Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of eleven counts of a thirteen count indictment, including several Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), violations predicated on robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the stipulation at issue was insufficient to establish the requisite jurisdictional element. The court held that the evidence proffered by the government was sufficient to sustain the interstate elements of the Hobbs Act attempted robbery count at issue where the stipulation entered into by the parties, that "marijuana [wa]s grown outside of the state of New York and travel[ed] in interstate and foreign commerce to arrive in the New York City area[,]" conveyed the same information about the interstate nature of the marijuana trade as the court's precedents. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal where, given the ample evidence, a rational juror could find that defendant's conduct went far beyond "mere preparation" and constituted a "substantial step" toward commission of a robbery. The court considered all of defendant's other arguments and found them to be without merit and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the district court in its entirety.

Thirteen present and former female inmates of various New York state prisons appealed from the dismissal of their class action complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) to alter its practices and procedures so as to enhance the protection of the class from sexual assault, abuse, and harassment. The complaint also asserted individual claims for damages. The dismissal was based on the grounds that some of the claims of named plaintiffs were moot and that the remaining named plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that it lacked pendant appellate jurisdiction over the damages claims. The court also held that the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief by plaintiffs who were now free but were in DOCs custody when they brought suit were not moot. The court applied a relation-back theory and determined that plaintiffs' class claims were capable of repetition, yet evading review. The court further held that three plaintiffs have exhausted applicable internal prison grievance proceedings while the remaining ten have not. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court convicting him of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The district court imposed a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for the discharge of the weapon, even though it was the intended victim, and not defendant, who fired the gun. Defendant contended that because he did not possess the gun when it was discharged, the district court erred in applying the enhancement. The court held that the district court correctly held that defendant was subject to the discharge enhancement where, as here, defendant possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug-related crime and the firearm was discharged during the course of that crime. Therefore, by its plain terms, the statute applied. The court also held that when a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, the risk of an intended victim trying to seize the gun was just as real as an accidental discharge and that defendant's reliance on United States v. Daija was unavailing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from appellant's participation in the Bayou Hedge Fund Group (Bayou), a classic Ponzi scheme masked as a group of domestic and offshore hedge funds. Appellant appealed from his sentencing, following a plea of guilty to misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4. At issue was whether the district court's order of restitution in the amount of $60 million was improper because it relied on events occurring outside the relevant time period and the putative victims' losses were neither directly nor proximately caused by his actions as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The court found no error, much less plain error, in the district court's use of appellant's fraudulent 2003 faxes at sentencing. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that appellant's failure to report the Bayou fraud was both the direct and the proximate cause of the victim investors' losses. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Former investors with Bernard L. Madoff appealed from an order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court in the liquidation proceedings of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq. At issue was whether the Net Investment Method the trustee selected for carrying out his responsibilities under SIPA was legally sound under the language of the statutes. The court held that the trustee's determination as to how to calculate "net equity" under SIPA was legally sound in light of the circumstances of the case and the relevant statutory language. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court.

Appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, eight counts of attempted obstruction of justice; one count of bribery; and one count each of importation and possession of electronic surveillance equipment. On appeal, appellant challenged, among other things, the government's use of a confidential informant to meet with him and discuss the defense of his client. These meetings, which were recorded, revealed appellant's plans for the bribery and intimidation of potential trial witnesses against his client, who subsequently pled guilty. The court held that, in the circumstances of this case, the government's use of the informant was entirely proper, that the convictions concerning the surveillance equipment should be vacated, and that the convictions on all other counts should be affirmed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause were violated by the application of the 2008 Sentencing Manual to a murder conspiracy that concluded in 1989. Defendant contended that his alleged violation and his ignorance of his ex post facto rights rendered the appeal-waiver provision in his plea agreement unenforceable. The court rejected defendant's claims and held that the plea waiver was enforceable. Accordingly, the court dismissed defendant's appeal.

Petitioner was convicted of one count of depraved indifference murder in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25(2) after his estranged wife died from a single gunshot wound to the head at point-blank range. At issue was whether, under the law as it existed when petitioner's conviction became final, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court erred in finding that the applicable law of depraved indifference murder was the law in effect when petitioner was convicted at trial. The court held that, although perhaps some point-blank shootings could still have been categorized as depraved indifference murder when petitioner's conviction became final, by that time, under any reasonable view of the evidence adduced at trial, petitioner's point-blank shooting, which was either undoubtedly intentional or accidental in the course of a struggle, could not support a depraved indifference murder conviction. As such, by upholding petitioner's conviction for depraved indifference murder in July 2004, the state courts unreasonably applied federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appealed her conviction of immigration offenses after the district court denied her motion to suppress testimony from the officer who questioned her without Miranda warnings on her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At issue was whether the district court correctly ruled that the officer's questioning failed to rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and thus, whether that court properly admitted into evidence defendant's statements to the officer. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have considered what occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, it followed that defendant was not in "custody" and that, for this reason alone, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the officer's testimony.

This instant appeal arose from the suppression of certain custodial statements made by defendant shortly after his arrest. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the government sought reconsideration and reversal of an order of suppression entered by the district court and previously affirmed by this court. The court reconsidered the district court's order of suppression in this case and vacated that order because the court agreed with the government that Berghuis constituted "an intervening change in controlling law," and because the court further agreed that Berghuis compelled a different outcome on these facts.