Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jamees Cooke was employed at a restaurant when a team from the United States Marshals Service Regional Fugitive Task Force arrived to execute three outstanding warrants for his arrest. Cooke attempted to escape but was confronted by officers. He became disorderly, assaulted a Task Force Officer (TFO) by punching him in the eye, and bit another officer. The assaulted TFO suffered a serious eye injury requiring surgery and resulting in permanent vision impairment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted Cooke after he pleaded guilty to one count of assaulting, resisting, and interfering with federal officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). The district court sentenced him to eighty-four months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The court applied a six-level official-victim enhancement under section 3A1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.Cooke appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in applying the six-level enhancement. He contended that section 3A1.2(b) should not apply when the offense guideline already includes an enhancement for the victim's status as a government officer. The Second Circuit agreed that section 3A1.2(b) does not apply if the offense guideline already incorporates such an enhancement but clarified that the only offense guideline incorporating this factor is section 2A2.4, which was not relevant in this case. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the application of the six-level enhancement under section 3A1.2(b). View "United States v. Cooke" on Justia Law

Kenneth Thompson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, following a guilty plea. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to thirty-seven months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The court also imposed special conditions of supervised release, including submitting to searches, complying with sex offender registration requirements, and undergoing a mental health evaluation and treatment if necessary.Thompson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in imposing the special conditions without an individualized assessment and explanation. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Additionally, he challenged the district court's Sentencing Guidelines calculation and argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Thompson waived any challenge to the mental health treatment condition by consenting to it. The court held that the district court made an individualized assessment and adequately explained its reasons for imposing the special conditions, which were supported by the record. The court declined to consider Thompson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting that it was not raised in the district court and lacked sufficient factual development. The court also held that Thompson's remaining challenges to his conviction and sentence were barred by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jere Eaton sued the City of Stamford and police officer Steven Estabrook, alleging that Estabrook used excessive force during a protest on August 8, 2020. Eaton claimed that Estabrook lifted her by her bra strap, drove her backward several feet, and dropped her on the ground without warning, violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights and committing assault and battery under Connecticut state law. Estabrook and the City of Stamford moved for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and state governmental immunity.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that while there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Estabrook used excessive force, Estabrook was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that his actions were unconstitutional. The court also granted summary judgment on Eaton’s state law claims, concluding that Estabrook was entitled to state governmental immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of excessive force. However, the appellate court concluded that Estabrook was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because the same factual disputes also affected whether his actions were clearly established as unconstitutional at the time. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court upheld the district court’s decision regarding state governmental immunity for the state law claims. View "Eaton v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

From the 1990s through the 2010s, Patrice Runner operated a mass-mailing enterprise that used false and misleading advertising to sell purportedly supernatural objects and psychic services. Customers paid for rare gems and personalized psychic services, but received junk items and generic responses. A jury convicted Runner of mail and wire fraud, among other crimes.Runner appealed, arguing that the Government’s theory of fraud was legally defective, which he claimed affected his indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had denied Runner’s motion to dismiss the indictment and rejected his post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial. The court also sentenced Runner to ten years’ imprisonment, despite a Guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment, based on a loss calculation of over $150,000,000.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Runner’s arguments, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Kousisis v. United States, which supported the Government’s fraudulent-inducement theory. The court found that the indictment sufficiently alleged that Runner used material misstatements to induce customers to pay money. The evidence presented at trial was deemed sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent, as Runner’s promotions contained intentional lies about the origin and nature of the goods and services sold. The jury instructions were also found to be adequate in conveying the intent-to-harm requirement.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that any error in the loss calculation at sentencing was harmless, as the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless. View "United States v. Runner" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Douglass Mackey, was convicted of conspiring to injure citizens in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The conviction was based on three memes he posted or reposted on Twitter shortly before the 2016 presidential election, which falsely suggested that supporters of then-candidate Hillary Clinton could vote by text message.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.) oversaw the trial, where a jury found Mackey guilty. Mackey appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly agreed to join the charged conspiracy. The government presented evidence of Mackey's participation in several private Twitter message groups where members discussed strategies to influence the election, including the creation and distribution of misleading memes. However, Mackey was not a member of these groups during the critical period when the conspiracy was allegedly formed and discussed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence that Mackey knowingly agreed to join the conspiracy. The court noted that while Mackey posted the misleading memes, there was no direct evidence that he viewed or participated in the relevant discussions within the private message groups. The court emphasized that mere association with individuals involved in an unlawful undertaking is not enough to prove knowing involvement in a conspiracy.The Second Circuit concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support Mackey's conviction and reversed the judgment of the district court. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for Mackey. View "United States v. Mackey" on Justia Law

