Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He received concurrent sentences of 235 months for enticement and 120 months for possession. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in certain programs, but excludes those serving sentences for specific offenses, including possession of child pornography.Giovinco argued that he should be eligible for FSA time credits after completing the sentence for the ineligible offense. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, stating that his entire term of imprisonment must be considered as a single, aggregated sentence, making him ineligible for FSA time credits. Giovinco filed a habeas petition, which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied, deferring to the BOP's interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment must be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes, including the administration of FSA time credits. Therefore, a prisoner serving any part of an aggregated sentence for an ineligible offense is not eligible to earn FSA time credits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the BOP correctly aggregated Giovinco's sentences and determined his ineligibility for FSA time credits. View "Giovinco v. Pullen" on Justia Law

In December 2019, the defendant and a co-conspirator robbed a woman in a Bronx hotel room, taking $4,000 in cash, credit cards, cell phones, and a watch. The victim, a prostitute, had earned the cash through her business. The defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act Robbery and Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery after a jury trial.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced the defendant to two concurrent 96-month terms of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, based on the defendant's alleged false testimony about his drug use at a suppression hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act offenses and the obstruction of justice enhancement. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence that the robbery affected interstate commerce by depleting the victim's business assets. However, the court vacated the obstruction of justice enhancement, noting that the district court did not make a sufficient finding that the defendant's false testimony was willful. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the defendant acted with willful intent to provide false testimony. View "United States v. Orelien" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Varian Lefebvre pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The case began when Vermont State Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault at a Holiday Inn in Rutland, Vermont. Officers located Lefebvre at the hotel and transported him to the nearby Vermont State Police barracks for identification by the purported victims, where he was then arrested. Lefebvre argued that all physical evidence seized from his backpack after his arrest should have been suppressed, claiming that his seizure ripened into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause when he was transported to the police barracks.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied Lefebvre’s motion to suppress the physical evidence. The court found that the seizure did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest and was supported by probable cause. Lefebvre entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Lefebvre’s seizure did not become a de facto arrest when he was transported to the police barracks because the transportation was a reasonable and non-dilatory investigative step given the unique circumstances. The court also found that even if the transportation did rise to the level of an arrest, it was supported by probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances, including the 911 call, witness descriptions, and Lefebvre’s behavior. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States of America v. Lefebvre" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud the City of West Haven, Connecticut, of COVID-19 relief funds. The defendant, along with co-conspirators, submitted fraudulent invoices for equipment and services that were never provided. The City paid over $400,000 based on these false invoices. The defendant was the only one among his co-defendants to go to trial, while the others pled guilty.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut convicted the defendant of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court sentenced him to 96 months in prison, which was above the recommended guidelines range. The defendant appealed, challenging the sentence as substantively unreasonable, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had provided a detailed explanation for the above-guidelines sentence, emphasizing the severity of the crime, the defendant’s financial gains, and the need for deterrence. The court also noted that the defendant did not receive a trial penalty, as the district court had explicitly stated that the sentence was not influenced by the defendant’s decision to go to trial. The court further found that the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.The Second Circuit concluded that none of the defendant’s challenges had merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Trasacco" on Justia Law

Eric Tompkins was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and possessing child pornography. During his arrest, a Samsung cellular phone with an SD card was seized. A search warrant was obtained to examine the phone for evidence related to his failure to register. During the search, child pornography was found on the SD card. A second warrant was then obtained to search the phone and SD card specifically for child pornography, leading to the discovery of additional images.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Tompkins's motion to suppress the images found on the SD card, ruling that the search was conducted in good faith. Tompkins argued that the initial search warrant did not specifically authorize the search of the SD card, making the search unlawful and tainting the subsequent search.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the initial search warrant, which authorized the search of the cellular phone for electronically stored information, included the SD card as it is a form of electronic storage. The court concluded that the search of the SD card fell within the scope of the warrant. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting Tompkins's argument that the search was unauthorized. View "United States v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and sex trafficking of a minor. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, followed by concurrent terms of supervised release. Maxwell appealed her conviction on several grounds, including the applicability of Jeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), the statute of limitations, jury impartiality, constructive amendment of the indictment, and the reasonableness of her sentence.The District Court denied Maxwell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that Epstein’s NPA with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida did not bar her prosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. The court also found that the second superseding indictment complied with the statute of limitations, as the relevant statute extended the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for offenses committed before its enactment. Additionally, the District Court denied Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in its handling of a juror’s erroneous answers during voir dire. The court also rejected Maxwell’s claim that its response to a jury note resulted in a constructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the indictment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Epstein’s NPA did not bind the Southern District of New York, the indictment was timely, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, and the response to the jury note did not result in a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The court also found Maxwell’s sentence to be procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. View "United States v. Suquilanda" on Justia Law

