Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Laurie Weinlein was convicted of bank fraud and embezzlement from an employee benefit plan, resulting in a sentence of sixty-three months in prison, five years of supervised release, and over $2 million in restitution payments. The crimes were committed in 1994 and 1995. At that time, the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) stipulated that restitution obligations terminated twenty years from the date of judgment. In 1996, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) extended the enforcement period for restitution orders. In 2021, Weinlein moved to terminate her restitution obligation, arguing that the VWPA’s enforcement period had expired and that applying the MVRA retroactively violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Weinlein’s motion to terminate her restitution obligation. The court held that retroactive application of the MVRA’s enforcement period did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Weinlein then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that retroactively applying the MVRA’s longer enforcement period did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court reasoned that the MVRA did not increase the punishment for Weinlein’s crime but merely extended the time period over which the government could collect the restitution. The court concluded that the punishment imposed by the restitution order remained the same, and the extension of the enforcement period did not constitute a greater punishment than what was originally imposed. View "United States v. Weinlein" on Justia Law

Rashawn Wynn pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, based on his involvement with the 110 Gang, a violent drug-trafficking group in Syracuse, New York. Wynn admitted to participating in the gang’s drug trafficking operations and personally selling 42.2 grams of crack cocaine. The Probation Office calculated his advisory sentencing range as 92 to 115 months of imprisonment. Wynn requested a mitigating role adjustment, arguing he was a minor participant, but the district court denied this request and sentenced him to 92 months in prison.Wynn appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court had not adequately addressed factors that might support a mitigating role adjustment. On remand, the district court provided a more detailed explanation but again denied the adjustment and reimposed the 92-month sentence. Wynn appealed once more, arguing that the district court erred in denying the adjustment and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Wynn was not substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal enterprise. The court also found that Wynn’s 92-month sentence was substantively reasonable given his criminal conduct and history. The court noted that Wynn had a long-standing involvement with the 110 Gang and had benefited from the gang’s criminal activities. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Betim Kaziu was convicted for his involvement in a plan to join and aid foreign terrorist organizations. He and his friend traveled to Cairo, Egypt, intending to join a terrorist group and fight jihad. After his friend returned to the U.S., Kaziu continued to Kosovo to formulate a plot to kill Americans but was arrested before he could act. He was convicted on four counts, including conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and conspiracy to use a firearm. He was sentenced to 27 years in prison.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially sentenced Kaziu to 27 years. Kaziu later filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that two of his convictions were unlawful based on new Supreme Court precedent. The district court vacated his conviction on Count Four and reduced his sentence on Count One by two years, from 27 to 25 years, without a full in-person resentencing proceeding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court exceeded its discretion by not conducting a full de novo resentencing. The appellate court noted two key factors: the resentencing judge was not the original sentencing judge, and Kaziu presented plausible allegations of changed circumstances, including his reform during imprisonment. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full de novo resentencing, ensuring that Kaziu would receive the full procedural protections of a standard sentencing. View "Kaziu v. United States" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Anthony Pica, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and attempted robbery. Pica, along with Salvatore Maniscalco, Jr., and John Delutro, planned to rob Louis Antonelli, a jeweler. They recruited Christopher Prince and Charles Santiago for the robbery. Despite Pica's instruction that Antonelli was not to be harmed, Santiago shot Antonelli twice during the robbery attempt, leading to Antonelli's death.Pica was initially sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The court applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, the Sentencing Guideline for first-degree murder, in sentencing him. Pica appealed, arguing that the district court should have sentenced him under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, the guideline for robbery. His appeal was unsuccessful.Later, Pica filed a petition to vacate his convictions based on new precedent from the United States Supreme Court. The district court granted his petition, vacating his convictions for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and causing the death of another during the commission of a violation. The court ordered a resentencing hearing.At the resentencing hearing, the district court again applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, sentencing Pica to 264 months' imprisonment. Pica appealed again, arguing that Antonelli's murder was not relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and that the district court should not have applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antonelli's murder was within the scope of Pica's jointly undertaken criminal activity and was reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 in sentencing Pica. View "United States v. Pica" on Justia Law

Joseph McGrain was sentenced to 264 months in prison for sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old daughter and obstructing the investigation into the abuse. The district court applied a two-offense-level enhancement under section 2G2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines because the victim was in McGrain’s “custody, care, or supervisory control” when he abused her. The court also denied McGrain an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because he merited an enhancement for obstruction of justice and continued to deny his sexual relationship with the victim and that he convinced her to send him sexually explicit images.McGrain appealed the district court's decisions, arguing that each was reversible error and that his sentence should be vacated. He also requested that his case be assigned to a different judge on remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court rejected McGrain's arguments, stating that the "custody, care, or supervisory control" enhancement was correctly applied given McGrain's relationship with the victim. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, stating that McGrain had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Finally, the court found no error in the district court's determination that McGrain was dangerous, which factored into his sentencing. View "United States v. McGrain" on Justia Law

