Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Ivan Reyes-Arzate, the defendant-appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to a drug offense before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. He was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and was also subjected to a special assessment and forfeiture. His defense counsel filed an Anders brief seeking to withdraw from the appeal on the basis that any appeal would be frivolous due to the defendant's plea agreement, which included a valid waiver of the right to appeal any sentence of 293 months or less. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, deferred a decision on the motion to withdraw and ordered the defense counsel to submit a supplemental brief. The court found that the defense counsel's brief only addressed the validity of Reyes-Arzate's appeal waiver and did not discuss the scope of the waiver, particularly as it related to non-imprisonment components of the sentence such as the term and conditions of supervised release. The court clarified that when filing Anders briefs, defense counsels should address all aspects of a defendant’s conviction and sentence that are not unambiguously waived. The court deferred decision on the motions and ordered the defendant-appellant's counsel to file a supplemental brief addressing whether the non-imprisonment components of the sentence, which are not unambiguously covered by the appeal waiver, present any non-frivolous issues for appeal. View "United States v. Reyes-Arzate" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the life imprisonment sentence of Azibo Aquart, who was found guilty of multiple federal homicide and drug trafficking crimes. The court had previously affirmed his conviction but vacated his death sentence, remanding the case for a new penalty proceeding. On remand, the government decided not to pursue the death penalty, and Aquart was resentenced to life imprisonment. Aquart appealed, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to address new challenges to his conviction and in sentencing him for both drug-related murder and drug conspiracy, which he argued constituted double jeopardy. The Appeals Court rejected both arguments, ruling that the district court correctly applied the mandate rule and that Aquart's double jeopardy argument was without merit. View "United States v. Aquart" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed a plaintiff's 2019 complaint against art dealers for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and rescission in connection with his 2001 purchase of an allegedly forged painting. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as time-barred and ruled that the plaintiff's fraud claim could not be granted relief. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that he was on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud before bringing the suit. The appellate court agreed with the district court that claims for breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission were time-barred under New York law. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the fraud claims were time-barred and in denying the plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Meyer v. Seidel" on Justia Law

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In Carpenter v. Allen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined a case involving a dispute over the return of seized property following the completion of a criminal case. The plaintiff, Grist Mill Capital LLC ("GMC"), filed a motion for return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) against the government. The property in question consisted of financial documents seized by the Department of Labor during a criminal investigation and prosecution of Daniel E. Carpenter.The district court granted GMC's motion in part, ruling that the government failed to demonstrate a need to keep the seized materials given that Carpenter's criminal conviction had been affirmed and his petition for certiorari denied by the Supreme Court. The district court ordered the government to destroy the materials rather than return them to GMC, citing the presence of third parties' personal identifying information used by Carpenter in his fraudulent scheme.The government appealed the district court's order, arguing that it needed to retain the materials due to Carpenter's pending collateral attack on his criminal convictions. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order, finding that the government had demonstrated a legitimate need to retain the property to defend against Carpenter's pending Section 2255 motion and to preserve evidence for a potential retrial if the motion succeeded. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion and dismissed GMC's cross-appeal as moot. View "Carpenter v. Allen" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard an appeal from Robert J. Chaires, who was challenging the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his 120-month sentence handed down by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. Chaires, who pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully distributing cocaine base, contended that the district court erred in determining his two prior state-court narcotics convictions as predicate offenses for the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.The Court of Appeals agreed with Chaires and held that the district court indeed erred in its determination. The district court had based its decision on an intervening decision in United States v. Minter, which showed that Chaires's prior convictions were brought under a state provision that is categorically broader than the federal predicate definition in section 4B1.2(b). This meant that the convictions could not serve as section 4B1.1 predicate offenses, making the district court's enhancement of Chaires's Guidelines range erroneous.Following this decision, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. View "United States v. Chaires" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Anthony Christopher Mendonca was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for one count of possession of child pornography. He appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated due to the public being excluded from substantial portions of his jury selection due to restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. He also argued that his inculpatory statements were coerced by law enforcement’s suggestion that he had “failed” a polygraph exam. Both challenges were not properly preserved in the lower court and therefore the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a plain-error review, ultimately affirming the judgment of the district court. The court emphasized the unique challenges posed by the pandemic and the effort made by the lower court to conduct a fair trial under these constraints. The court also found no clear or obvious error in the lower court's decision to admit Mendonca's incriminatory statements. View "United States of America v. Mendonca" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Defendant of one count of financial institution bribery in violation of Section 215(a)(2) and one count of conspiracy to commit financial institution bribery. