Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree, arising out of the death of his estranged wife. Petitioner appealed from a judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner contended that by upholding his conviction for depraved indifference murder, the state courts unreasonably applied the rule of Jackson v. Virginia that a jury find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the law as it existed after defendant's conviction became final in July 2004, the court found that although the evidence of "significantly heightened recklessness," was slim at best, giving the state courts and the jury the utmost deference, the court could not find that the evidence was so completely lacking that no rational jury could have found defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq., and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his conspiring with others in a scheme to illegally purchase SOCAR, a state-owned oil company, by bribing the Azerbaijani president and other officials. Defendant appealed his conviction. The court held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding overt acts, conscious avoidance, insufficiency of the mens rea charge, and proposed bad faith instructions; the district court did not err in allowing his conviction on the false statements count to stand because it was supported by sufficient evidence; and the district court did not err in not permitting testimony by the vice president for investments at Columbia University, not permitting cross-examination of Thomas Farrell, and permitting a portion of a certain memorandum referencing a conversation as a prior consistent statement. The court examined the remainder of defendant's arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court following an evidentiary hearing on a remand pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, denying petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to set aside certain convictions on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that petitioner's request for an expansion of the certificate of appealability was denied because his submission failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court also held that there was no error in the district court's conclusion that there was no deficient performance by counsel with respect to the failure-to-advise aspect of petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim or his claim that his attorneys overrode his desire to testify. The court saw no basis on the present appeal for concluding, as to any count, that there was any reasonable probability that, had there been objections, the jury would not have found petitioner guilty. Thus, petitioner could not show that the failures to object satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and this facet of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was properly rejected. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for physically obstructing access to a reproductive services facility in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. 248. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that he was entitled to a jury trial as opposed to a bench trial. Because the court concluded that defendant was charged with a petty offense, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on account of his trial counsel's failure to object, under New York law, to venue in Ontario County, New York, for one of the alleged rapes, which appeared to have occurred in Monroe County, New York. The court held that trial counsel's failure to object to venue resulted in defendant receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief and remanded.

Appellant Spies petitioned for a rehearing on the court's decision in United States v. Nadirashvili where the court vacated appellant Solomonyan's sentence because the district court used the incorrect standard, preponderance of the evidence, in applying two offense level enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the involvement of: (i) 200 or more firearms, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(E); and (ii) a destructive device, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A). The court found that the district court used the incorrect standard in applying the enhancements of appellants Spies and Kharabadze. Therefore, the court vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court following his plea of guilty to a violation of the conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court exceeded its authority by imposing a post-revocation term of supervised release that extended beyond the end-date of the originally imposed term of supervision. Therefore, defendant argued that his sentence was impermissible under Johnson v. United States. The court joined a number of other circuits in rejecting the approach urged by defendant where the court failed to see how the decision could be read to impose the limitation which defendant sought. In the alternative, defendant argued that the term of supervised release was a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that because this was not an exceptional case where the trial court's decision could not be located within the range of permissible decisions, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 59-month term of supervised release. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant, former Majority Leader of the New York State Senate, appealed his conviction for honest services mail fraud, arising from defendant's failure to disclose conflicts of interest related to his receipt of substantial payments from individuals seeking to do business with the State. While defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Skilling, and held that 18 U.S.C. 346, the honest services statute, criminalized only fraudulent schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks and did not criminalize mere failures to disclose conflicts of interest. At issue was whether defendant could be retried under the standard announced in Skilling on certain counts. Although the court held that Skilling required the court to vacate the convictions on Counts Four and Eight, because the court's review of the record convinced it that the government adduced sufficient evidence under the Skilling standard, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on those two counts. The court also held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial on Count Three because, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude a retrial on a charge that resulted in a hung jury. Accordingly, the court vacated the counts of conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a New York state prisoner who practiced Rastafarianism, sued New York Department of Corrections officials, among others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging inter alia that these two defendants infringed his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by touching his dreadlocks without his consent. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff but awarded him only $1.00 in actual damages. Plaintiff appealed from the part of an amended judgment awarding him $1.50 in attorney's fees and ordering defendants to pay $1.40 of the fee award. Plaintiff contended that the district court erred in concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), capped the maximum possible fee award in this case at 150 percent of the $1.00 monetary judgment. The court agreed with the district court and held that Section 1997e(d)(2) limited the possible award of attorney's fees in this case to 150 percent of the monetary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the amended judgment.

Petitioner, a New York state prisoner serving a 10-year sentence for first-degree robbery, appealed a judgment by the district court denying his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although the district judge granted petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (COA), the COA did not specify the issue or issues on which it was granted. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2)-(3), the court remanded the case for specification of the issue or issues on which the COA was granted.