The case involves defendants Dennis A. Bradley, Jr., and Jessica Martinez, who were charged with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in relation to Bradley’s 2018 campaign for Connecticut state senator. The government obtained two videos from videographers hired by Bradley, one 13-minute video and a 28-minute video, both of which were recorded at an event where Bradley announced his campaign. The government only became aware of the existence of the 28-minute video a week before the trial and promptly provided it to the defendants. Bradley moved to preclude the 28-minute video, arguing that the government had violated Rule 16(a)(1)(E) by not obtaining and producing the video earlier.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted Bradley's motion, ruling that the government had violated its disclosure obligations by not obtaining and producing the 28-minute video at an earlier date. The government appealed this decision, arguing that it did not have the video in its possession, custody, or control until the eve of the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's order. The court held that neither Rule 16(a)(1)(E) nor the Connecticut District Court’s Standing Order imposed a requirement on the government to discover and turn over to a criminal defendant evidence that the government did not have in its physical possession, custody, or control, or that it did not have a duty to obtain from a third party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

The case involves the United States government's appeal against a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The lower court had granted federal prisoner Joe Fernandez's motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), reducing his sentence to time served and ordering his release. The court based its decision on two grounds: Fernandez's possible innocence due to the questionable credibility of the government's key witness, and the fact that Fernandez received a far longer sentence than his co-defendants.The government argued on appeal that the district court had abused its discretion. It contended that potential innocence is never a permissible "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and that Fernandez's sentencing disparity is not an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction in this case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the government's arguments. It held that a compassionate release motion is not the proper vehicle for litigating the issues Fernandez raised, irrespective of whether his mandatory life sentence is unjust. The court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Brandon Washington pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court added a point to Washington's criminal history score for a prior state-court conviction for harassment, which was related to the sale of controlled substances from the same house involved in the current case. Washington appealed, arguing that the district court incorrectly determined his criminal history category under the United States Sentencing Guidelines by improperly assessing a criminal history point for the prior harassment conviction.The district court had determined that the harassment conviction was similar to the current offense of possession with intent to distribute, and thus, under section 4A1.2(c)(1)(B) of the Guidelines, a one-point increase to Washington’s total criminal history points was warranted. Washington was then sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment, followed by six years’ supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed with the district court that Washington’s harassment conviction and his current offense were similar under section 4A1.2(c)(1)(B) of the Guidelines. Both offenses arose from the same conduct – the sale of controlled substances – and both offenses were committed at the same house. Therefore, the district court did not err in adding the extra criminal history point. The court also dismissed Washington's other arguments regarding the calculation of his criminal history score. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Aleksandra Malgorzata Stankiewicz, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who was convicted in 2003 for violating a New Jersey statute that criminalizes distributing a controlled substance on or near school property. In 2018, removal proceedings were initiated against her, with the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluding that her conviction was an aggravated felony, making her both removable and ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.The BIA dismissed Stankiewicz's appeal, maintaining its reasoning that her conviction was an aggravated felony. Stankiewicz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Stankiewicz's conviction under the New Jersey statute is not an "aggravated felony" under federal law. The court applied the "categorical approach," comparing the state law to any federal controlled substance offense that is a felony subject to a prison sentence greater than one year. The court found that neither of the parties' proposed federal analogs categorically matches the New Jersey statute. The court therefore granted Stankiewicz's petition for review, vacated the agency’s ruling, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Stankiewicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Quadri Garnes was charged with threatening to assault and murder employees of the United States Postal Service (USPS) and transmitting interstate communications containing threats to injure another person. These charges stemmed from a phone call Garnes made to the New York State Department of Labor (DOL) after his unemployment benefits claim was denied. During the call, Garnes made several statements referencing his criminal record. Before trial, Garnes moved to exclude these statements, arguing they were of limited probative value and could unfairly prejudice the jury. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted his motion, excluding the statements under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.The government appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the court had exceeded its discretion in excluding the statements. The government contended that the statements were highly probative as they were a significant part of the threat (the actus reus) and substantially indicative of Garnes's intent (the mens rea).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the government. The court found that the district court had incorrectly concluded that the statements were of limited probative value. The appellate court held that the statements were highly probative as they were both a significant part of the threat and substantially indicative of Garnes's intent. The court also found that the district court had overstated the risk of unfair prejudice. The court concluded that a jury instruction could mitigate any potential unfair prejudice. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's order of exclusion and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Garnes" on Justia Law