Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a computer programmer employed by Goldman Sachs & Co., appealed his conviction for stealing and transferring proprietary computer source code of Goldman's high frequency trading system in violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832. Defendant argued, inter alia, that his conduct did not constitute an offense under either statute because: (1) the source code was not a "stolen" "good" within the meaning of the NSPA, and (2) the source code was not "related" to a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the EEA. The court agreed and concluded that defendant's conduct did not constitute an offense under either the NSPA or the EEA, and that the indictment was therefore legally insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Aleynikov" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of Robbery in the Third Degree. The State subsequently appealed from an order of the district court denying the State's motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner more than a year earlier. The court found that the State's motion was nothing more than an attempted end-run around the one year time limitation on a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, which allowed the district court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. View "Stevens v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment from the district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Plaintiff was a convicted sex-offender who had been civilly committed post-release from prison and he alleged that when he was confined in the Manhattan Psychiatric Center, staff seized and withheld his personal DVDs and CDs and his incoming non-legal mail in violation of his due process rights. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the complaint failed to state any claim for which relief could be granted. The court also undertook to clarify some applicable principles and affirmed the judgment of the district court because, in any event, it was objectively reasonable for the Center staff to believe that their acts did not violate plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, they were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Ahlers v. Rabinowitz" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from defendant's judgment of conviction for one count of distributing, and possessing with the intent to distribute, a controlled substance. At his trial, the prosecution introduced, over the defense's objection, testimony from two police detectives that they were familiar with defendant and had spoken to him on numerous occasions prior to his arrest in the instant case. The court held that the admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and 403 of trial testimony by the officers was an abuse of discretion where the testimony served no purpose other than to invite jury speculation about defendant's propensity to attract police contact and monitoring. The court further held that such error was not harmless and therefore vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court's denial of his motion to compel post-conviction DNA testing of six items pursuant to the Innocence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3600 et seq. Defendant contended that the testing of these items would provide evidence exonerating him from his conviction for the murder of three persons in furtherance of a continuing enterprise. On appeal, defendant faulted the government for failing to take reasonable measures to preserve the items he sought to test and for lack of due diligence in searching for the items. The court held that defendant failed to show that "[t]he proposed DNA testing of specific evidence may produce new material evidence that would...raise a reasonable probability that [he] did not commit the offense." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pitera" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin, aggravated theft, and making false statements on a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Defendant appealed his convictions for aggravated identity theft and false statements, the district court's pretrial denials of his motions to suppress statements made during a safety-valve proffer and for severance of Count One from Counts Four and Six of the indictment, and his 110 month sentence. The court held that (1) defendant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the court's pretrial decisions on defendant's motions were not erroneous; and (3) defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Concluding that defendant's claims on appeal have no merit, the court affirmed both his convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Oyewumi" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). On appeal, defendant contended that the district court miscalculated his applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines range by including a two-point criminal history enhancement for his commission of his offense while on a term of supervised release. The court held that a term of supervised release did not terminate upon a defendant-alien's deportation for purposes of calculating a defendant's applicable sentencing range under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d). The court further held that the district court did not erroneously take into account unproven relevant conduct in fashioning its sentence, nor was the district court's sentence substantively unreasonable in light of defendant's personal circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Roccisano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prison inmate, appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against defendants after granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's individual claims for damages arising from defendants' refusal to give plaintiff antiviral treatment for his Hepatitis C. Because the district court did not adequately explain why it granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for damages, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court to address more fully defendants' motion. Because the district court misinterpreted the parties' settlement agreement with respect to the recovery of reasonable costs, the court vacated that part of the its order denying plaintiff's application for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and remanded the issue to the district court to determine in its discretion whether to grant plaintiff's application for such costs.

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered in the district court on a plea of possession of a firearm by a felon. After defendant's arrest, defendant inculpated himself when he was questioned by police before he received Miranda warnings and again later, after he was warned. Defendant contended that the subsequent confession must be suppressed because it was obtained through a two-part interrogation technique outlawed as a violation of the Fifth Amendment in Missouri v. Seibert. The court concluded that the subsequent confession was given voluntarily and without coercion, and was not elicited by the proscribed two-step technique. The court also concluded that the confession did not offend the Sixth Amendment because defendant's right to counsel had not yet attached, particularly with regard to the federal offense for which he was prosecuted. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment following his guilty plea to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that his above-Guidelines sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court impermissibly based the sentence on his rehabilitative needs. The court held that the district court did not impose the prison term to promote defendant's rehabilitative needs and that the court's discussion of rehabilitation during the sentencing proceeding was permissible. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.