Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged in district court with five counts of an eight-count indictment in connection with two killings. Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Defendant with conspiring to commit, and committing, murder for hire. Counts Seven and Eight charged Defendant with the use of a firearm to commit murder. Defendant was convicted on all five counts and received a sentence of five concurrent life terms, one for each count. In response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 asserting that his two Section 924(j) convictions on Counts Seven and Eight should be vacated. The district court agreed and granted the motion. The court declined, however, to resentence Defendant de novo. Defendant argued that this was an error, either because de novo resentencing was mandatory, or because the district court abused its discretion in declining to resentence Defendant de novo.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Section 2255's statutory text vests district courts with the discretion to decide when to conduct a de novo resentencing and that de novo resentencing was not mandatory here. The court also concluded that because resentencing Defendant would have been “strictly ministerial,” resulting in the same sentence of mandatory life imprisonment that he received in the first instance, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Peña" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 36 months in prison following his conviction by a jury of witness retaliation. Defendant challenged the manner in which the district court conducted jury selection, arguing primarily that the district court neglected to adequately screen prospective jurors for bias against gang members and that the voir dire process was too abbreviated to allow for informed peremptory and for-cause challenges.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that, under these circumstances, the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to sufficiently account for the risk of gang-related bias among prospective jurors. The court explained that the district court’s failure on voir dire to explore or to take other steps specifically to counter such potential prejudice unfairly deprived Defendant of the opportunity to unearth a pervasive bias relevant to an issue pivotal to the government’s case against him. Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States of America v. Nieves" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed various issues arising from his 2017 amended judgment of conviction for Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses in district court. The Second Circuit addressed two of Defendant’s arguments—first that the order of forfeiture entered against him should be vacated because the district court failed to enter a preliminary order prior to sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B); second, that he was improperly convicted of possessing firearms as a felon, Counts Twelve through Fourteen because the government did not prove that he knew that he was a felon.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that Defendant asserted that forfeiture is unlike restitution, which was at issue in Dolan because restitution is intended to assist the victims of crimes. Forfeiture and restitution indeed serve different purposes: restitution is for “remediating a loss,” while forfeiture is for “disgorging a gain.” But that distinction is less material here. Forfeiture also serves other important purposes, and the court saw no reason why, for purposes of timing, restitution and forfeiture should be treated differently under these circumstances. Defendant also argued that the government alone is responsible for preserving the value of seized assets, but for support, he cites only an inapposite customs statute. However, the court found that Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to void the forfeiture order. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 kilograms (kg) of marijuana. During a reverse-sting operation, Defendant took possession of 10 kg of real and “sham” cocaine from an undercover agent and agreed to take possession of 40 kg more. After his arrest, Defendant told law enforcement that he thought he was picking up marijuana or money, not cocaine. Defendant later entered a plea agreement, in which he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute marijuana. At sentencing, the government raised and the district court considered the 50 kg of cocaine as part of Defendant’s “relevant conduct” under Sentencing Guideline Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to 36 months imprisonment.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court concluded that (1) the plea agreement permitted the government to raise that quantity of cocaine at sentencing, (2) the government was not judicially estopped from doing so, and (3) the district court did not err by considering the 50 kg of cocaine as part of Defendant’s “relevant conduct” because Guideline Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) does not require scienter as to drug type when a defendant is directly and personally involved in a drug transaction. View "United States v. Helm" on Justia Law

In 2021, Second Circuit issued an opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the convictions of Defendants after trial in the district court. Among other things, the Second Circuit affirmed Defendants’ convictions under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) for brandishing firearms during and in relation to attempted Hobbs Act robberies. The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded to the Second Circuit for further consideration in in light of its decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). See McCoy v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2863 (2022); Nix v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2860 (2022).   The Second Circuit reversed Defendants’ section 924(c) convictions on Counts 4 and 6 for brandishing firearms during and in relation to attempted Hobbs Act robberies. The court agreed after Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). More specifically, the Supreme Court explained that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence pursuant to section 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause because an attempt does not categorically require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force against the person or property of another. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and unlawful use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. In his plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his convictions and sentence so long as the district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment equal to or less than 106 months. He was sentenced principally to 96 months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed the district court’s order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and his corresponding sentence. He contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), invalidate his conviction on that count. The government disputes primarily that Petitioner’s guilty plea to the section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction rested solely on Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, contending that the conviction also rested on the predicate crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The government asserts that the record is sufficient to support Petitioner’s guilt based on attempted Hobbs Act robbery.