman with the Corderos' personal information and paid over $16,000 in Bitcoin. The FBI traced the online activity and cryptocurrency transaction to Pence’s Utah residence, but acknowledged that others in the household could have accessed the devices involved. After obtaining a search warrant, law enforcement executed an early morning raid on Pence’s home, subsequently separating him from his family and inviting him to speak voluntarily in an FBI vehicle parked outside.Following these events, Pence was questioned by agents in the vehicle without being handcuffed or physically restrained and was told he was not under arrest and did not have to answer questions. After a period of rapport-building, agents confronted him with evidence of his involvement in the murder-for-hire scheme, prompting Pence to confess before receiving Miranda warnings. Over two hours into the encounter, agents read Pence his rights, after which he continued to speak. Pence moved to suppress his pre-Miranda statements in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, arguing he was in custody during the interrogation. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding Pence was not in custody and thus Miranda warnings were not required at the time of his confession. Pence subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Pence’s position would not have believed he was in custody. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pence" on Justia Law

The case concerns a noncitizen, a native and citizen of Ecuador, who entered the United States without authorization around 1999. In 2009, he was convicted of reckless assault of a child and sentenced to three years in prison. During removal proceedings in 2010, the immigration judge advised him that his conviction made him ineligible for voluntary departure and offered removal instead. The noncitizen, after confirming his understanding of his rights and waiving his right to counsel and appeal, was removed to Ecuador in 2011. He later reentered the United States without permission and was arrested in 2021. In 2022, he was charged with aggravated illegal reentry.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant moved to dismiss the criminal information, arguing that recent Supreme Court precedent established he had, in fact, been eligible for voluntary departure at his 2010 hearing, and that the immigration judge’s erroneous advice rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The District Court, relying on prior Second Circuit precedent from United States v. Sosa, excused the defendant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and granted the motion to dismiss, finding his waiver of appeal was not knowing and intelligent due to the immigration judge’s mistake.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Palomar-Santiago made clear that all three requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)—exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of opportunity for judicial review, and fundamental unfairness—are mandatory and cannot be excused by courts. Because the defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies and was not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review, he was barred from collaterally attacking his removal order. The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States of America v. Mejia" on Justia Law

The defendant operated a business exchanging bitcoin for cash, advertising his services online and charging commission fees. Over several months, undercover DEA agents arranged multiple transactions with the defendant, exchanging large amounts of bitcoin for cash. During these exchanges, the agent initially claimed the bitcoin came from an online business but later said it was from drug sales. Despite this disclosure, the defendant continued the exchanges. Ultimately, he was arrested after arranging another large transaction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicted the defendant on charges of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. During jury selection, the defense objected to the seating of a juror who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views about financial crimes. The court denied the challenge for cause, empaneling the juror. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. At sentencing, the court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the offense level and imposed a term of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed several issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling the challenged juror, given the juror’s assurances of impartiality. The court further held that exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and its implementing regulations, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s supplemental jury instruction clarifying that such exchanges qualify as transfers of funds. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s sentencing challenges as moot because he had completed his prison term and raised no issues regarding supervised release. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Goklu" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine based on his role as a supplier to a lower-level dealer operating in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. The prosecution established that, beginning in late 2013 or early 2014, the defendant supplied large quantities of cocaine and heroin to his co-conspirator, knowing and assisting as the cocaine was converted into crack for resale. Law enforcement began investigating the operation in 2014, conducting controlled purchases and making several arrests of individuals involved in the conspiracy. The defendant was ultimately linked to the conspiracy through surveillance, witness testimony, text messages, and physical evidence such as drug ledgers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, but acquitted him of involvement with larger quantities of heroin and powder cocaine. The court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. At sentencing, the court calculated a sentencing range of life imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The judgement included standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the district court’s jury instructions were proper, and the sentence imposed was reasonable. However, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release without properly notifying the defendant at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated the standard conditions of supervised release, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "United States v. Fabian" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was observed by New York City police officers driving without a seatbelt. When officers attempted to pull him over, he fled, eventually crashing into a parked car. After the crash, he fled on foot and was seen throwing a green bag over a fence into a construction lot across from a school. Inside the bag, officers later found a loaded firearm with a defaced serial number. The defendant’s photo identification and cell phone were found in the car. He was arrested about a month later during a scheduled meeting with probation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the initial criminal proceedings, where the defendant was indicted, and a jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, the government missed the court-ordered deadline for expert disclosures under Rule 16 but provided the DNA evidence report to the defense as soon as it was available. The district court found the government negligent but not in bad faith and offered the defendant a continuance, which he declined in favor of a one-day delay before trial. The jury convicted the defendant, and the court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 78 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the DNA evidence despite the late disclosure and whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence with a continuance, nor was the sentence unreasonable. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence in all respects. View "United States v. Aryeetey" on Justia Law

In January 2020, William Jimenez sold fentanyl-laced heroin to an undercover New York City police detective, arranging the transactions by phone. During the same period, Jimenez shot another individual and was arrested soon after. A search revealed drugs and ammunition in his possession and vehicle. He was indicted on several counts, including possessing ammunition after a felony conviction, firearm discharge related to drug trafficking, and multiple counts of distributing controlled substances. Jimenez ultimately pled guilty to possessing ammunition after a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), pursuant to a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver for sentences within a stipulated Guidelines range.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Jimenez to 105 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, imposing seven special conditions, three of which he later challenged. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case, requiring the District Court to provide individualized justifications for the challenged special conditions. On remand, the District Court reimposed the conditions with further explanation. Jimenez appealed again, contesting the special conditions and seeking resentencing based on a change in the law affecting his Guidelines calculation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that the special conditions—electronic device searches, community service requirements during unemployment, and outpatient mental health counseling—were procedurally and substantively reasonable, supported by the record, and tailored to Jimenez’s history and circumstances. The Court also held that Jimenez’s appeal waiver barred his challenge to the term of imprisonment, even in light of an intervening change in the law. The judgment of the District Court was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

A patrol-level police officer in Colombia was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. The officer did not dispute that he participated in communications about a proposed cocaine export scheme, but argued that he lacked criminal intent because he believed he was assisting the Colombian National Police in arranging a seizure of the cocaine, rather than joining a drug-trafficking conspiracy. His defense at trial centered on his understanding that he was participating in an anti-narcotics operation and not an illegal export scheme.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the jury trial. The prosecution presented evidence of the officer’s participation in meetings and communications with a DEA informant posing as a drug trafficker. The defense sought to introduce evidence that the officer’s colleague, who recruited him into the scheme, had previously assisted the Colombian National Police's anti-narcotics unit in successful drug seizures. The district court excluded this evidence, accepting the government’s argument that it constituted impermissible propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The officer was convicted and sentenced to 165 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in excluding the challenged evidence. The appellate court found the evidence relevant to corroborate the officer’s account of conversations with his colleague, directly impacting his state of mind, and determined that it was not barred by Rule 404(b). The court further held that the exclusion was not harmless, as the officer’s defense turned on criminal intent and the evidence could have affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "U.S. v. Cardenas" on Justia Law