Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal law enforcement agents investigated the defendant after he sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant in three controlled buys in Suffolk County, New York. Based on these transactions, agents executed a search warrant at his residence and seized drugs, firearms, packaging materials, and cash. The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and possession of firearms in connection with drug trafficking.At sentencing, the district court considered the defendant’s background and criminal history and imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. The court orally pronounced certain mandatory and special conditions of supervised release, but did not recite or specifically incorporate by reference the full set of standard conditions recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines or the Probation Department. The written judgment included thirteen standard conditions and several special conditions, some of which expanded on or added new requirements not mentioned orally.Nearly three years after judgment, the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Although the appeal was untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), the government did not timely raise the issue, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined the objection was forfeited. The court reviewed the merits of the appeal and held that the district court erred by imposing the standard conditions and certain special conditions without proper oral pronouncement or clear judicial determination. The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to vacate the thirteen standard conditions and three special conditions (mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and search condition), allowing the district court to conduct further proceedings and potentially reimpose these conditions in compliance with procedural requirements. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The defendant was born and raised in Lebanon and was recruited into Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in 1996. He received various forms of military-type training, including weapons, explosives, and surveillance, and participated in operations against Israeli targets. After moving to the United States in 2000, he continued his involvement with Hizballah by traveling back to Lebanon for further training and assignments. In 2004 and 2005, he received advanced explosives and surveillance training, including field exercises and site surveillance in Istanbul and New York City, where he documented potential targets for Hizballah. His activities with Hizballah ceased in spring 2005.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant in 2019 on multiple counts, including receiving military-type training from Hizballah (Count Three). After a jury trial, he was found guilty on Count Three and two other counts, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for Count Three, with a sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for terrorism-related offenses. Neither the parties nor the district court recognized that the relevant statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339D) was enacted in December 2004, or that certain enhancements and waivers only applied to post-March 2006 conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that although the district court erred by not instructing the jury to consider only post-enactment conduct, there was no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted due to substantial evidence of post-enactment conduct. The court also concluded that the retroactive application of the statute of limitations waiver was permissible because the original limitation period had not expired. However, the court vacated the sentence, finding plain error in the application of the terrorism enhancement and remanded for resentencing. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentence was vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Saab" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who participated in a series of armed robberies targeting narcotics traffickers. Two particular robberies, one in Elmont and another in the Bronx, resulted in the deaths of two individuals. The defendant was involved in planning the Elmont robbery, though not present during it, and actively participated in the Bronx robbery. A superseding indictment charged him with conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, as well as conspiracy to distribute large quantities of marijuana.Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant was acquitted of attempted robbery in the Elmont incident but convicted on the other charges, including conspiracy and attempt related to the Bronx robbery, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court initially imposed lengthy sentences on all counts, running them concurrently. The defendant later challenged his convictions under two firearm-related counts after Supreme Court decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence.” The government agreed, and those convictions were vacated. At resentencing, the district court imposed consecutive sentences of 180 months each for conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and a concurrent 60-month sentence for the drug conspiracy.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on the two Hobbs Act charges because they related to the same underlying robbery, and the aggregate exceeded the statutory maximum for a single Hobbs Act offense. The Second Circuit held that conspiracy and attempt are distinct offenses under the Hobbs Act, and Congress permits consecutive sentences for such convictions, even if the total exceeds the maximum for one offense. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and rejected additional challenges to sentencing calculations and procedures. View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted in 2012 of several offenses related to drug trafficking and violence, including attempted Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of using or brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The firearm convictions were predicated on the attempted robbery and a murder committed during a narcotics conspiracy. The attempted robbery involved physically assaulting a drug dealer with a firearm. The district court sentenced the petitioner to a total of 100 years in prison, including consecutive sentences for the § 924(c) convictions.After his conviction and unsuccessful direct appeal, the petitioner filed an initial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. He then sought permission to file a second § 2255 motion, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis (which struck down § 924(c)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague) and United States v. Taylor (which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause) required vacatur of his firearm brandishing conviction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the trial record and concluded that the petitioner’s conviction for brandishing a firearm during the attempted robbery was based on the elements clause, not the residual clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the petitioner’s second § 2255 motion. The Second Circuit held that because the petitioner’s conviction was based on the elements clause, his claim relied only on a statutory change, not on a new rule of constitutional law, and thus did not satisfy the requirements for a successive habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The court also rejected his argument regarding the second firearm conviction as foreclosed by precedent. View "Barnes v. United States of America" on Justia Law

A Malaysian national who worked as a managing director for Goldman Sachs in Malaysia was prosecuted for his role in a large-scale financial scheme involving 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund. The government presented evidence showing that, along with other conspirators, he participated in three major bond offerings raising $6.5 billion, from which more than $2.5 billion was diverted for bribes and kickbacks to officials and participants, including himself. The funds were laundered through shell companies, and the defendant received $35.1 million that was deposited in an account controlled by his family members. The defendant’s wife asserted at trial that these funds were legitimate investment returns, not criminal proceeds.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied several motions by the defendant. The court rejected his arguments that the indictment should be dismissed for lack of venue, concluding that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy passed through the Eastern District of New York. The court also found that the government did not breach an agreement regarding his extradition from Malaysia, since the superseding indictments did not charge new offenses. The district court excluded a video recording offered by the defense as inadmissible hearsay, and ultimately, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $35.1 million.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued improper venue, breach of extradition agreement, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and that the forfeiture was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not erred in any respect. Venue was proper, the extradition agreement was not breached, the evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and forfeiture order were affirmed. View "USA v. NG CHONG HWA" on Justia Law