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Petitioner relief under section 2255, vacated Petitioner’s conviction and related sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1); and remanded to allow resentencing. The court explained that on de novo review, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence.” Thus, the court concluded that Petitioner’s conviction under section 924(c)(1)(A) is invalid. View "Hall v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are U.S. service members wounded in terrorist attacks in Iraq and the families and estates of service members killed in such attacks. They appealed from the dismissal of their claims under the Antiterrorism Act (the “ATA”) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (the “JASTA”), against various financial institutions in the United States and abroad (the “Banks”). As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the Banks conspired with and aided and abetted Iranian entities to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States and channel funds to terrorist groups that killed or injured U.S. service members. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims primarily because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead a direct connection between the Banks and the terrorist groups. The district court also declined to consider Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims because they were raised for the first time in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.   The Second Circuit explained that while it disagreed with the district court’s primary reason for dismissing Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims, it affirmed the district court’s judgment because Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the Banks conspired – either directly or indirectly – with the terrorist groups, or that the terrorist attacks that killed or injured the service members were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs forfeited their JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims by raising them for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. View "Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on counts related to a drug distribution conspiracy, the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant committed these crimes while on supervised release following prior convictions. On appeal, Defendant asserted primarily that two alleged district court errors require vacatur of his conviction. First, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 2 U.S. 545 (1977), Defendant contended that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony from his former cellmate concerning what Defendant told the cellmate about Defendant planned defense. Second, Defendant submitted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer supervising Defendant during his period of supervised release coordinated a search of his residence and rental car. Accordingly, Defendant argued that the district court erred by admitting his former cellmate’s testimony and evidence seized during the search of his residence and rental car.   The Second Circuit affirmed hold that on plain error review of the Sixth Amendment claim, the court identified no error, never mind plain error. Nothing in the record suggests that the government learned privileged information or intentionally invaded Defendant’s relationship with his attorney. On de novo review of the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The officer monitoring Defendant had reasonable suspicion to search his residence and rental car based on credible reports that Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and was engaged in drug trafficking. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law

On appeal to the Second Circuit from remand from the United States Supreme Court, the court vacated Defendants’ convictions conversion of government property, wire fraud, and securities fraud; and convicting certain Defendants on various counts of conspiring to engage in conduct violating one or more of the above sections, all originating from misappropriation of confidential information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS").   On remand: (A) Defendants contend that their argument that the CMS information at issue does not constitute "property" or a "thing of value" within the meaning of the above statutes is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly; (B) the government, concurring in that contention, confesses error as to the substantive counts and as to a count charging only conspiracy to violate Sections 1343 and 1348 (Count Two); and it agrees that either Defendants' convictions on those counts should be reversed, or the cases should be remanded to the district court so that the government can dismiss those counts pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a); and (C) the government seeks affirmance on the remaining conspiracy counts (Counts One and Seventeen).   The Second Circuit explained that given the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly and the prosecutorial discretion to which the Executive Branch of the government is entitled, the court granted the government's request to remand the cases to the district court for dismissal of the substantive counts and Count Two. View "USA v. Blaszczak" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with five counts of an eight-count indictment in connection with the murders of two victims. Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Defendantwith conspiring to commit, and committing, murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1958. Counts Seven and Eight charged Defendant with use of a firearm to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). Defendant was convicted on all five counts and received a sentence of five concurrent life terms, one for each count. In response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 asserting that his two Section 924(j) convictions on Counts Seven and Eight should be vacated. The district court agreed, and granted the motion. The court declined, however, to resentence Defendant de novo.   Defendant argued that this was an error, either because de novo resentencing was mandatory, or because the district court abused its discretion in declining to resentence Defendant de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Section 2255's statutory text vests district courts with the discretion to decide when to conduct a de novo resentencing and that de novo resentencing was not mandatory here. The court also concluded that because resentencing Defendant would have been “strictly ministerial,” resulting in the same sentence of mandatory life imprisonment that he received in the first instance, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Peña" on Justia Law