Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of multiple fraud-related felonies. Defendant timely appealed his criminal conviction and moved to withdraw his direct criminal appeal with leave to reinstate it after he had finished pursuing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In the alternative, defendant moved for a six month extension to file his appellate brief. The court held that the interests of judicial economy and fairness disfavored staying defendant's direct appeal. The court held, however, that staying the direct appeal by six months would not seriously prejudice the government or the co-defendant. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his direct appeal and granted defendant's request for the six month extension.

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners.

Plaintiff moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel in this appeal from an order of the district court that dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The motions were denied on the ground that plaintiff had filed three or more frivolous lawsuits in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).

Petitioner challenged the manner by which the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated Good Conduct Time (GCT) under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), maintaining that he should be eligible to receive GCT for the 94 months he spent in state and federal custody prior to the date on which he was sentenced in district court, even though those 94 months were credited to a prior state sentence. At issue was whether section 3624(b) permitted the award of GCT for presentence custody served by an inmate, that under 18 U.S.C. 3585(b), could not be credited to the inmate's federal sentence. The court held that the BOP's interpretation of section 3624(b) was persuasive under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and deferred to the agency's interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court granting petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.

Defendant appealed from convictions of possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of cocaine base, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant also appealed the district court's denial of a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during his detention because the search and seizure of defendant's person and property were conducted in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and whether the district court erred in denying defendant's section 2255 motion because he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that defendant's detention during the search of his residence was justified pursuant to Michigan v. Summers and that the district court, therefore, did not err in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during that detention. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance was prejudicial and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the section 2255 motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments of the district court.

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the district court granting defendants' motion to dismiss his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the statute of limitations had run on the first of his two causes of action and in dismissing his second cause of action for improper venue. The court vacated and remanded on the grounds that claims brought by an inmate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 32 U.S.C. 1997e(a), were entitled to equitable tolling during the time-period the inmate was exhausting his administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. The court also vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed some of defendants' claims for improper venue and remanded with instructions that the court transfer those claims to the Eastern District of New York if the court deemed it proper to do so upon reexamination of defendants' claims.

Defendant appealed from a 45 month prison sentence following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm where the district court imposed a six-level sentence enhancement after finding that the stolen weapon was a machine gun. At issue was whether the enhancement was reversible error where the weapon's automatic fire feature was disabled at the time of defendant's theft and therefore, it no longer qualified as a machine gun. The court held that the weapon was a machine gun within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because the undisputed evidence established that the weapon originally was designed to fire automatically. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of immigration fraud and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. At issue was under what circumstances did the exclusion of the public from a courtroom during voir dire violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court held that, although the district court's exclusion of defendant's brother and girlfriend during voir dire failed to meet the four-factor test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, and now Presley v. Georgia, the exclusion was too trivial to implicate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court also held that Presley did not alter the "triviality exception" to the public trial guarantee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendants Linda O'Connor and Dean Sacco appealed from convictions of sex trafficking of a child; O'Connor appealed from convictions of selling a child for the purpose of producing child pornography and producing child pornography; and Sacco appealed from convictions of buying a child for the purpose of producing child pornography, producing and possessing child pornography, and interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. O'Connor contended that evidence was insufficient to support her conviction on any count and that the district court deprived her of a fair trial by denying her motions for severance of her trial from Sacco's trial. O'Connor also challenged certain evidentiary rulings. Sacco contended chiefly that the district court deprived him of a fair trial by denying his attorney's request to withdraw from the case, by admitting in evidence portions of his self-titled autobiography that gave an account of his past thoughts and conduct, and by denying his request for a continuance following unexpected testimony from a government witness. The court found no merit in any of defendants' contentions and therefore, affirmed the judgments and convictions.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. At issue, among other things, was whether venue was proper in the Eastern District of New York. The court held that venue in the Eastern District was proper for the conspiracy counts where defendant committed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracies in the Eastern District. Accordingly, the court did not find venue for the conspiracy charges to be unfair or prejudicial. The court held, however, that venue in the Eastern District was improper for the substantive securities fraud count where no conduct that constituted the offense took place in the Eastern District. Accordingly, nothing in United States v. Svoboda called into question the principle that preparatory acts alone were insufficient to establish venue. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.