Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mathew James, a former nurse and owner of a medical billing business, was convicted after a jury trial for health care fraud, conspiracy to commit health care fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The charges arose from a scheme in which James and his employees falsified insurance claims by “upcoding” and “unbundling” medical procedures, directed patients to emergency rooms for pre-planned surgeries, and impersonated patients in communications with insurance companies. The fraudulent activity spanned several years, involved nearly 150 physicians, and resulted in tens of thousands of claims. While some of James’s business was legitimate, the government’s evidence focused on the fraudulent aspects of his operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Judge Seybert) presided over the trial and sentencing. The jury convicted James on most counts but acquitted him of money laundering conspiracy. During trial, jurors were inadvertently given access to transcripts of two recorded calls not admitted into evidence, but the district court declined to conduct an inquiry into the exposure, instead instructing the jury to disregard any material not in evidence. At sentencing, the court imposed a 144-month prison term, a forfeiture order of over $63 million, and restitution of nearly $337 million. The court applied sentencing enhancements for James’s leadership role and abuse of trust, and increased the sentence after considering James’s potential eligibility for earned time credits and rehabilitation programs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed James’s conviction, finding any jury exposure to extra-record material harmless. However, the court vacated the sentence, including the forfeiture and restitution orders, holding that the district court erred by enhancing the sentence based on potential earned time credits and rehabilitation program eligibility, misapplied sentencing enhancements without adequate findings, and failed to properly calculate forfeiture and restitution by including legitimate business revenue. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York imposed a term of imprisonment followed by supervised release. During the sentencing hearing, the court orally imposed several “special” conditions of supervised release, as recommended in the presentence report, but did not specify or discuss any “standard” or additional discretionary conditions. The court also stated that the defendant would not be required to contribute to the cost of mental health services, contrary to a recommendation in the presentence report. However, the written judgment later included not only the special conditions but also thirteen additional discretionary “standard” conditions of supervised release, as well as a requirement that the defendant contribute to mental health service costs.After sentencing, the defendant appealed, arguing that his constitutional right to be present at sentencing was violated because the thirteen discretionary conditions were not pronounced in his presence, and that the written judgment’s requirement to pay for mental health services contradicted the oral sentence. Both parties agreed that the payment requirement should be eliminated due to this inconsistency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the case de novo. The court overruled its prior precedent in United States v. Truscello, which had allowed non-mandatory “standard” conditions to be added to the written judgment without oral pronouncement. The Second Circuit held that all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, including those labeled as “standard” in the Sentencing Guidelines, must be pronounced in the defendant’s presence at sentencing. The court vacated the portions of the sentence imposing the thirteen discretionary conditions and the payment requirement, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Maiorana" on Justia Law

A New York State Police trooper stopped Daniel Delgado for erratic driving and discovered that his license was suspended. During an inventory search of his vehicle, the trooper found a loaded “ghost gun” and ammunition, which Delgado admitted belonged to him. Delgado had several prior convictions, including a felony conviction for attempted second-degree murder in Florida, where he had shot a man in the back. Delgado was indicted for possessing ammunition after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Delgado’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the indictment, finding that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment. At sentencing, the court determined that Delgado’s prior Florida conviction for attempted second-degree murder was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a), resulting in a higher base offense level. Delgado was sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He timely appealed, challenging both the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and the classification of his prior conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Delgado’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by its recent decision in Zherka v. Bondi, which reaffirmed the statute’s constitutionality after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The court also held that Florida’s offense of attempted second-degree murder is categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, as it requires an intentional act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved mind. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Carlos Mercado was originally convicted in federal court of conspiracy to distribute heroin and sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release, with conditions including a prohibition on committing new offenses. After completing his prison term, Mercado began supervised release in June 2021. In November 2024, he was arrested by Hartford police and charged under Connecticut law with drug offenses after narcotics and cash were found in his possession. The United States Probation Office petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to issue a summons for a hearing on Mercado’s alleged violation of supervised release.The District Court for the District of Connecticut questioned whether it had statutory authority to detain Mercado pending revocation proceedings, citing the Non-Detention Act, which requires statutory authorization for detention of U.S. citizens. The court concluded that neither 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provided such authority, reasoning that Mercado had not been “found guilty of an offense” with respect to the alleged violation and was not “awaiting imposition or execution” of a sentence. The court denied the government’s motion to detain Mercado, and Mercado moved to dismiss the government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Second Circuit further held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) authorizes a district court to detain a supervisee charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings, because the supervisee was previously found guilty and is awaiting execution of a portion of the original sentence. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Mercado" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including an individual, a retirement fund, and several investment funds, traded derivatives based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). They alleged that a group of banks and brokers conspired to manipulate Euribor, which affected the pricing of various over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as FX forwards, interest-rate swaps, and forward rate agreements. The alleged conduct included coordinated false submissions to set Euribor at artificial levels, collusion among banks and brokers, and structural changes within banks to facilitate manipulation. Plaintiffs claimed this manipulation harmed them by distorting the prices of their Euribor-based derivative transactions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state common law, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court also found that the RICO claims were based on extraterritorial conduct and did not meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It declined to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction was not established but held that two plaintiffs—Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—had established specific personal jurisdiction over UBS AG and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC for Sherman Act and RICO claims related to OTC Euribor derivative transactions in the United States. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims for lack of particularity, but held that the Sherman Act claims were sufficiently pleaded. It vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Sullivan v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of possessing child pornography, following an investigation that began when coworkers reported him for viewing such material at work. A forensic analysis confirmed the allegations, and further investigation revealed that he possessed between 10 and 150 images of child pornography, as well as other images indicating a sexual interest in children. During the investigation, authorities also learned that in 2014, the defendant, then a church treasurer and deacon, had sexually abused two young boys at his church on the same day, in separate rooms and separated by non-criminal conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York accepted the defendant’s guilty plea and, at sentencing, applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s abuse of the two boys constituted two separate instances of sexual abuse. The court sentenced the defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment and imposed a 20-year term of supervised release, including special conditions restricting contact with minors, limiting him to one internet-capable device, and prohibiting possession of sexually explicit material.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the application of the pattern enhancement, the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and the procedural reasonableness of the special conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court correctly applied the pattern enhancement, finding that the two acts of abuse were separate instances under the relevant guideline, drawing on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wooden v. United States. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable and upheld the special conditions of supervised release. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Bullock" on Justia Law

