Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to overturn his conviction on one count of felony murder in the second degree for a street robbery that resulted in the death of a young doctor and soon-to-be father. Petitioner, whose first trial on these charges resulted in a hung jury, principally challenged admission at his second trial of the transcript and testimony offered by a State witness at the first trial without informing the jury that the witness had, since the first trial, "recanted." The court held that, because the claim was not properly raised and preserved before the trial court and was therefore procedurally defaulted under New York state law, the district court's grant of the habeas corpus petition was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner applied for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, challenging his 2006 murder-for-hire conviction and resulting sentence. At issue was whether a movant's prior unsuccessful motion under section 2255 seeking reinstatement of his right to direct appeal rendered a subsequent section 2255 motion challenging his conviction or sentence "successive" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court held that, because a prior unsuccessful section 2255 motion was filed for the purpose of obtaining a direct appeal, and did not directly attack his conviction or sentence, the section 2255 motion that petitioner now wished to filed was not "successive" within the meaning of section 2255(h). Therefore, the court denied his motion as unnecessary and transfered the matter to the district court.

Defendant, subject to delinquency and default penalties under 18 U.S.C. 3612(g) for failure to pay restitution and a fine arising from his criminal conviction, appealed a district court order denying his request that the district court waive or reduce such penalties. At issue was whether the district court erred by finding that it lacked the authority under section 3612 to waive all or part of defendant's delinquency and default penalties. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted section 3612(h) as authorizing only the Attorney General, in its discretion, to waive all or part of delinquency and default penalties properly assessed pursuant to section 3612(g). Therefore, the district court properly denied defendant's motion for waiver of his delinquency and default penalties.

Defendant appealed from two judgments of conviction related to his involvement in "pump and dump" stock schemes. At issue was whether the first judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, should be overturned, either because the evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to find a fiduciary duty, or because the jury was improperly instructed about how to determine the existence of a fiduciary duty. Also at issue was whether the second judgment of conviction should be overturned because defendant's guilty plea, entered after his conviction in the first trial, was premised on the outcome of that trial. The court held that, upon reviewing the jury instructions for plain error and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the jury was entitled to find that the brokers in this case had a duty to disclose their exorbitant commissions, just as they had a duty to refrain from making affirmative misrepresentations regarding the size of their commissions, and thus, the district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of that duty. The court also held that, because it found no principled basis on which to distinguish this case from United States v. Szur, the court concluded that there was no error in the charge, and affirmed defendant's first conviction. Therefore, the court's conclusion necessarily defeated defendant's argument challenging his subsequent guilty plea and the second judgment of conviction was also affirmed.

This appeal arose out of a successful forfeiture action brought by the United States government pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1595a, which denied appellant's subsequent motion for attorney's fees. The forfeiture action sought to recover the Pissaro work of art entitled "Le Marche" that was reported stolen from the Musee Faure in Aix-les-Bains, France in 1981. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to apply the protections afforded by 18 U.S.C. 983 to the government's section 1595a claim and by denying her motion for attorney's fees after two of the government's three forfeiture claims were dismissed at summary judgment. The court held that a forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 1595a was not governed by section 982 and therefore, appellant was not entitled to raise the innocent-owner defense provided by section 983(d) or to take advantage of the heightened proof requirement of section 983(c). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of forfeiture and since appellant was not a prevailing party within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1), she was not entitled to attorney's fees under the statute.

Defendants appealed from May 17, 2010 judgments of conviction entered by the district court for possession with intent to distribute a mixture of 3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), methamphetamine, and N-Benzylpiperazine ("BZP"), all Schedule I controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C. 846. At issue was whether the district court engaged in clearly erroneous fact-finding that led to a procedurally unreasonable sentence when it determined that the controlled substance referenced in the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1, that was mostly related to the mixture found in defendants' possession, was MDMA or "ecstasy." The court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that the appropriate substitute for the mixture contained in the pills found in defendants' possession was MDMA and therefore, remanded the case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the composition of the pills for the purposes of U.S.S.G. 2D1.1.

Defendant was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment and 18 months of supervised release for violating two conditions of his previous term of supervised release. At issue was whether the district court had the power to revoke the supervised release finding that defendant had violated a condition of supervised release when he failed to report changes in employment and residence. The court vacated and held that the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke supervised release because the delays in adjudicating the revocation petitioner were reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. 3583(i). The court also held that the district court erred by finding that defendant violated the asserted condition, based on the district court's view of the "purpose" of the condition, rather than the "clear and specific" meaning that a person of ordinary intelligence would attribute to it.

Respondents appealed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner where petitioner had been convicted of first-degree murder. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding defense counsel from cross-examining a witness about a document that contained multiple hearsay. The court held that the trial court's preclusion of cross-examination on the document was not so clearly an abuse of its broad discretion, to balance the probative and prejudicial aspects of potential cross-examination, that the state appellate court's failure to find such an abuse of discretion was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, sought leave to file a successive habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 where she was convicted of reckless manslaughter and depraved indifference murder in connection with the death of her infant child. At issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated when New York's appellate courts violated her application for a writ of error coram nobis where she alleged that she was denied effective assistance of counsel in her district court appeal. The court denied the petition and held that petitioner did not raise a claim cognizable under section 2254 where a section 2254 petition was not a proper vehicle for challenging deficiencies in a state post-conviction proceeding.

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued defendants pro se alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law where plaintiff was charged with a traffic violation by a state trooper and where plaintiff alleged that the charge was false and that the trooper's actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to reopen his case, which the district court had administratively closed, because of plaintiff's failure to obtain counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion where the inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel was not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.