In October 2021, a Florida attorney, Ross, held a trust account at Regions Bank that received a $29.6 million wire transfer, the result of a business email compromise fraud perpetrated on a company called Phoenix. Most of the funds were rapidly transferred out of the account, with some recalled by the bank. Federal authorities seized approximately $4.9 million remaining or recovered from the account and initiated a civil forfeiture action, alleging the funds were proceeds of fraud or involved in money laundering.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York oversaw the initial proceedings. Ross filed a verified claim to $1.21 million of the seized funds, asserting they were legitimate client funds or proceeds from his home sale, but made no claim to the remaining $3.69 million. Another claimant, Phoenix, also asserted interest in the $1.21 million. The district court entered default judgment forfeiting the unclaimed $3.69 million to the government, dismissed without prejudice the forfeiture proceedings as to the $1.21 million, and issued a certificate of reasonable cause for the seizure. It denied Ross’s subsequent motion for attorney fees, costs, and interest under CAFRA, finding he did not “substantially prevail,” and denied reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Ross lacked standing to contest the forfeiture of the $3.69 million because he had not filed a claim as to those funds. The court rejected Ross’s due process challenge to the stay of proceedings, finding the delay reasonable, and upheld the denial of attorney fees, costs, and interest, concluding that dismissal without prejudice did not make Ross a prevailing party under CAFRA. The court also found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the forfeiture action without prejudice. However, the Second Circuit vacated the issuance of a certificate of reasonable cause, as no judgment for Ross had been entered. All other aspects of the district court’s judgments were affirmed. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law

Adam Gomez was charged with receiving and possessing a firearm that had an obliterated serial number. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), was unconstitutional. After the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied his motion, Gomez pleaded guilty to the offense. His appeal centers on the claim that the statute is facially unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, which clarified the scope of the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Gomez’s motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting his constitutional challenge to § 922(k). Following this denial, Gomez entered a guilty plea and was convicted. He then appealed the judgment, arguing that the statute violates the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bruen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) is facially constitutional. The court reasoned that the statute does not infringe upon the right to bear arms because it does not prevent anyone from possessing any type of firearm, and firearms with obliterated serial numbers are not weapons in common use for lawful purposes. The court also noted that Gomez’s facial challenge failed because he did not demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional in all its applications or that it lacks a plainly legitimate sweep. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

In March 2023, a New York State grand jury indicted a former President on thirty-four counts of falsifying business records in the first degree. The indictment alleged that he orchestrated a scheme to influence the 2016 presidential election by directing his personal lawyer to pay $130,000 to an adult film star to prevent disclosure of an alleged sexual encounter. The payments were disguised as legal fees in business records. After arraignment, the defendant sought to remove the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing the conduct was within the color of his office and involved federal defenses. The federal district court remanded the case to state court, finding the prosecution fell outside the scope of federal officer removal jurisdiction. A state court jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts.After conviction but before sentencing, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Trump v. United States, holding that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority and that evidence of immunized official acts is inadmissible even when an indictment alleges only unofficial conduct. The defendant then sought leave to file a second, untimely notice of removal in federal court, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision provided new grounds for removal and established good cause for the delay. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied leave, concluding that good cause had not been shown and that the hush money payments were private, unofficial acts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not adequately considered issues relevant to the good cause inquiry, including the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision and whether evidence admitted at trial related to immunized official acts. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for reconsideration of the motion for leave to file a second notice of removal, instructing the district court to address these issues. View "New York v. Trump" on Justia Law

Lavellous Purcell operated a commercial sex business from 2012 to 2017, recruiting women from across the United States to work as prostitutes and coordinating their interstate travel. He resided primarily on Long Island, New York, and the women involved traveled to at least fourteen states. The government’s case focused on documentary evidence regarding one victim, Samantha Vasquez, showing her work for Purcell in various locations, but not in the Southern District of New York.Purcell was indicted in 2018 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on five counts related to sex trafficking. After a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment. On direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, his conviction on Count One (enticement to engage in unlawful sexual activity) was reversed for lack of venue in the Southern District of New York, but his conviction on Count Two (transporting a victim in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution) was affirmed because his appellate counsel did not challenge venue for that count. The district court reimposed the original sentence after remand. Purcell then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding appellate counsel’s performance reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the denial of Purcell’s habeas petition de novo. The court held that Purcell’s appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge venue as to Count Two, as the omitted argument was significant and obvious and likely would have resulted in reversal of that conviction. The court declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and found Purcell was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Purcell’s § 2255 petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Purcell v. United States" on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a brand-management company who was prosecuted for allegedly orchestrating a scheme to inflate company revenues through secret “overpayments-for-givebacks” deals with a business partner. The government alleged that the CEO arranged for the partner to pay inflated prices for joint ventures, with a secret understanding that the excess would be returned later, thereby allowing the company to report higher revenues to investors. The CEO was also accused of making false filings with the SEC and improperly influencing audits. The central factual dispute was whether the CEO actually made these undisclosed agreements.In 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a jury trial. The jury acquitted the CEO of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, make false SEC filings, and interfere with audits, but could not reach a verdict on the substantive charges, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. The government retried the CEO in 2022 on the substantive counts, and the second jury convicted him on all charges. The CEO moved to bar the retrial, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded it because the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided factual issues essential to the government’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the first jury’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge necessarily decided that the CEO did not make the alleged secret agreements, which was a factual issue essential to the substantive charges. Because the government’s case at the second trial depended on proving those same secret agreements, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine barred the retrial. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the CEO’s convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law