Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Alexander Arguedas pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to charges of racketeering conspiracy, narcotics conspiracy, and using and carrying firearms in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy. The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 390 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $300. The court also imposed mandatory, standard, and special conditions of supervised release. Arguedas appealed, and his appellate counsel moved to be relieved and for the appointment of substitute counsel, submitting a brief in accordance with Anders v. California.The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on an appeal waiver in the plea agreement or, alternatively, for summary affirmance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the Anders brief was incomplete because it did not address Arguedas’s conditions of supervised release, which fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. The court held that such a deficiency in an Anders brief is not necessarily fatal if it is harmless. The court concluded that there were no non-frivolous issues with respect to the mandatory, standard, and five of the seven special conditions of supervised release, making the deficiency harmless in those respects.However, the court identified potential non-frivolous issues regarding two special conditions concerning financial disclosure and new lines of credit. As a result, the court deferred decision on the motions and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing to address these conditions. The court directed appellate counsel to determine whether Arguedas wishes to appeal these conditions and to discuss any non-frivolous issues they might raise. The government was also directed to respond to the supplemental briefing. View "United States v. Arguedas" on Justia Law

Isaac Poole, while on supervised release for prior drug offenses, tested positive for cocaine, and probation officers found drugs and drug paraphernalia in his home. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to eight months of imprisonment followed by ninety-six months of supervised release. As a condition of his supervised release, the court required Poole to submit to suspicionless searches by probation officers or law enforcement officers assisting them. Poole appealed this condition, arguing it was unsupported by the record and involved a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York initially handled Poole's case. After his release from prison, Poole began his supervised release in Syracuse, New York. Following a positive drug test and the discovery of drugs and paraphernalia in his home, the court modified his supervised release conditions to include suspicionless searches. Poole admitted to possessing and using illegal drugs, leading to the revocation of his supervised release and the imposition of the new conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing the suspicionless search condition. The court found that Poole's pattern of illegal drug activity, including while on supervised release, justified the condition. The court concluded that the condition served the purposes of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, and enabled probation officers to fulfill their statutory duties. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the suspicionless search condition as both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Poole" on Justia Law

Kenneth Darrah exchanged messages with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as the mother of a nine-year-old girl. During these exchanges, Darrah sent an audiovisual file of child pornography through the Kik Messenger application, expecting to receive a picture of the child in return. He pled guilty to distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(2)(A) and was sentenced by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York to 106 months in prison and 20 years of supervised release.Darrah appealed, challenging the procedural reasonableness of a five-level increase for distribution of child pornography under U.S.S.G. §2G2.2(b)(3)(B), the substantive reasonableness of his 106-month sentence, and a special condition of supervised release limiting him to one internet-capable device. The district court had calculated a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, resulting in a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. Despite objections, the court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 106 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It found that the district court erred in applying the five-level increase because there was no evidence of an agreement to exchange anything of value, as required under the amended U.S.S.G. §2G2.2(b)(3)(B). However, this error was deemed harmless since the district court indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. The court also found the 106-month sentence substantively reasonable, considering the nature of Darrah's offense and his background.The appellate court vacated the judgment regarding the special condition of supervised release, which limited Darrah to one internet-capable device, as it constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the Probation Office. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "U.S. v. Darrah" on Justia Law

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

Willie Dennis was convicted of three counts of cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) for sending repeated abusive electronic communications to his former partners at the law firm K&L Gates LLP after his ouster from the partnership. Dennis argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case because the trial evidence was insufficient to prove that his communications constituted "true threats" of physical harm, which would fall outside the First Amendment's protection of free speech. He also contended that erroneous jury instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty without proof of true threats and that he was unduly prejudiced by trial rulings and the trial judge's statements about his pro se status.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted Dennis on three counts of cyberstalking. Dennis appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove true threats and that the jury instructions were erroneous. He also claimed that he was prejudiced by the exclusion of certain evidence and by the trial judge's comments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find true threats in Dennis's communications to two of the victims, Bicks and Bostick, but insufficient as to the third victim, Cottle. The court held that Dennis's conviction on Count Two must be reversed due to insufficient evidence of true threats. The court also found that Dennis's failure to raise a true-threat challenge to the jury instructions in the district court limited appellate review to plain error, which was not evident. The court concluded that Dennis's other arguments were without merit.The Second Circuit affirmed Dennis's conviction on Counts One and Four but reversed the conviction on Count Two. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Joshua G. Stegemann was convicted in 2015 for drug and firearm offenses. His Presentence Investigation Report identified him as a "career offender" based on prior Massachusetts convictions for trafficking and distributing cocaine. He was sentenced to 360 months in prison, and the judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. In 2018, Stegemann filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court allowed him to amend his petition five times before denying it in 2020. The Second Circuit granted a certificate of appealability, but Stegemann's arguments were ultimately rejected.Stegemann then filed a sixth motion to amend his § 2255 petition, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging his prior conviction under Massachusetts law as a "controlled substance offense" under the sentencing guidelines. The district court denied the motion, stating it was repetitive of arguments already rejected by the Second Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Stegemann's motion to amend was futile because it repeated an argument previously rejected by the Second Circuit. The court found no compelling reason to depart from the law of the case, as there was no intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Stegemann v. United States" on Justia Law