James Coonan, a former leader of the "Westies" gang, was convicted in 1987 for crimes including racketeering, extortion, and murder, committed between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. He was sentenced to 75 years in prison. Over his 38 years of incarceration, Coonan has unsuccessfully sought parole multiple times. In 2023, he filed a motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), which allows for sentence reductions based on "extraordinary and compelling reasons."The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Coonan's motion, ruling that § 3582(c)(1) does not apply to offenses committed before November 1, 1987. The court explained that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which includes § 3582, only applies to offenses committed on or after that date. The First Step Act of 2018, which amended § 3582 to allow inmates to file their own motions for sentence reductions, did not change this limitation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that § 3582(c)(1) does not apply to Coonan's pre-1987 offenses. The court emphasized that the Sentencing Reform Act's effective date and its applicability only to post-November 1, 1987, offenses remain unchanged by the First Step Act. The court also rejected Coonan's arguments based on legislative intent and constitutional avoidance, finding no ambiguity in the statute that would allow for a different interpretation. Thus, Coonan remains ineligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1). View "United States v. Coonan" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Hernán Lopez, a top executive at Twenty-First Century Fox, and Full Play Group, S.A., a South American sports marketing company, were convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud related to a FIFA corruption scandal. They were involved in bribery schemes to secure media rights for various soccer tournaments, including the Copa Libertadores, Copa América, and World Cup qualifiers. The government presented evidence that Full Play bribed officials from several South American soccer federations, while Lopez was implicated in a scheme involving T&T Sports Marketing, a joint venture of Fox and Torneos y Competencias, to secure undervalued media rights contracts through bribery.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially denied pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment but later granted post-trial motions for acquittal under Rule 29(c). The district court reasoned that, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Percoco v. United States and Ciminelli v. United States, the conduct did not fall within the scope of honest services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in its conclusion. The appellate court determined that the conduct of Lopez and Full Play did fall within the ambit of § 1346, as it involved bribery, which is a core application of the honest services fraud statute. The court noted that the fiduciary duties breached by the bribed officials were established by their relationships with FIFA and CONMEBOL, and these duties were informed by the organizations' codes of ethics. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgments of acquittal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

George Guldi, a former Suffolk County legislator and disbarred real estate attorney, conspired with his former girlfriend, Victoria Davidson, to deceive a mortgage servicer, Ditech Financial LLC, into wiring them $253,236. The funds did not belong to either of them. A jury convicted Guldi of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York oversaw the trial. The jury found sufficient evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy, fraudulent intent, and aiding and abetting. The district court also found no reversible error in its jury instructions on conspiracy, wire fraud, and fraudulent intent. Additionally, the court properly considered Guldi’s medical needs during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Guldi’s convictions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings and that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in applying a two-offense-level enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for using “sophisticated means” to commit or conceal the offense. The appellate court determined that this procedural error rendered Guldi’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.As a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated and remanded Guldi’s sentence for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Guldi" on Justia Law

William Hines was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for receipt and possession of child pornography found on his cellphone and laptop. Hines had pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cellphone. Hines argued that his girlfriend, K.S., acted as an agent of the police when she used his password to unlock his cellphone, observed child pornography, and showed the images to a police officer, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights.The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent when she unlocked the phone and showed the images to the police officer. The court concluded that the private search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the burden lies with the defendant to show that a private search constituted governmental action implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court found no error in the district court's determination that Hines failed to meet this burden. The court concluded that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent, and thus, the private search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search warrant was admissible. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hines" on Justia Law

A man was accused in Ecuador of repeatedly sexually abusing his partner’s ten-year-old daughter over the course of a year, beginning in August 2016. The alleged abuse included digital penetration and other sexual acts, accompanied by threats to the victim and her family. After the allegations surfaced, the man fled to the United States in 2018. Ecuador requested his extradition, and U.S. authorities arrested him in July 2024. The extradition request was based on charges of sexual abuse under Ecuadorian law, which does not require penetration, unlike the offense of rape.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held an extradition hearing, excluded the defendant’s proposed expert testimony about Ecuadorian evidentiary law, and certified his extradition, finding probable cause that he committed acts constituting rape as defined in the extradition treaty. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, arguing that sexual abuse was not an extraditable offense, that the magistrate judge erred in excluding his expert, and that humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition. The district court denied the petition, rejecting all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that extradition is permissible when the underlying conduct matches an offense listed in the relevant treaty, regardless of the specific charge’s name in the requesting country. The court found probable cause that the defendant’s conduct constituted rape, an extraditable offense. It also held that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony and reaffirmed that humanitarian concerns are for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to consider. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lalama Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law