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of 366 days’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ supervised release, and imposed a $1.25 million fine. On appeal, Defendant raiseed four challenges. First, Defendant challenged (a) what constitutes “corrupt” conduct under Section 215(a); (b) what constitutes a “thing of value” under Section 215(a); and (c) how to determine the monetary value of a “thing of value” under Section 215(a), all elements of the crime. Second, Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence in the record to uphold his convictions. Third, Defendant argued that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous. Fourth, Defendant claimed that the district court failed to exclude prejudicial testimony that the prosecution allegedly procured through the improper use of a grand jury subpoena.   The Second Circuit affirmed and concluded that Defendant’s challenges are without merit. First the court explained that “corrupt” conduct describes actions motivated by an improper purpose, even if such actions (a) did not entail a breach of duty, and (b) were motivated in part by a neutral or proper purpose, as well as by an improper purpose. Second, that a “thing of value” may cover subjectively valuable intangibles, such as political assistance, including endorsements, guidance, and referrals. Third, that the “thing of value” may be measured by its value to the parties, by the value of what it is exchanged for, or by its market value. View "United States v. Calk" on Justia Law

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The False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. Sections 3729–32, provides that when a private person brings an action under the FCA on behalf of the federal government, the “complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.” Alleging violations of the FCA, Relator Clifford Weiner brought a complaint in district court, which the district court dismissed for untimely service of process. Relator argued that because the district court never expressly ordered him to serve Defendants in accordance with Section 3730, the clock for service of process never began to run, and dismissal for untimely service was improper.   The Second Circuit agreed with Relator and vacated. The court explained that Defendants have not identified an error of law or an erroneous factual finding embedded in the district court’s decision denying Rule 41(b) dismissal. Nor have they shown that the district court’s conclusion fell outside of the range of permissible decisions. Specifically, as the district court noted, Relator was not given express notice that his delays could result in dismissal, and the court had not devoted substantial resources to the action. View "United States ex rel. Weiner et al. v. Siemens AG et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner appealed from the denial of his successive Section 2255 motion challenging his conviction and accompanying sentence for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). In his motion, Petitioner argued that his  924(c) conviction was invalid in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The district court denied the motion because it determined that Petitioner’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on the valid predicate crime of murder. The district court further held that its Pinkerton instruction—which permits a jury to convict a defendant of a substantive offense committed by his co-conspirators—did not undermine the validity of the Section 924(c) predicate.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that intentional murder under New York law, even when the conviction is based on a Pinkerton theory of liability, qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of Section 924(c). Under a Pinkerton theory, the defendant is convicted of the substantive offense—not of conspiring to commit the offense—so he has committed a crime of violence if the substantive offense is a crime of violence. Because Pinkerton does not transform a substantive offense into a conspiracy offense, it does not implicate Davis. View "Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks a review of an April 20, 2022, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering her removal and denying her application for cancellation of removal after determining she had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). That conviction, for abuse of a corpse in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated (“ACA”) Section 5-60-101, stemmed from concealing her child’s body in a closet after he was murdered. In her petition for review, Petitioner argued that the BIA and IJ erred because her conviction under ACA Section 5-60-101 is not categorically a CIMT.   The Second Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s order of removal and remanded. The court explained that the language of ACA Section 5-60-101(a)(1) allows someone to be convicted if he or she knowingly “removes” or “disinters” a corpse, no matter the reason and without regard to whether it is done in a manner offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities. The court explained that the broad language makes it clear that one can be convicted under the statute for conduct that is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Thus, because ACA Section 5-60-101 criminalizes conduct that is not invariably vile or depraved, a conviction under the statute cannot categorically be considered a CIMT. The BIA did not conduct an elements-based categorical inquiry. Instead, it applied an inapposite “realistic probability” test. View "Giron-Molina v. Garland" on Justia Law