Rickey Johnson was convicted of making threatening interstate communications and threatening U.S. officials. He posted videos and sent messages on Instagram threatening Fox News hosts Greg Gutfeld and Laura Ingraham, Senator Joe Manchin, and Representative Lauren Boebert. Johnson was indicted on four counts, including making threatening interstate communications and threatening U.S. officials. During the trial, the district court dismissed three jurors, reducing the jury to eleven members. The jury found Johnson guilty on three counts and not guilty on one count. Johnson was sentenced to twenty-four months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York handled the initial trial. Johnson appealed, arguing that the district court made five errors: proceeding with eleven jurors without stipulation, dismissing two jurors without good cause, admitting hearsay evidence, delivering an "uncalled witness charge," and improperly admitting expert testimony as lay testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in proceeding with eleven jurors without stipulation but deemed the error harmless. The dismissals of the jurors were found to be within the district court's discretion. The admission of Gutfeld’s email was upheld as an excited utterance and not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The "uncalled witness charge" was deemed appropriate, and Kelley’s testimony was found to be permissible lay opinion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that any errors were either not present or harmless, and Johnson’s convictions were upheld. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this case, three defendants, officers and executives of the Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative (CMEEC), were convicted of theft involving a program receiving federal funds. The defendants misappropriated funds from CMEEC in 2015 to pay for personal vacations disguised as corporate retreats. These trips included visits to the Kentucky Derby and the Greenbrier Resort, with expenses charged to CMEEC's accounts.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut oversaw the trial, where the jury found the defendants guilty of one count of theft involving a program receiving federal funds. The jury determined that CMEEC received more than $10,000 in federal benefits in 2015, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). The defendants were acquitted on other counts, including conspiracy and theft for the years 2014 and 2016. The district court sentenced the defendants to imprisonment and ordered restitution for the misappropriated funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting the defendants' claims of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The appellate court held that CMEEC received federal benefits exceeding $10,000 in 2015, as the funds were provided under a federal grant program. The court also found no merit in the defendants' argument that the government misled the grand jury or that the district court erred in setting the restitution amount. Additionally, the court denied CMEEC's petition for mandamus, concluding that the district court did not err in finding that the legal fees advanced to the defendants lacked a sufficient causal relationship to their offense of conviction.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and restitution order, and denied CMEEC's petition for mandamus. View "United States v. Sullivan, Bilda, Rankin" on Justia Law

In 2007, Mohamed Musaid was arrested for the murder of a relative and confessed to the crime. However, his trial was delayed for over eight years due to repeated findings of incompetence to stand trial, attributed to his long history of mental illness. Musaid was found incompetent on ten occasions and competent on five, with his competency dependent on his compliance with antipsychotic medication. Each time he was found competent and transferred to Rikers Island, he would refuse medication and regress to incompetence.The trial court eventually allowed Musaid's trial to proceed nearly ten months after a final finding of competency, without re-evaluating his mental state. During the trial, Musaid exhibited erratic behavior, raising questions about his competency. Despite this, the trial court did not conduct a further inquiry into his mental state. Musaid was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life for second-degree murder and five years for criminal possession of a weapon.Musaid appealed, arguing that the trial court's failure to reassess his competency before trial violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating there was no indication that Musaid was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. Musaid then sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's failure to conduct a minimal inquiry into Musaid's competency just before trial was objectively unreasonable, given his history of mental illness and the time elapsed since the last competency evaluation. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, allowing the state courts to determine whether it is possible to reconstruct Musaid's competency at the time of trial based on evidence proximate to the trial. View "Musaid v. Kirkpatrick" on Justia Law