Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Victor Rivera participated in a robbery crew responsible for over a dozen robberies of jewelers and luxury watch owners between October 2019 and November 2020. The crew identified victims on social media and ambushed them, often at gunpoint. Rivera was arrested and indicted on 18 counts. He pled guilty to one count of participating in a Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy under a plea agreement with a stipulated Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted Rivera's plea agreement. However, the Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed additional convictions in Puerto Rico, increasing Rivera's criminal history points from three to ten, placing him in Criminal History Category V. The Government, agreeing with the PSR, advocated for a revised Guidelines range of 235 to 240 months. Rivera's defense argued that the Government should have reviewed his criminal history more thoroughly before the plea agreement. The district court sentenced Rivera to 235 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Rivera argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher Guidelines range based on information available at the time of the plea and by describing him as a leader in the conspiracy. The court found that the Government breached the plea agreement by relying on Rivera’s Puerto Rico convictions, which were available at the time of the plea. However, this breach did not amount to a "plain" error. The court also found no error in the Government's description of Rivera as a leader, as it was relevant to the sentencing factors. Rivera's procedural and substantive challenges to his sentence were rejected, and his request for resentencing due to a recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines was denied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In 2013, the petitioner was convicted in Monroe County, New York, of engaging in a course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of the child victim, who described years of sexual abuse by the petitioner. A medical expert for the prosecution testified that the child's normal physical examination was consistent with past sexual abuse, as any injuries would have healed over time. The defense did not call a medical expert but cross-examined the prosecution's expert to elicit that normal findings could also indicate no abuse.The petitioner challenged his conviction in state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to consult or call a medical expert. The Appellate Division rejected this claim, stating that the petitioner had not shown that such testimony was available, would have assisted the jury, or that he was prejudiced by its absence. The New York Court of Appeals denied further review. The petitioner then filed a motion under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10, which was also denied without a hearing. The state court found that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the absence of a defense expert, as the prosecution's expert's key conclusions were not seriously challenged.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the petitioner's habeas corpus petition, ruling that the state courts had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in rejecting the ineffective-assistance claim. The petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington in concluding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to consult or call a medical expert. The court noted that the defense counsel effectively neutralized the prosecution's expert through cross-examination, and the petitioner failed to show that expert testimony would have likely changed the trial's outcome. View "Englert v. Lowerre" on Justia Law

In 2021, Ellva Slaughter was charged with illegally possessing a firearm while knowing he had previously been convicted of a felony, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Slaughter moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the jury selection plan of the Southern District of New York (SDNY) systematically underrepresented Black and Hispanic or Latino people, violating his Sixth Amendment right and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (JSSA). The district court assumed the underrepresentation was significant but denied the motion, finding Slaughter failed to prove systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Slaughter's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court assumed without deciding that there was significant underrepresentation of Black and Hispanic or Latino people but concluded that Slaughter did not establish that this underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion. The court found that Slaughter's expert did not provide evidence that the identified practices caused the disparities and noted that many of the challenged practices were authorized by the Second Circuit. The court also found that any disparities were due to external factors outside the SDNY's control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the framework from Duren v. Missouri, assuming without deciding that the underrepresentation was significant. However, it concluded that Slaughter did not meet his burden of proving systematic exclusion. The court found that Slaughter's expert did not provide sufficient evidence that the SDNY's practices caused the underrepresentation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Slaughter failed to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement under the Sixth Amendment and the JSSA. View "United States v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Enock Mensah, a social worker, was convicted of theft of public funds and health care fraud for billing publicly funded agencies for over 1,600 treatment sessions that never occurred. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to forty-two months of imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $177,345 in restitution.Mensah appealed, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: (1) failing to excuse or further examine a juror who knew a government witness, (2) denying his post-trial motion for a new trial based on a prosecutor's comment that suggested Mensah had the ability to testify, and (3) applying a ten-level enhancement based on the loss amount in calculating the United States Sentencing Guidelines advisory range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the juror to remain, as the connection was too attenuated to presume bias. The voir dire was deemed adequate in screening for actual bias. Regarding the prosecutor's comment, the court held that any potential prejudice was moot since Mensah chose to testify, and there was no evidence that the comment compelled him to do so. Finally, the court found no clear error in the district court's calculation of the loss amount, which was based on substantial evidence, including video surveillance, license-plate reading technology, and cellphone records.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Mensah's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Mensah" on Justia Law

The defendants were involved in a fraudulent slip-and-fall scheme in which they recruited poor and homeless individuals to stage accidents and seek unnecessary medical treatment. The scheme involved doctors and lawyers who would then sue property owners or their insurance companies for damages, with the proceeds being divided among the conspirators. The recruits received minimal compensation compared to the organizers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The jury found them guilty, and the court sentenced them based on the guidelines calculations, including enhancements for the number of victims and the amount of loss. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing various errors in the trial and sentencing process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no persuasive arguments to overturn them. However, it remanded for factfinding regarding the number of fraudulent accidents orchestrated by the conspiracy during the defendants' involvement to accurately compute the loss enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. The court vacated and remanded Duncan’s forfeiture order, concluding it was based on government allegations without factual support. The restitution order for Rainford and Locust was affirmed but modified by $120,000. Rainford’s sentence was affirmed but remanded for reconsideration in the interest of justice.The main holdings were: affirming the convictions, remanding for factfinding on the loss enhancement, vacating and remanding Duncan’s forfeiture order, modifying the restitution order, and remanding Rainford’s sentence for reconsideration. View "United States v. Rainford" on Justia Law