A New York resident, known as Lucha El, was twice arrested for unlawful possession of firearms. In both instances, the firearms had been purchased in South Carolina by another individual, Keith Vereen, who acted as a straw purchaser. Lucha El paid Vereen, who then transported the firearms to New York, where Lucha El received them. Lucha El did not have the necessary permits to purchase firearms in New York and did not attempt to obtain a federal license to transport firearms across state lines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charged Lucha El with interstate transport of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and conspiracy to transport or receive firearms from outside his state of residency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Lucha El moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that § 922(a)(3) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. After a trial, a jury found him guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearms. Lucha El appealed, raising only the Second Amendment challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that § 922(a)(3) is a lawful regulation on the commercial sale of firearms that does not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms. The court further found that, even if the statute did impose a meaningful constraint, it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Lucha El’s convictions under § 922(a)(3) did not violate the Second Amendment. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Brandon Prawl was convicted after a jury trial of several offenses arising from heroin distribution activities in Schenectady, New York. The evidence at trial showed that Prawl sold heroin to an undercover investigator on four occasions in September 2019, often retrieving the drugs from an apartment at 1526 Devine Street. On October 4, 2019, police raided the apartment and found Prawl in a bedroom with his identification card listing the apartment as his address. In the same room, officers discovered heroin, drug paraphernalia, and an unloaded handgun with a loaded magazine nearby. Prawl did not have a license for the firearm.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge Suddaby) presided over the trial. Prawl was indicted for four counts of heroin distribution, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin. At trial, the government’s arguments and the district court’s jury instructions linked the firearm possession charge to Prawl’s possession with intent to distribute heroin on October 4, rather than to the September sales as specified in the indictment. Prawl did not object to this at trial. The jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Prawl challenged only his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He argued that the evidence was insufficient and that the indictment was constructively amended in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, that Prawl had abandoned his constructive amendment claim on appeal, and that, even if not abandoned, any error was not plain. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Prawl" on Justia Law

Two defendants were charged and convicted for their roles in a large-scale ATM skimming operation that spanned the United States, Europe, and Mexico, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to financial institutions and individual account holders. The scheme involved installing skimming devices and hidden cameras on ATMs to steal debit card numbers and PINs, creating counterfeit cards, withdrawing cash from victims’ accounts, and laundering the proceeds overseas. One defendant was primarily involved in sending and receiving skimming devices and laundering money, while the other built and distributed skimming devices, supervised cash-outs, and was found with skimming equipment and counterfeit cards in his garage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. One defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts, while the other pled guilty to most charges and was convicted by a jury of aggravated identity theft. Both received below-Guidelines sentences (92 and 120 months) and were ordered to pay restitution in installments, with the option to use the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (IFRP). The defendants appealed, jointly challenging their aggravated identity theft convictions, and individually raising issues regarding the suppression of evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the restitution payment schedule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that debit card numbers and PINs are “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, thus supporting the aggravated identity theft convictions. The court also upheld the denial of the suppression motion, finding the search of the garage lawful as a protective sweep incident to arrest. The court found no procedural or substantive error in the sentences. However, it vacated the restitution order for one defendant and remanded for clarification of the installment payment schedule during incarceration. All other aspects of the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States of America v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2012 of assaulting the mother of his child, which constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under New York law. Several years later, he was arrested in New York City for possessing a firearm, specifically a .380 caliber pistol, after having been previously convicted of that domestic violence misdemeanor. He pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm after a domestic violence conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). At sentencing, the district court considered his criminal history, including a 2013 state drug conviction, and imposed a forty-eight-month prison term and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the 2013 state drug conviction did not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a lower base offense level for sentencing. Both the defendant and the government appealed: the defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment and the reasonableness of his sentence, while the government contested the district court’s interpretation of the drug conviction under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, both facially and as applied to the defendant, because it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals deemed dangerous, such as those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. The court also found that the defendant’s sentencing challenges were moot, as he had completed his prison term and there was no indication the district court would reduce his supervised release. Additionally, the court agreed with the government’s concession that its cross-appeal was foreclosed by recent precedent. The court dismissed the appeal in part as moot and otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law