Omotayo, along with at least eleven co-conspirators, participated in an international scheme aimed at defrauding businesses in the United States. For his role in the fraud, Omotayo was convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. He concedes that substantial evidence supported those convictions. The sole question before the court was whether Omotayo also violated a federal law criminalizing “aggravated identity theft,” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, which carries a mandatory consecutive two-year prison term. At trial, the government showed that Omotayo possessed and sent a co-conspirator two versions of a single counterfeit invoice, both of which included the real name of another person. The jury was instructed that it could find Omotayo guilty of aggravated identity theft if the invoice had “a purpose, role, or effect with respect to the [wire fraud conspiracy].” It convicted Omotayo on that count. Omotayo appealed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Omotayo’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated identity theft charge. The jury convicted Omotayo on all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to forty-eight months on Counts One and Two, and twenty-four months on Count Five, to be served consecutively. Omotayo timely appealed his conviction on Count Five, arguing that the government’s evidence was insufficient to establish that he used, transferred, or possessed Yulia Roytman’s name “during and in relation to” the wire fraud conspiracy, or that he acted “without lawful authority.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Soon after Omotayo’s conviction, the Supreme Court decided Dubin v. United States, which established that Section 1028A applies only where a “defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal.” The court agreed with Omotayo that his conviction could not stand in light of Dubin. The jury was instructed to apply a legal standard that is now plainly incorrect. Even if the jury had been correctly instructed under Dubin, the government’s evidence was insufficient to show that Omotayo’s possession or transfer of the invoice played a key role in the wire fraud scheme. The court reversed Omotayo’s judgment of conviction as to the aggravated identity theft charge and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Omotayo" on Justia Law

Nasir Cooper was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Cooper was sentenced to 57 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and a $100 mandatory special assessment. Cooper appealed, arguing that the district court erred in classifying his prior conviction for second-degree attempted assault under New York Penal Law § 120.05(7) as a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that Cooper's prior conviction for second-degree attempted assault was a crime of violence, which resulted in a base offense level of 24 under the Sentencing Guidelines. Cooper objected, arguing that the conviction should not be considered a crime of violence, which would have resulted in a lower base offense level of 20. The district court rejected Cooper's argument and sentenced him based on the higher offense level.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Cooper had waived any argument that his conviction was not under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) by acknowledging it in his sentencing submissions. The court also held that a conviction for second-degree attempted assault under N.Y.P.L. § 120.05(7) categorically constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a). The court reasoned that the statute requires the use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury, meeting the criteria for a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Consequently, the appellate court found no procedural error in the district court's determination of Cooper's base offense level and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry was convicted of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute the same. The case centers on the use of a stationary pole camera by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to monitor the exterior of Harry's business, Action Audio, for approximately 50 days without a warrant. The camera captured footage of the business's exterior, parking lot, and occasionally the interior when the garage door was open. Harry was arrested after investigators found narcotics and firearms at Action Audio and his residence.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Harry's motion to suppress the pole-camera evidence, which was introduced at trial. The jury convicted Harry, and the district court sentenced him to ten years for the fentanyl- and cocaine-related charges, including conspiracy, and five years for the marijuana charge, to run concurrently. The court also denied Harry's request for safety-valve relief from the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of the stationary pole camera did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, as Harry did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the publicly visible areas of his business. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Harry safety-valve relief, as he failed to prove that the firearms found were not connected to his drug-trafficking activities. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harry" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law