Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested for various federal crimes based on his participation in a global crime ring. Before his sentencing hearing, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the United States, closing down courts. Eventually, and with Defendant's and his attorney's consent, the district court sentenced defendant via video. On appeal, defendant claims that the district court's procedures under the CARES Act was insufficient to find he waived his right to an in-person sentencing.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's claims on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 43 generally compels the defendant’s physical presence in the courtroom and a defendant can waive this right under only very limited circumstances. However, the CARES Act permits a district court to hold a felony sentencing hearing by videoconference if all conditions are met. See United States v. Coffin, 23 F.4th 778 (7th Cir. 2022).Here, defendant orally consented to the hearing after being told by the court that his sentencing may be delayed if he insisted on an in-person hearing. The district court's decision that immediate video sentencing was in defendant's best interest was reasonable because defendant was asking for a time-served sentence, and an immediate sentence would allow him to more quickly appeal an adverse sentence. View "United States v. Leroux" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a total term of 28 months imprisonment for violations of multiple conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged his revocation on Specification Four, which alleged that, on May 12, 2019, Defendant committed the state crime of second-degree assault in violation of New York Penal Law Section 120.05(2) by striking his ex-girlfriend (“J.D.”) with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument—namely, a glass bottle.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant committed Specification Four by a preponderance of the evidence or by finding good cause to admit the out-of-court statement under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(c). In addition, the majority disagreed with the dissent’s conclusion that because the charged supervised release violations subjected Defendant to imprisonment for more than one year based on new conduct for which he was never federally indicted, the violation proceedings constitute a new prosecution that violated Defendant Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Finally, as to Specification Nine, the court agreed with the parties that the written judgment conflicted with the district court’s oral ruling that the alleged violation had been proven, and that the oral ruling controls. View "United States v. Peguero" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter for administering a fatal dose of prescription medication to her son. The courtroom was closed to spectators for fifteen minutes, during which the prosecutor addressed a website and an email detailing complaint by Petitioner that her trial was unfair. Petitioner moved to set aside her conviction on the ground that her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. The district court, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluded that the Appellate Division had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Petitioner’s writ and remanded with instructions to the district court to deny the petition. The court held that the ruling of the New York Appellate Division was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  The court reasoned that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") claims are "adjudicated on the merits" if the state court ruled on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural ground. Further, a writ cannot be granted "simply because . . . the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." The court concluded that based on the relevant Supreme Court decisions, there are at least reasonable arguments supporting the Appellate Division's ruling, which is enough to preclude habeas relief. View "Jordan v. Lamanna" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment entered in district court following a jury trial, convicting him of conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to consider his proffered evidence that the illegal trading activity lacked anticompetitive effects and had procompetitive benefits and by refusing to conduct a pre-trial assessment as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies. He further contended that the district court abused its discretion in precluding his competitive effects evidence from admission at trial and in conducting only a limited post-trial inquiry into juror misconduct.   The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, concluding that the district court was not required to make a threshold pre-trial determination as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies to the alleged misconduct in this case. The court reasoned that the grand jury indicted Defendant for a per se antitrust violation and the government was entitled to present its case to the jury. The district court properly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence of the alleged per se violation and the sufficiency decision upholding the verdict is not challenged on appeal. In addition, the district court acted within its broad discretion in strictly limiting the admission of Defendant’s competitive effects evidence at trial. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ending its post-trial investigation into alleged juror misconduct. View "United States v. Aiyer" on Justia Law