Carlos Martinez, a former federal prison guard, was convicted of multiple charges related to the repeated rape of an inmate, referred to as "Maria," at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Maria testified that Martinez raped her on five occasions, using both physical force and threats to coerce her. The jury found Martinez guilty of several counts, including sexual abuse by threats or fear, deprivation of civil rights, and aggravated sexual abuse for one of the rapes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced Martinez to ten years in prison. Martinez challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for two counts, arguing that the jury's acquittals on other counts indicated they did not believe Maria's testimony. The government cross-appealed, arguing that the ten-year sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Martinez's sufficiency challenge, affirming that the jury was entitled to credit Maria's testimony that Martinez physically restrained her during one of the rapes. The court also noted that inconsistent verdicts do not undermine a conviction.The court found the district court's sentence procedurally unreasonable due to several errors: relying on clearly erroneous factual findings, misapprehending the law, and failing to sentence Martinez based on all his convictions. The district court had improperly treated the convictions for sexual abuse by threats or fear as equivalent to sexual abuse of a ward, and it had given undue weight to its doubts about the jury's guilty verdicts.The Second Circuit held that the ten-year sentence was also substantively unreasonable because it did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Martinez's offenses. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction, ordered that a specific paragraph in the Presentence Investigation Report be stricken, and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Steve Rosado was arrested after attempting to meet with a woman he believed to be the mother of two young girls, with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. The woman was actually an undercover law enforcement agent. Rosado, a registered sex offender with prior convictions involving minors, was charged with attempted enticement of a minor and attempted receipt of child pornography. He pled guilty to both charges.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Rosado to 240 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. During sentencing, the court orally pronounced several conditions of supervised release. However, the written judgment included additional conditions that were not mentioned during the oral pronouncement. Rosado appealed, arguing that these additional conditions should have been pronounced at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had failed to pronounce the seven additional conditions at sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a). The appellate court held that the oral pronouncement of the sentence controls over the written judgment. Consequently, the court vacated the written judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remove the unpronounced conditions from the written judgment. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment on other challenges raised by Rosado in a concurrently issued summary order. View "United States of America v. Rosado" on Justia Law

George Moses was convicted of mail and wire fraud, money laundering, lying to the FBI, and other charges for defrauding two nonprofit community organizations he led. He used funds from these organizations for personal expenses, including a timeshare, cruise tickets, and other personal items. Moses was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Wolford, C.J.) handled the initial trial. Moses was convicted on 28 counts, but he appealed 14 of these counts. He argued that the district court improperly excluded a document he claimed was his employment contract, gave erroneous jury instructions, and that the evidence was insufficient for his convictions. He also claimed procedural errors at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the employment contract because Moses failed to authenticate it. The jury instructions were deemed proper, including those on fraud by omission and the lack of a need for a specific instruction on ratification by an authorized agent. The appellate court also found sufficient evidence to support Moses's convictions on the challenged counts, including detailed schemes of fraud and misuse of funds.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting all of Moses's arguments on appeal. The court upheld the 78-month sentence, finding no procedural errors in the district court's sentencing process. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

Laurie Weinlein was convicted of bank fraud and embezzlement from an employee benefit plan, resulting in a sentence of sixty-three months in prison, five years of supervised release, and over $2 million in restitution payments. The crimes were committed in 1994 and 1995. At that time, the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) stipulated that restitution obligations terminated twenty years from the date of judgment. In 1996, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) extended the enforcement period for restitution orders. In 2021, Weinlein moved to terminate her restitution obligation, arguing that the VWPA’s enforcement period had expired and that applying the MVRA retroactively violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Weinlein’s motion to terminate her restitution obligation. The court held that retroactive application of the MVRA’s enforcement period did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Weinlein then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that retroactively applying the MVRA’s longer enforcement period did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court reasoned that the MVRA did not increase the punishment for Weinlein’s crime but merely extended the time period over which the government could collect the restitution. The court concluded that the punishment imposed by the restitution order remained the same, and the extension of the enforcement period did not constitute a greater punishment than what was originally imposed. View "United States v. Weinlein" on Justia Law

Rashawn Wynn pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, based on his involvement with the 110 Gang, a violent drug-trafficking group in Syracuse, New York. Wynn admitted to participating in the gang’s drug trafficking operations and personally selling 42.2 grams of crack cocaine. The Probation Office calculated his advisory sentencing range as 92 to 115 months of imprisonment. Wynn requested a mitigating role adjustment, arguing he was a minor participant, but the district court denied this request and sentenced him to 92 months in prison.Wynn appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court had not adequately addressed factors that might support a mitigating role adjustment. On remand, the district court provided a more detailed explanation but again denied the adjustment and reimposed the 92-month sentence. Wynn appealed once more, arguing that the district court erred in denying the adjustment and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Wynn was not substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal enterprise. The court also found that Wynn’s 92-month sentence was substantively reasonable given his criminal conduct and history. The court noted that Wynn had a long-standing involvement with the 110 Gang and had benefited from the gang’s criminal activities. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law