Defendants appeal from judgments of the district court convicting them of crimes arising from their participation in a street gang known as the Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta Disciples Folk Nation. All three were convicted of violating the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (Count One), of conspiring to violate RICO (Count Two), and of unlawful use of firearms “during and in 12 relation to a crime of violence . . . .” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) (Count 13 Three). In addition Defendant 1 was convicted of murder in aid of racketeering 14 (Count Four), Defendant 2 was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering (Count Six) as well as additional violations of Sec 924(c) 16 (Counts Seven and Ten), and both Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 were convicted of Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy (Counts Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Twelve).   While this appeal was pending, the Second Circuit Court concluded that RICO conspiracy could not be a crime of violence for purposes of Sec. 924(c). The court then vacated Defendant 3’s Count Three conviction, reasoning that the court could not be confident that the jury’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on a valid predicate. Further, the court reversed Defendant 2’s Count Ten conviction with prejudice, because Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy cannot be a crime of violence under Sec. 924(c). Finally, the court rejected Defendants’ other 26 challenges. View "United States v. Laurent" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and other offenses in New York state court. During jury selection, Petitioner’s lawyer exercised peremptory strikes against two male jurors, but the prosecutor raised a “reverse-Batson” challenge; which is a claim that the defendant (rather than the prosecution) was using strikes in a discriminatory manner. The state court disallowed the two strikes, and Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner petitioned unsuccessfully for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 in the United States District Court. On appeal, Petitioner renews his challenge to the state court’s reverse-Batson ruling.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that it need not determine whether the state court properly applied Batson or erred in disallowing the two peremptory strikes because those claims are not cognizable under Section 2254. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has held that a state defendant has no freestanding federal constitutional right to peremptory strikes, and so a state court’s mistaken disallowance of such a strike does not, standing alone, form a basis for federal habeas relief. Thus,  any procedural error by the state court in following the three-step Batson framework would not, without more, constitute a violation of a federal constitutional right. View "Murray v. Noeth" on Justia Law

The court addressed Defendants' appeal of the District Court’s Rule 33 Order. On appeal, the court addressed the district court’s ruling that the information withheld by the prosecution was neither “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady, nor prejudicial, and therefore denied Defendants’ motions. Defendants argue that the withheld information would have supplied impeachment evidence against the government’s witness.The Second Circuit rejected Defendant's claim, finding that there was significant additional evidence against both Defendants, such that simply impeaching the government's witness would not have sufficed to upset the trial verdict. Further, the court found that impeachment based on the withheld information would have been cumulative, and thus non-prejudicial. The court reasoned that “strictly speaking, there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.”The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ Rule 33 motions for a new trial. View "U.S. v. Hunter et al." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendants for various offenses for their role in a crime syndicate. The court sentenced each defendant to 198 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendants raised various arguments including challenges to the admissibility of certain trial testimony, the correctness of the jury charge, the sufficiency of the Government’s proof, and the lawfulness of their sentences.The court found that the district court did not clearly err in permitting a witness to identify one of the defendants at trial nor did it abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing. Further, the court declined to address the defendant’s double jeopardy claim. Moreover, the court affirmed the defendants’ RICO convictions and RICO conspiracy convictions. The court further affirmed defendants’ arson and conspiracy to commit arson convictions. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the defendants' sentences. In sum, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Gershman" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding Defendant Ayfer has not yet satisfied her restitution obligation to W.A-M. The court also concluded that district courts may employ the hybrid approach to craft restitution orders that both apportion liability among multiple defendants according to the loss caused by each defendant and hold defendants jointly and severally liable for some portion of the amounts owed to their victim or victims. The court explained that such hybrid restitution obligations are ordinarily not satisfied until either a defendant has paid as much as she has been ordered to pay or the victim has been made whole. The court finally concluded that Defendant Hakan lacks standing to challenge the district court's orders as to Ayfer's rights and obligations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order in appeal No. 20-2144-cr and dismissed the consolidated appeals in Nos. 20-1540-cr and 20-1542-cr for lack of standing. View "United States v. Yalincak" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit concluded that, under its precedents, there can be no doubt that a Notice to Appear that omits information regarding the time and date of the initial removal hearing is nevertheless adequate to vest jurisdiction in the Immigration Court, so long as a notice specifying this information is later sent to the alien. The court also concluded that using a false document in connection with petitioner's application for a U.S. passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a), requires that an offender make a material misrepresentation with the intent to impair the efficiency and lawful functioning of the government, and thus it is a crime involving moral turpitude that renders petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to terminate removal proceedings and his application for cancellation of removal. View "Cupete v. Garland" on Justia Law